Automation is often problematic because people fail to rely upon it appropriately. Because people respond to technology socially, trust influences reliance on automation. In particular, trust guides reliance when complexity and unanticipated situations make a complete understanding of the automation impractical. This review considers trust from the organizational, sociological, interpersonal, psychological, and neurological perspectives. It considers how the context, automation characteristics, and cognitive processes affect the appropriateness of trust. The context in which the automation is used influences automation performance and provides a goal-oriented perspective to assess automation characteristics along a dimension of attributional abstraction. These characteristics can influence trust through analytic, analogical, and affective processes. The challenges of extrapolating the concept of trust in people to trust in automation are discussed. A conceptual model integrates research regarding trust in automation and describes the dynamics of trust, the role of context, and the influence of display characteristics. Actual or potential applications of this research include improved designs of systems that require people to manage imperfect automation.

By watching each other's lower oscillating leg, 2 seated Ss kept a common tempo and a particular phase relation of either 0 ° (symmetric mode) or 180 ° (alternate mode). This study investigated the differential stability of the 2 phase modes. In Experiment 1, in which Ss were instructed to remain in the initial phase mode, the alternate phase mode was found to be less stable as the frequency of oscillation increased. In addition, analysis of the nonsteady state cycles revealed evidence of a switching to the symmetric phase mode for the initial alternate phase mode trials. In Experiments 2 and 3, Ss were instructed to remain at a noninitial phase angle if it was found to be more comfortable. The transition observed between the 2 phase modes satisfies the criteria of a physical bifurcation—hysteresis, critical fluctuations, and divergence—and is consonant with previous findings on transitions in limb coordination within a person. The coordination of movements between people is an omnipresent aspect of daily life. Such coordinations consist of the very natural and commonplace coordinations exhibited by people walking and talking together and the very practiced and refined coordinations exhibited by people playing sports

How and why the presence of a person directly affects the perception and action of another person is a phenomenon that has been approached in a limited and piecemeal fashion within psychology. This kind of diffuse strategy has failed to capture the jointness of perception and action within and between people. In contradistinction, the authors offer a perspective that retains both integrally social features (e.g., involves interaction) and yet adequately exploits the current state of knowledge regarding the ecological properties of perception–action, while at the same time drawing on aspects of dynamic systems theory. In this article the authors review the best attempts to examine how one individual affects another’s perceptions and actions in the emergence of a social unit of action. Two important approaches, the individual-level and cognitive dynamics approaches, have yielded insights that derive in significant degree from principles of ecological psychology and/or dynamical systems theory. Prototypic of the individual-level approach is a focus on what can be perceived by coactors with the aim of uncovering how the dispositional qualities (affordances) of another person are informationally specified during social interaction. In contrast, the cognitive dynamics approach simulates dynamical characteristics of cognition and psychological influence with the aim of uncovering how cooperative interaction emerges out of its component parts. The authors argue that these approaches involve, respectively, insufficient mutuality and insufficient embodiment. Consequently, a social synergy perspective is discussed that approaches the problem of socially cooperative interaction at the relational, nonreductive level, using novel methods to examine how social perception and action emerge through self-organizing processes.

The field concept was introduced into physics in the 19th century. Soon afterward, some Gestaltists tried to use this approach to characterize the internal global brain process. Conversely, another Gestaltist, Lewin (1938), tried to develop a field description of the physical and social environment in which the brain field was immersed. Later, J. J. Gibson (Gibson & Crooks, 1938/1982) attempted to conceptualize the environment–organism interaction in field theoretic terms. First, he suggested that a dynamical field of safe travel may be used by drivers to control their automobiles in traffic while avoiding collisions. Later, Gibson and his colleagues (Gibson, 1950; Gibson, Olum, & Rosenblatt, 1955) showed, mathematically, how an optic flow field that actors may use in selecting approach paths for landing aircraft safely is available. Over the ensuing decades, the optic flow field description has provided a powerful and popular tool for addressing a number of diverse problems in visual perception as it pertains to the control of action. Although in a seminal article, Gibson (1958) outlined a general theory of visually controlled locomotion, a recently published special issue on this topic (in Ecological Psychology; W. H. Warren, 1998) revealed that in even simple tasks (e.g., steering), intentional and informational constraints are still not yet understood. This article critically reviews the history of field theoretical approaches to the problem of perceptual control of goal-directed behavior. In particular, our overview focuses

