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Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems
 Market Based Control of Distributed Systems. World Scientific
, 1996
"... With the advances in computer and networking technology, thousands of heterogeneous computers can be interconnected to provide a large collection of computing and communication resources. These systems are used by agrowing and increasingly heterogeneous set of users. ..."
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Cited by 105 (2 self)
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With the advances in computer and networking technology, thousands of heterogeneous computers can be interconnected to provide a large collection of computing and communication resources. These systems are used by agrowing and increasingly heterogeneous set of users.
Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
 GAMES ECON. BEHAV
, 1996
"... This paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure. Gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors. I show ..."
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Cited by 96 (2 self)
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This paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure. Gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors. I show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game. If stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games, a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games. Furthermore, symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players. A general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games.
The Application of Microeconomics to the Design of Resource Allocation and Control Algorithms
, 1989
"... In this thesis, we present a new methodology for resource sharing algorithms in distributed systems. We propose that a distributed computing system should be composed of a decentralized community of microeconomic agents. We show that this approach decreases complexity and can substantially improve ..."
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Cited by 21 (4 self)
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In this thesis, we present a new methodology for resource sharing algorithms in distributed systems. We propose that a distributed computing system should be composed of a decentralized community of microeconomic agents. We show that this approach decreases complexity and can substantially improve performance. We compare the performance, generality and complexity of our algorithms with noneconomic algorithms. To validate the usefulness of our approach, we present economies that solve three distinct resource management problems encountered in large, distributed systems. The first economy performs CPU load balancing and demonstrates how our approach limits complexity and effectively allocates resources when compared to noneconomic algorithms. We show that the economy achieves better performance than a representative noneconomic algorithm. The load balancing economy spa...
The algebraic versus the topological approach to additive representations
 Journal of Mathematical Psychology
, 1988
"... It is proved that, under a nontriviality assumption, an additive function on a Cartesian product of connected topological spaces is continuous, whenever the preference relation, represented by this function, is continuous. The result is used to generalize a theorem of Debreu ( ( 1960). Mathematical ..."
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Cited by 21 (4 self)
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It is proved that, under a nontriviality assumption, an additive function on a Cartesian product of connected topological spaces is continuous, whenever the preference relation, represented by this function, is continuous. The result is used to generalize a theorem of Debreu ( ( 1960). Mathematical methods in the social sciences (pp. 1626). Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press) on additive representations and to argue that the algebraic approach of KLST to additive conjoint measurement is preferable to the more customary topological approach. Applications to the representation of strength of preference relations and to the characterization of subjective expeeted utility maximization are given.!!? 1988 Academic Press, Inc. 1.
Fair Attribution of Functional Contribution in Artificial and Biological Networks
 Neural Computation
, 2003
"... One of the first challenges in understanding neural information processing is the identification of the functional roles of neural network elements. Aiming at this goal, lesion studies have been classically used in neuroscience, most of which have employed single lesions which are limited in their a ..."
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Cited by 19 (8 self)
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One of the first challenges in understanding neural information processing is the identification of the functional roles of neural network elements. Aiming at this goal, lesion studies have been classically used in neuroscience, most of which have employed single lesions which are limited in their ability to reveal the significance of interacting elements. The recently developed Functional Contribution Analysis (FCA) method has addressed the functional localization challenge by analyzing data composed of multiple lesioning experiments and corresponding functional performance levels, using an operative minimization approach. This paper presents the Multilesion Shapley value Ana/ysis (MSA), an axiomatic, scalable and rigorous method for deducing causal function localization from multiple lesioning data, overcoming several shortcomings of the FCA. The MSA, based on fundamental concepts from game theory, accurately quantifies the contributions of network elements and their interactions. While the original game theoretical definition and calculation of the Shapley value requires a data set of a potentially vast number of all multiple lesion experiments, we developed several MSA prediction and estimation variants which use only a relatively small set of experiments. The successful working of the MSA is demonstrated in a theoretical test case, in artificially evolved neurocontrollers and for the analysis of an example of biological, reversible deactivation data. MSA has a wide range of potential applications in neuroscience for the analysis of reversible deactivation experiments and transcranial magnetic stimulation "virtual lesions", and in biology in general, for the analysis of gene networks via "multiknockout" experiments.
