The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Testfpassing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.

Abstract not found

In this paper I place Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conception of mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view in a nutshell: Computationalism will yield Total Turing Test-passing zombies (in the philosopher's sense of `zombie'), but replicating persons will be unreachable for two reasons. One, persons process information at a "super"-Turing level; two, people enjoy certain properties (e.g., intentionality) beyond the reach of any mere information-processing object. Accordingly, computationalism ought to be supplanted with the engineering of "sub-person" artifacts and the irreducibly philosophical investigation of personhood. I end with nascent appraisal of Fetzer's interesting semiotic/connectionist replacement for computationalism. I'm grateful to Michael Costa for inviting Jim Fetzer to organize a symposium on whether minds are computational systems for the annual meeting of the Sout...