Leading accounts of judgment under uncertainty evaluate performance within purely statistical frameworks, holding people to the standards of classical Bayesian (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) or frequentist (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) norms. We argue that these frameworks have limited ability to explain the success and flexibility of people's real-world judgments, and propose an alternative normative framework based on Bayesian inferences over causal models. Deviations from traditional norms of judgment, such as "base-rate neglect", may then be explained in terms of a mismatch between the statistics given to people and the causal models they intuitively construct to support probabilistic reasoning. Four experiments show that when a clear mapping can be established from given statistics to the parameters of an intuitive causal model, people are more likely to use the statistics appropriately, and that when the classical and causal Bayesian norms differ in their prescriptions, people's judgments are more consistent with causal Bayesian norms.

In the real world causal variables do not come pre-identified or occur in isolation, but instead are imbedded within a continuous temporal stream of events. A challenge faced by both human learners and machine learning algorithms is identifying subsequences that correspond to the appropriate variables for causal inference. A specific instance of this problem is action segmentation: dividing a sequence of observed behavior into meaningful actions, and determining which of those actions lead to effects in the world. Here we present two experiments investigating human action segmentation and causal inference, as well as a Bayesian analysis of how statistical and causal cues to segmentation should optimally be combined. We find that both adults and our model are sensitive to statistical regularities and causal structure in continuous action, and are able to combine these sources of information in order to correctly infer both causal relationships and segmentation boundaries.

People learn quickly when reasoning about causal relationships, making inferences from limited data and avoiding spurious inferences. Efficient learning depends on abstract knowledge, which is often domain or context specific, and much of it must be learned. While such knowledge effects are well documented, little is known about exactly how we acquire knowledge that constrains learning. This work focuses on knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships; there are many kinds of relationships that can apply between causes and their effects, and knowledge of the form such a relationship takes is important in order to quickly identify the real causes of an observed effect. We developed a hierarchical Bayesian model of the acquisition of knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships and tested it in five experimental studies, considering disjunctive and conjunctive relationships, failure rates, and cross-domain effects. The Bayesian model accurately predicted human judgments and outperformed several alternative models.

We present a computational Bayesian approach for Wiener diffusion models, which are prominent accounts of response time distributions in decision-making. We first develop a general closed-form analytic approximation to the response time distributions for one-dimensional diffusion processes, and derive the required Wiener diffusion as a special case. We use this result to undertake Bayesian modeling of benchmark data, using posterior sampling to draw inferences about the interesting psychological parameters. With the aid of the benchmark data, we show the Bayesian account has several advantages, including dealing naturally with the parameter variation needed to account for some key features of the data, and providing quantitative measures to guide decisions about model construction. 1

Abstract. Imitation-based learning is a general mechanism for rapid acquisition of new behaviors in autonomous agents and robots. In this paper, we propose a new approach to learning by imitation based on parameter learning in probabilistic graphical models. Graphical models are used not only to model an agent’s own dynamics but also the dynamics of an observed teacher. Parameter tying between the agent-teacher models ensures consistency and facilitates learning. Given only observations of the teacher’s states, we use the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to learn both dynamics and policies within graphical models. We present results demonstrating that EM-based imitation learning outperforms pure exploration-based learning on a benchmark problem (the FlagWorld domain). We additionally show that the graphical model representation can be leveraged to incorporate domain knowledge (e.g., state space factoring) to achieve significant speed-up in learning. 1

We address the problem of learning grounded causal models: systems of concepts that are connected by causal relations and explicitly grounded in perception. We present a Bayesian framework for learning these models—both a causal Bayesian network structure over variables and the consequential region of each variable in perceptual space—from dynamic perceptual evidence. Using a novel experimental paradigm we show that humans are able to learn grounded causal models, and that the Bayesian model accounts well for human performance.

Rational models of cognition aim to explain the structure of human thought and behavior as an optimal solution to the computational problems that are posed by our environment

Chater, 1998). The explanations provided by rational analysis have two properties: they emphasize the connection between behavior and the structure of the environment, and

According to the transitive dynamics model, people can construct causal structures by linking together configurations of force. The predictions of the model were tested in two experiments in which participants generated new causal relationships by chaining together two (Experiment 1) or three (Experiment 2) causal relations. The predictions of the transitive dynamics model were compared against those of Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird’s model theory (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). The transitive dynamics model consistently predicted the overall causal relationship drawn by participants for both types of causal chains, and, when compared to the model theory, provided a better fit to the data. The results suggest that certain kinds of causal reasoning may depend on force dynamic—rather than on purely logical or statistical—representations.

Word segmentation is one of the first problems infants must solve during language acquisition, where words must be identified in fluent speech. A number of weak cues to word boundaries are present in fluent speech, and there is evidence that infants are able to use many of these, including phonotactics