In this paper we focus on how instructions for actions can be modelled in a selforganising memory. Our approach draws from the concepts of regional distributed modularity and self-organisation. We describe a self-organising model that clusters action representations into different locations dependent on the body part they are related to. In the first case study we consider semantic representations of action verb meaning and then extend this concept significantly in a second case study by using actual sensor readings from our MIRA robot. Furthermore, we outline a modular model for a selforganising robot action control system using language for instruction. Our approach for robot control using language incorporates some evidence related to the architectural and processing characteristics of the brain (Wermter et al. 2001b). This paper focuses on the neurocognitive clustering of actions and regional modularity for language areas in the brain. In particular, we describe a self-organising network that realises action clustering (Pulvermüller 2003). 1.

Neuropsychological studies have demonstrated that the production of nouns and verbs can be dissociated in aphasia. These reports have been taken as evidence for separate representations of nouns and verbs in the human brain. We used whole-head magnetoencephalography to record cortical dynamics of action and object naming in 10 healthy adults and in 1 anomic patient with superior naming of verbs compared with nouns due to a left posterior parietal lesion. A single set of 100 line drawings was used for both action and object naming. In normal subjects, the activation sequences in action and object naming were essentially identical, advancing from the occipital to posterior temporoparietal and further to the left frontal cortex, without consistent involvement of the classical left inferior frontal (Broca) and temporal (Wernicke) language areas. In the anomic patient, pronounced differences between action and object naming emerged in the left hemisphere. The activation sequence was disrupted at the level of the damaged parietal cortex and did not reach the left frontal cortex even in the relatively easier action naming. The more severely impaired object naming was associated with exceptionally strong and early activation of the left inferior frontal cortex (Broca) and subsequent pronounced activation of the left middle temporal cortex, silent in action naming. Verb and noun retrieval thus utilized a spatiotemporally similar neuronal network in healthy individuals. A clear dissociation in cortical correlates of verb and noun retrieval only became evident in our anomic patient, in whom damage to the language network has resulted in disproportionately worse performance in object than action naming.

The idea that concepts are embodied by our motor and sensory systems is popular in current theorizing about cognition. Embodied cognition accounts come in di¤erent versions and are often contrasted with a purely symbolic amodal view of cognition. Simulation, or the hypothesis that concepts simulate the sensory and motor experience of real world encounters with instances of those concepts, has been prominent in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Here, with a focus on spatial thought and language, I review some of the evidence cited in support of simulation versions of embodied cognition accounts. While these data are extremely interesting and many of the experiments are elegant, knowing how to best interpret the results is often far from clear. I point out that a quick acceptance of embodied accounts runs the danger of ignoring alternate hypotheses and not scrutinizing neuroscience data critically. I also review recent work from my lab that raises questions about the nature of sensory motor grounding in spatial