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Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
 Psychological Review
, 1983
"... Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P(A&B), cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P(A) and.P(B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the exten ..."
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Cited by 352 (4 self)
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Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P(A&B), cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P(A) and.P(B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both betweensubjects and withinsubjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored. Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of the the last decade (see, e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, human condition. Many significant choices must be based on beliefs about the likelihood
Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Belief Functions
 International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
, 1990
"... The theory of belief functions provides one way to use mathematical probability in subjective judgment. It is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. When we use the Bayesian theory to quantify judgments about a question, we must assign probabilities to the possible answer ..."
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Cited by 91 (7 self)
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The theory of belief functions provides one way to use mathematical probability in subjective judgment. It is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. When we use the Bayesian theory to quantify judgments about a question, we must assign probabilities to the possible answers to that question. The theory of belief functions is more flexible; it allows us to derive degrees of belief for a question from probabilities for a related question. These degrees of belief may or may not have the mathematical properties of probabilities; how much they differ from probabilities will depend on how closely the two questions are related. Examples of what we would now call belieffunction reasoning can be found in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, well before Bayesian ideas were developed. In 1689, George Hooper gave rules for combining testimony that can be recognized as special cases of Dempster's rule for combining belief functions (Shafer 1986a). Similar rules were formulated by Jakob Bernoulli in his Ars Conjectandi, published posthumously in 1713, and by JohannHeinrich Lambert in his Neues Organon, published in 1764 (Shafer 1978). Examples of belieffunction reasoning can also be found in more recent work, by authors
Toward normative expert systems: Part I the pathfinder project
 Methods of Information in Medicine, 31:90– 105
, 1992
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Two views of belief: Belief as generalized probability and belief as evidence
, 1992
"... : Belief functions are mathematical objects defined to satisfy three axioms that look somewhat similar to the Kolmogorov axioms defining probability functions. We argue that there are (at least) two useful and quite different ways of understanding belief functions. The first is as a generalized prob ..."
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Cited by 82 (12 self)
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: Belief functions are mathematical objects defined to satisfy three axioms that look somewhat similar to the Kolmogorov axioms defining probability functions. We argue that there are (at least) two useful and quite different ways of understanding belief functions. The first is as a generalized probability function (which technically corresponds to the inner measure induced by a probability function). The second is as a way of representing evidence. Evidence, in turn, can be understood as a mapping from probability functions to probability functions. It makes sense to think of updating a belief if we think of it as a generalized probability. On the other hand, it makes sense to combine two beliefs (using, say, Dempster's rule of combination) only if we think of the belief functions as representing evidence. Many previous papers have pointed out problems with the belief function approach; the claim of this paper is that these problems can be explained as a consequence of confounding the...
Computational Methods for A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
, 1981
"... Many knowledgebased expert systems employ numerical schemes to represent evidence, rate competing hypotheses, and guide search through the domain’s problem space. This paper has two objectives: first, to introduce one such scheme, developed by Arthur Dempster and Glen Shafer, to a wider audience; ..."
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Cited by 81 (2 self)
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Many knowledgebased expert systems employ numerical schemes to represent evidence, rate competing hypotheses, and guide search through the domain’s problem space. This paper has two objectives: first, to introduce one such scheme, developed by Arthur Dempster and Glen Shafer, to a wider audience; second, to present results that can reduce the computationtime complexity from exponential to linear, allowing this scheme to be implemented in many more systems. In order to enjoy this reduction, some assumptions about the structure of the type of evidence represented and combined must be made. The assumption made here is that each piece of the evidence either confirms or denies a single proposition rather than a disjunction. For any domain in which the assumption is justified, the savings are available.
A UNIFYING FIELD IN LOGICS: NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC. NEUTROSOPHY, NEUTROSOPHIC SET, NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS (fourth edition)
, 2005
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Soft Computing: the Convergence of Emerging Reasoning Technologies
 Soft Computing
, 1997
"... The term Soft Computing (SC) represents the combination of emerging problemsolving technologies such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), Probabilistic Reasoning (PR), Neural Networks (NNs), and Genetic Algorithms (GAs). Each of these technologies provide us with complementary reasoning and searching methods to so ..."
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Cited by 64 (8 self)
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The term Soft Computing (SC) represents the combination of emerging problemsolving technologies such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), Probabilistic Reasoning (PR), Neural Networks (NNs), and Genetic Algorithms (GAs). Each of these technologies provide us with complementary reasoning and searching methods to solve complex, realworld problems. After a brief description of each of these technologies, we will analyze some of their most useful combinations, such as the use of FL to control GAs and NNs parameters; the application of GAs to evolve NNs (topologies or weights) or to tune FL controllers; and the implementation of FL controllers as NNs tuned by backpropagationtype algorithms.
A New Approach to Updating Beliefs
 Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
, 1991
"... : We define a new notion of conditional belief, which plays the same role for DempsterShafer belief functions as conditional probability does for probability functions. Our definition is different from the standard definition given by Dempster, and avoids many of the wellknown problems of that def ..."
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Cited by 58 (6 self)
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: We define a new notion of conditional belief, which plays the same role for DempsterShafer belief functions as conditional probability does for probability functions. Our definition is different from the standard definition given by Dempster, and avoids many of the wellknown problems of that definition. Just as the conditional probability P r(\DeltajB) is a probability function which is the result of conditioning on B being true, so too our conditional belief function Bel(\DeltajB) is a belief function which is the result of conditioning on B being true. We define the conditional belief as the lower envelope (that is, the inf) of a family of conditional probability functions, and provide a closedform expression for it. An alternate way of understanding our definition of conditional belief is provided by considering ideas from an earlier paper [FH91], where we connect belief functions with inner measures. In particular, we show here how to extend the definition of conditional pro...
A Review of Rough Set Models
, 1997
"... Since introduction of the theory of rough set in early eighties, considerable work has been done on the development and application of this new theory. The paper provides a review of the Pawlak rough set model and its extensions, with emphasis on the formulation, characterization, and interpretation ..."
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Cited by 55 (18 self)
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Since introduction of the theory of rough set in early eighties, considerable work has been done on the development and application of this new theory. The paper provides a review of the Pawlak rough set model and its extensions, with emphasis on the formulation, characterization, and interpretation of various rough set models. 1