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
, 2002
"... In a differential information economy with quasilinear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods ..."
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Cited by 16 (4 self)
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In a differential information economy with quasilinear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.
Social Welfare Functionals and Interpersonal Comparability
, 2001
"... This chapter reviews the SWFL approach to social choice. It does not attempt to be a complete and systematic survey of existing results,but to give a critical assesment of the main axioms and their role in filtering the ethically relevant information,in particular the measurability and comparability ..."
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Cited by 15 (0 self)
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This chapter reviews the SWFL approach to social choice. It does not attempt to be a complete and systematic survey of existing results,but to give a critical assesment of the main axioms and their role in filtering the ethically relevant information,in particular the measurability and comparability properties of individual evaluation functions. Social welfare functionals are defined formally together with closely related concepts. After adducing a good number of examples,we elaborate on the meaning of the SWFL domain of definition and we sketch some alternative approaches. Several types of axioms are considered; some of them are used to filter the relevant information while others express collective efficiency or equity requirements. Then,to illustrate the various tradeoffs among these axioms,selected characterisation results are presented; most of them are cast in what we call the formally welfarist framework. Finally, we have assembled some other characterisations which eschew either invariance properties or the formally welfarist framework. We discuss the treatment of two sets of social alternatives endowed with an enriched structure,viz. the set of classical exchange economies and the complete set of lotteries one can define on an abstract set of pure alternatives. As an introduction to the latter discussion,we elaborate on the difficulties raised by social evaluation when risks and uncertainty are taken explicitly into account.
Games with imperfect information
 In Games: Planning and Learning, 1993 AAAI Fall Symposium, 5967
, 1993
"... An information set in a game tree is a set of nodes from which the rules of the game require that the same alternative (i.e., move) be selected. Thus the nodes an information set are indistinguishable to the player moving from that set, thereby reflecting imperfect information, that is, information ..."
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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An information set in a game tree is a set of nodes from which the rules of the game require that the same alternative (i.e., move) be selected. Thus the nodes an information set are indistinguishable to the player moving from that set, thereby reflecting imperfect information, that is, information hidden from that player. Information sets arise naturally in (for example) card gaines like poker and bridge. IIere we focus not on the solution concept for imperfect information games (which has been studied at length), but rather on the computational aspects of such games: how hard is it to compute solutions? We present two fundainental results for imperfect information games. The first result shows that even if there is only a single player, we must seek special cases or heuristics. The second result complements the first, providing an efficient algorithm for just such a special case. Additionally, we show how our special case algorithm can be used as a heuristic in the general case. 1
Perfect Recall and Pruning in Games with Imperfect Information
 Computational Intelligence
, 1996
"... Games with imperfect information are an interesting and important class of games. They include most card games (e.g., bridge and poker), as well as many economic and political models. Here, we investigate algorithms for solving imperfect information games expressed in their extensive (gametree) for ..."
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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Games with imperfect information are an interesting and important class of games. They include most card games (e.g., bridge and poker), as well as many economic and political models. Here, we investigate algorithms for solving imperfect information games expressed in their extensive (gametree) form. In particular, we consider algorithms for the simplest form of solution  a purestrategy equilibrium point. We introduce to the artificial intelligence (AI) community a classic algorithm due to Wilson, that finds a purestrategy equilibrium point in oneplayer games with perfect recall. Wilson's algorithm, which we call IMPminimax, runs in time linear in the size of the gametree searched. In contrast to Wilson's result, Koller & Meggido have shown that finding a purestrategy equilibrium point in oneplayer games without perfect recall is NPhard. Here, we provide another contrast to Wilson's result  we show that in games with perfect recall, finding a purestrategy equilibrium p...