Results 1 
4 of
4
Towards a Model of Language Understanding
 2 nd RomanianHungarian Joint Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence SACI 2005
"... Abstract: The paper is an attempt to outline a hierarchical model of language apprehension based on an extension of Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH). Several arguments are presented which show that language being incomplete has limitations in representing both the reality and the mental states. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract: The paper is an attempt to outline a hierarchical model of language apprehension based on an extension of Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH). Several arguments are presented which show that language being incomplete has limitations in representing both the reality and the mental states. Therefore, postulating LOTH similar with a conventional language is fallacious. Nonetheless, if language is related with thought, language properties would have to have a causal root in the functioning of the mind. This controversial issue is discussed in relation with the possibility of using Zipf’s law for identifying a deeper causal law at the level of cognition. Zipf’s law may be related with language redundancy necessary for the language understanding process. This process can be modeled based on information compression performed by a selforganizing neuralcomputation structure at two levels. At the first level, a feature extraction is done in a parsing process of a natural conventional language, and the result is a linguistic map which acts as input for the second level of compression. There, a purely semantic map is formed which is independent of any conventional language, accounting in this way the universality of thinking and reasoning process. Keywords: Cognitive modeling, language of thought, Zipf’s law, statistical linguistics. 1
Bridging the Gap between Cognition and Developmental Neuroscience: The Example of Number Representation
, 2001
"... Developmental cognitive neuroscience necessar ily begins with a characterization of the developing mind. One cannot discover the neural underpinnings of cognition with out detailed understanding of the representational Capacities that underlie thought. Characterizing the developing mind nvolv ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Developmental cognitive neuroscience necessar ily begins with a characterization of the developing mind. One cannot discover the neural underpinnings of cognition with out detailed understanding of the representational Capacities that underlie thought. Characterizing the developing mind nvolves specifying the evolutionarily given building blocks from which human conceptual abilities are constructed. de scribing what develops, and discovering the computational mechanisms that underlie the process of change. Here, 1 pres ent the current state of the art with respect to one example of conceptual understanding: the representation of number.
© 1993 The MIT Press.
"... is provided in screenviewable form for personal use only by members ..."
In Defense of the Ideal 2nd DRAFT
"... This paper lies at the edge of the topic of the workshop. We can write down a Π1 1 axiom whose models are precisely the ∈structures 〈Rα, ∈ ∩R2 α〉 where α> 0 and Rα is the collection of all (pure) sets of rank < α. From this, one can consider the introduction of new axioms concerning the size of α. ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
This paper lies at the edge of the topic of the workshop. We can write down a Π1 1 axiom whose models are precisely the ∈structures 〈Rα, ∈ ∩R2 α〉 where α> 0 and Rα is the collection of all (pure) sets of rank < α. From this, one can consider the introduction of new axioms concerning the size of α. The question of the grounds for doing so is perhaps the central question of the workshop. But I want to discuss another question which, as I said, arises at the periphery: How do we know that there are structures 〈Rα, ∈ ∩R2 α〉? How do we know that there exist such things as sets and how do we know that, given such things, the axioms we write down are true of them? These seem very primitive questions, but the skepticism implicit in them has deep (and ancient) roots. In particular, they are questions about ideal objects in general, and not just about the actual infinite. I want to explain why I think the questions (as intended) are empty and the skepticism unfounded. 1 I will be expanding the argument of the first part of my paper “Proof and truth: the Platonism of mathematics”[1986a]. 2 The argument in question