The theory-based model of categorization posits that concepts are represented as theories rather than as feature lists. Thus, it is particularly interesting that the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), establishes a set of atheoretical guidelines for diagnosis in the domain of mental disorders. Five experiments investigated how clinicians handle an atheoretical nosology. Clinical psychologists' causal theories for DSM-IV disorders and their responses on diagnostic and memory tasks were measured. Participants were more likely to diagnose a hypothetical patient with a disorder if that patient had causally central rather than causally peripheral symptoms according to their theory of the disorder. They also showed biased memory for the causally central symptoms. Clinicians are cognitively driven to form and apply theories despite decades of training and practice with the DSM's atheoretical guidelines. Clinical Psychologists' Theory-Based Representations of Mental Disorders Predict their Diagnostic Reasoning and Memory The theory-based view of categorization proposes that concepts are represented as theories or causal explanations. Murphy and Medin (1985) suggested that our nave theories about the world hold the features of a concept together in a cohesive package. For instance, a layperson's concept of anorexia not only contains the features "fear of becoming fat" and "refuses to maintain minimal body weight," but also the notion that the fear of becoming fat helps cause the refusal to maintain minimal body weight (Kim & Ahn, 2002). Indeed, a growing body of evidence supports the notion that the human mind constantly seeks out rules and explanations that make sense of incoming data concerning its surroundings, and forms concepts based on its theories about the ...

Introduction This chapter presents a computational model of introspective multistrategy learning, which is a deliberative or strategic learning process in which a reasoner introspects about its own performance to decide what to learn and how to learn it. The reasoner introspects about its own performance on a reasoning task, assigns credit or blame for its performance, identifies what it needs to learn to improve its performance, formulates learning goals to acquire the required knowledge, and pursues its learning goals using multiple learning strategies. Our theory models the following characteristics of goal-driven learning: (i) that learning is active, and strategic, goal-driven processes underlie much of the learning that occurs during the performance of analytical tasks in complex, real-world domains; (ii) that learning is experiential and occurs incrementally through the performance of a reasoning task; (iii) that learning is<F35.52

In this paper I will present and defend an analysis of (a sample of) the English modal auxiliary verbs using a relevance-theoretic semantic and pragmatic framework. I will start by discussing previous analyses of modality in English with an eye to explaining how a cluster of related meanings- epistemic, root, and other- is expressed by the same set of lexical items. I will then go on to develop a unitary semantic approach to the English toodais, treating them as (mostly) incomplete propositional operators. After defending the details of my semantic account, I will show how the proposed semantics can give rise to the range of root interpretations modal verbs can receive in context. Epistemic interpretations require some further theoretical machinery, which will make crucial use of the notion of metarepresentation. Finally, I will sketch the differences between natural-language interpretations of modal operators and their alethic/logical uses.

Abstract not found

This thesis is about common-sense psychology and its role in cognitive science. Put simply, the argument is that common-sense psychology is important because it offers clues to some complex problems in cognitive science, and because common-sense psychology has significant effects on our intuitions, both in science and on an everyday level. The thesis develops a theory of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology. Anthropomorphism, the natural human tendency to ascribe human characteristics (and especially human mental characteristics) to things that aren't human, is an important theme in the thesis. Anthropomorphism reveals an endemic anthropocentricity that deeply influences our thinking about other minds. The thesis then constructs a descriptive model of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology, and uses it to analyse two studies of the ascription of mental states. The first, BaronCohen et al.'s (1985) false belief test, shows how cognitive modelling can be used to compare dif...

Theory grounding is suggested as a way to address the unresolved cognitive science issues of systematicity and productivity. Theory grounding involves grounding the theory skills and knowledge of an embodied artificially intelligent (AI) system by developing theory skills and knowledge from the bottom up. It is proposed that theory grounded AI systems should be patterned after the psychological developmental stages that infants and young children go through in acquiring naïve theories. Systematicity and productivity are properties of certain representational systems indicating the range of representations the systems can form. Systematicity and productivity are likely outcomes of theory grounded AI systems because systematicity and productivity are theoretical concepts. Theory grounded systems should be well oriented to acquire and develop these theoretical concepts.

The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis suggests that all theorists accept the idea that cognitive processing involves internal information-carrying states that mediate cognitive processing. These mediating states are a superordinate category of representations. We discuss five properties that can be added to mediating states and examine their importance in various cognitive models. Finally, three methodological lessons are drawn from our analysis and discussion.

When Tom Givón asked me a while ago what my chapter would be about, I said, “Roughly, about the relation between language and theory of mind. ” His laconic response was, “Well, they are inseparable. ” So, I thought, there goes my chapter. But not really. There is reason to believe that language and theory of mind have coevolved, given their close relation in development and their tight connection in social behavior. However, they are clearly not inseparable—physiologically, cognitively, or functionally. So the question becomes, “What is the exact relation between language and theory of mind, in evolution, development, and social behavior? ” To answer this question is a daunting task; I will try merely to clear a path toward an answer. I will consider several possible relations between the two faculties, bring conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to bear on them, and end up arguing for an escalation process in which language and theory of mind have fueled each other’s evolution. Language Some Stipulations About Language and Theory of Mind What constitutes genuine language? Modern language is typically described on several

Predicting how people will behave in the future is a critical social-cognitive task. In four studies (N 5 150, ages preschool to adult), young children (ages 4 – 5) used category information to guide their expectations about individual consistency. They predicted that psychological properties (preferences and fears) would remain consistent over time after hearing one example in which properties followed a category-linked distribution (e.g., children of different genders had different properties) but not when properties varied within a category (e.g., children of the same gender had different properties). The developmental course of these findings is examined. Results suggest the importance of considering how children’s emerging theories of behavior and of social groups operate together to inform their expectations about the social world. To an adult, hearing a child say that she ‘‘likes Winnie the Pooh’ ’ provides valuable information. For example, the adult may use this information to select birthday presents for this child or to choose books to offer to read to her. These inferences are possible because adults interpret the child’s statement as stemming from a stable disposition toward Winnie

The purpose of this article is to develop a preliminary comprehensive model of antisocial development based on dynamic systems principles. The model is built on the foundations of behavioral research on coercion theory. First, the authors focus on the principles of multistability, feedback, and nonlinear causality to reconceptualize real-time parent–child and peer processes. Second, they model the mechanisms by which these real-time processes give rise to negative developmental outcomes, which in turn feed back to determine real-time interactions. Third, they examine mechanisms of change and stability in early- and late-onset antisocial trajectories. Finally, novel clinical designs and predictions are introduced. The authors highlight new predictions and present studies that have tested aspects of the model. An enormous amount of high-quality research has focused on understanding the development of antisocial behavior. The study of aggressive and antisocial development encompasses a large variety of broad theoretical perspectives (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, social) and diverse disciplines (e.g., psychology, sociology, epidemiology). The mechanisms that are studied in relation to the