History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiencyenhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.

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We conduct a carefully designed random-assignment experiment to investigate whether negative affect impacts overconfidence. Our result indicates that, compared to neutralaffect, fear and sadness significantly increase overconfidence. All decisions were incentivized, and the result is robust to various specification checks. Further, our result has implications for the role of emotions in economic decision making, in general. Finally, we reconfirm the ubiquity of overconfidence and start to explore its determinants

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