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MerkleDamg˚ard Revisited: How to Construct a Hash Function
 Advances in Cryptology, Crypto 2005
"... The most common way of constructing a hash function (e.g., SHA1) is to iterate a compression function on the input message. The compression function is usually designed from scratch or made out of a blockcipher. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion for hashfunctions, stronger than col ..."
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Cited by 76 (8 self)
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The most common way of constructing a hash function (e.g., SHA1) is to iterate a compression function on the input message. The compression function is usually designed from scratch or made out of a blockcipher. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion for hashfunctions, stronger than collisionresistance. Under this notion, the arbitrary length hash function H must behave as a random oracle when the fixedlength building block is viewed as a random oracle or an ideal blockcipher. The key property is that if a particular construction meets this definition, then any cryptosystem proven secure assuming H is a random oracle remains secure if one plugs in this construction (still assuming that the underlying fixedlength primitive is ideal). In this paper, we show that the current design principle behind hash functions such as SHA1 and MD5 — the (strengthened) MerkleDamg˚ard transformation — does not satisfy this security notion. We provide several constructions that provably satisfy this notion; those new constructions introduce minimal changes to the plain MerkleDamg˚ard construction and are easily implementable in practice.
New Integrated proof method on Iterated Hash Structure and New Structures
, 2006
"... A secure hash structure in Random Oracle Model may not be a secure model in true design. In this paper, we give an integrated proof method on security proof of iterated hash structure. Based on the proof method, we can distinguish the security of MerkelDamagård structure, widepipe hash, doublepi ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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A secure hash structure in Random Oracle Model may not be a secure model in true design. In this paper, we give an integrated proof method on security proof of iterated hash structure. Based on the proof method, we can distinguish the security of MerkelDamagård structure, widepipe hash, doublepipe hash and 3c hash and know the requirement of true design on compression function, and give a new recommend structure. At last, we give new hash structure, MAC structure, encryption model, which use same block cipher round function and key schedule algorithm, the security proofs on those structures are given.
Prashant PuniyaThe Random Oracle Methodology
"... ♦ “Paradigm for designing secure and efficient protocols ” (BR’93). ♦ Assume existence of a publicly accessible ideal random function and prove protocol security. ♦ Replace ideal random function by an actual “secure hash function ” (such as SHA1) to deploy protocol. ♦ Hope that nothing breaks down! ..."
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♦ “Paradigm for designing secure and efficient protocols ” (BR’93). ♦ Assume existence of a publicly accessible ideal random function and prove protocol security. ♦ Replace ideal random function by an actual “secure hash function ” (such as SHA1) to deploy protocol. ♦ Hope that nothing breaks down! Is SHA1 Really Random? ♦ Is SHA1 obscure enough to successfully replace a random oracle? ♦ No. Practical hash functions usually iteratively apply a fixed length compression function to the input (called the Merkle Damgard construction). f f f