Three experiments addressed the relative importance of original function and current function in artifact categorization. Subjects were asked to judge whether an artifact that was made for one purpose (e.g. making tea) and was currently being used for another purpose (e.g. watering flowers) was a teapot or a watering can. Experiment 1 replicated the finding by Hall (1995) (unpublished manuscript) that adults rely on the original function of an artifact over a current function in their kind judgments. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that whereas the kind judgments of 6-year-olds, like those of adults, patterned with the original function, those of 4-year-olds did not. Four-year-olds were influenced by the order in which the functions were mentioned in the story. Further, in their justifications 6-year-olds and adults referred to the origin of the objects, whereas 4-year-olds virtually never did. We conclude that 6-year-olds have begun to organize their understanding of artifacts around the notion of original function, and that 4-year-olds have not. The data are discussed as they bear on children's understanding of the design stance (Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge,

In this paper I will present and defend an analysis of (a sample of) the English modal auxiliary verbs using a relevance-theoretic semantic and pragmatic framework. I will start by discussing previous analyses of modality in English with an eye to explaining how a cluster of related meanings- epistemic, root, and other- is expressed by the same set of lexical items. I will then go on to develop a unitary semantic approach to the English toodais, treating them as (mostly) incomplete propositional operators. After defending the details of my semantic account, I will show how the proposed semantics can give rise to the range of root interpretations modal verbs can receive in context. Epistemic interpretations require some further theoretical machinery, which will make crucial use of the notion of metarepresentation. Finally, I will sketch the differences between natural-language interpretations of modal operators and their alethic/logical uses.

One of the fundamental social skills for humans is a theory of other minds. This set of skills allows us to attribute beliefs, goals, and desires to other individuals. To take part in normal human social dynamics, a robot must not only know about the properties of objects, but also the properties of animate agents in the world. This paper presents the theories of Leslie (1994) and Baron-Cohen (1995) on the development of theory of mind in human children and discusses the potential application of both of these theories to building robots with similar capabilities. Initial implementation details and basic skills (such as finding faces and eyes and distinguishing animate from inanimate stimuli) are introduced. We further speculate on the usefulness of a robotic implementation in evaluating and comparing these two models.

Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that

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difficulties in schizophrenia

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Children learn causal relationships quickly, and make farreaching causal inferences on the basis of what they see. In knowledge to bear on their problems. This paper addresses children’s ability to acquire that knowledge. We present evidence that children can learn about the abstract properties of causal relationships using only a handful of events, and – consistent with a hierarchical Bayesian model of casual inference – children can be more sensitive to evidence than adults.

The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20 th century, however, this idea came under serious

to the special issue Our behavior is commonly much more driven by our intentions and goals than by particular stimuli or situations. That is, we are used to experiencing and interpreting goal-directed actions of others, and carrying out goal-directed actions by ourselves. This special