Skilled users of a long-cane are quite fluid in registering the layout of surfaces that surround them. What they need to know, of course, concerns properties with consequences for behavior—whether the ground is sufficiently flat and solid to be negotiated safely, whether discontinuities in that ground surface are gaps that can be stepped over or brinks that must be descended. At first blush, this skill may seem like a remarkable cognitive achievement, one in which the unsighted individual has managed to associate tactile impressions with some basic spatial elements, perhaps plugging them into modified variants of the inferential algorithms presumed to serve vision. Such a characterization, however, ignores the fundamental informativeness of the haptic perceptual system in its own right. The skillful use of a long-cane is possible because the properties registered through touch are lawful and reliable. Wielding the cane and using it to strike and probe surfaces deforms the tissues of the hand, arm, and body. Despite moment to moment, incidental variation in the impressions on the skin, we argue that there must be reliable structure in the deforming tissue that informs about not only the probed surfaces but about the probe itself. The commonality between perceiving probes and perceiving by means of probes—more generally, between perceiving objects and perceiving by means of objects—reinforces the anchoring of what

This paper addresses three emerging cognitive ergonomics issues associated with increasingly complex automation . First, cognitive ergonomics must THEOR. ISSUES IN ERGON. SCI., 2001, VOL. 2, NO. 3, 238250 Theoretica l Issues in Ergonomics Science ISSN 1463922X print/ISSN 1464536X online # 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI 10.1080 /1463922011010492 5 * e-mail: jdlee@engineering.uiowa.edu identify the particular cognitive demands associated with the emergent properties of multi-agent automation that may make it di # cult to understand . Secondly, to understand these cognitive demands, cognitive ergonomics must develop more comprehensive analysis and modelling techniques. Thirdly, cognitive ergonomics might benet by rethinking the constructs underlying the dynamic decision making associated with reliance on multi-agent automation . The objective of this paper is to outline considerations and initial directions associated with each of these emerging issues

Modem science has been built on a Cartesian or Newtonian (mechanical) world view giving rise to an artifactual view of mind and suggesting that particles (learners) are continuously working to destroy order (are recalcitrant), which can only be main-tained by an external artificer (the teacher). At the core of the Cartesian worldview is the absolute separation of mind and matter. Beginning with the separation of mind and body, Cartesianism is grounded in a set of dualisms that separate individual from environment and leads to the belief that knowledge refers to a self-sumcient immate-rial substance that can be understood independently from the individual, environ-Corres~ondence and reauests for reorints should be sent to Sasha A. Barab, School of Education, In-

Recent interest in consciousness and the mind-brain problem has been fueled by technological advances in brain imaging and computer modeling in artificial intelligence: Can machines be conscious? The machine metaphor originated in Cartesian "reflections" and culminated in 19th century reflexology modeled on Newtonian optics. It replaced the Aquinian view of mind, which was focused on the emergence of intentionality within the body, with control of output by input through brain dynamics. The state variables for neural activity were identified successively with animal spirits, lan vital, electricity, energy, information, and, most recently, Heisenbergian potentia. The source of dynamic structure in brains was conceived to lie outside brains in genetic and environmental determinism. An alternative view has grown in the 20th century from roots in American Pragmatists, particularly John Dewey, and European philosophers, particularly Heidegger and Piaget, by which brains are intrinsically unstable and continually create themselves. This view has new support from neurobiological studies in properties of self-organizing nonlinear dynamic systems. Intentional behavior can only be understood in relation to the chaotic patterns of neural activity that produce it. The machine metaphor remains, but the machine is seen as selfdetermining. 1.

This study investigated the role that visual tracking plays in coupling rhythmic limb movements to an environmental rhythm. Two experiments were conducted in which participants swung a hand-held pendulum while tracking an oscillating stimulus or while keeping their eyes fixed on a stationary location directly above an oscillating stimulus. It was expected that the participants ’ rhythmic movements would become entrained to the oscillating stimulus in both conditions but that visual tracking would strengthen this entrainment. Experiment 1 investigated the role of visual tracking in establishing unintentional entrainment. Experiment 2 investigated the role of visual tracking in intentional entrainment. As predicted, participants exhibited greater unintentional coordination and more stable intentional coordination when they tracked the stimulus. These findings highlight the importance of understanding the role of eye movements in environmental coordination.

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