We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions

ABayesian network is a probabilistic representation for uncertain relationships, which has proven to be useful for modeling real-world problems. When there are many potential causes of a given e ect, however, both probability assessment and inference using a Bayesian network can be di cult. In this paper, we describe causal independence, a collection of conditional independence assertions and functional relationships that are often appropriate to apply to the representation of the uncertain interactions between causes and e ect. We show how the use of causal independence in a Bayesian network can greatly simplify probability assessment aswell as probabilistic inference. 1

It is suggested that taking into account considerations that traditionally fall within the scope of computer science in general. and artificial intelligence in particular, sheds new light on the subject of causation. It is orgued that adopting causal nations can be viewed as filling a computational need: They allow reasoning with incomplete information, facilitate economical representations, and afford relatively efficient methods for reasoning about those representations. Specif-ically, it is proposed that causal reasoning is intimately bound to nonmonotonic reasoning. An account of causation is offered that relies upon this connection, and compares this proposal to previous accounts within philosophy and artificial intelligence. 1.

Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the classes of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the mind. I develop an account of implementation, linked to an appropriate class of automata, such that the requirement that a system implement a given automaton places a very strong constraint on the system. This clears the way for computation to play a central role in the analysis of mind. 1 Introduction The theory of computation is often thought to underwrite the theory of mind. In cognitive science, it is widely believed that intelligent behavior is enabled by the fact that the mind or the b...

The dynamics model, which is based on L. Talmy’s (1988) theory of force dynamics, characterizes causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related concepts and explains the induction of causal relationships from single observations. Support for the model is provided in experiments in which participants categorized 3-D animations of realistically rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. Experiments 1–3 showed that causal judgments are based on several forces, not just one. Experiment 4 demonstrated that people compute the resultant of forces using a qualitative decision rule. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that a dynamics approach extends to the representation of social causation. Implications for the relationship between causation and time are discussed.

A stratified view of causal reasoning is set forth; one in which the identification of counterfactual dependencies plays an important role in determining what sort of causal connection, if any, exists between two events named by a given pair of partial descriptions. A semantics for temporal counterfactuals in which events are represented at the object level is then formalized based on a syntactic form of belief updating. Counterfactuals are evaluated relative to an agent's information state, taken to include a set of initial beliefs together with additional assumptions to handle the frame problem. Inertial inferences emerge as a side-effect of requiring minimal information change between states of the world in some chronicle. A chronicle is, in addition, assumed minimal with respect to an explanatory preference that minimizes the set of beliefs that are not part of an agent's initial set of beliefs or are not supported by some body of law-like knowledge. A number of epistemic preferenc...

. This paper presents a semantics of goals that deals with the problem of closeness under believed implications. The paper develops the semantics of wishes, its relation to beliefs, and define goals in relation to wishes. Also, the semantics of a priority or importance relation among propositions (and goals) is developed. Finally the paper advances in extending this semantics to the multi-agent case. 1 Introduction Goals are an important aspect of an agent's mental state. The "standard" semantics for goals (for example [2, 13]) is based on an extension of the possible world semantic of knowledge: besides an accessibility relation among the possible worlds that defines the knowledge of an agent, one would also define a desirability relation that is the base of the definition of goals. Like the accessibility relation, the desirability relation has some constraints that define further properties of the goal operator. One of the main problems with that approach is that the goal operator...

This paper addresses the phenomenon of event composition: the derivation of a single event description expressed in one clause from two lexical heads which could have been used in the description of independent events, each expressed in a distinct clause. In English, this phenomenon is well attested with respect to sentences whose verb is found in combination with an XP describing a result not strictly lexically entailed by this verb, as in (1). (1) The joggers ran the pavement thin. This sentence makes reference to a complex event encompassing an event of running and an event of becoming thin. The lexical heads run and thin appear in a single clause, with the AP appearing as closely bound to the verb in the syntax as subcategorized complements (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995; Tenny 1994; Roberts 1988), justifying the assumption that a single event is made reference to by this sentence. We consider (1) to be an instance of event composition since its verb, run, on its own does not entail a particular result state, and certainly not a result state that does not involve the runner. Furthermore, the components of the event described in this example could have been expressed in separate clauses, as in

We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms, or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue

This thesis examines the relation between aspect, argument structure, and case. The approach developed in this thesis assumes that Dowty-style aspectual operators are zero affixes of the type discussed in Pesetsky 1995, that can head syntactic projections, and enter into semantic composition in the manner determined by the compositional semantics. The analysis of argument projection explored in this thesis follows Hoekstra and Mulder 1990 and Borer 1994 who proposed that arguments are not specified in the lexicon as being external or internal, and there are no linking conventions concerning projection of arguments. The present analysis develops this approach by using tools of compositional semantics to filter out impossible tree-verb combinations. This analysis is supported in this thesis by the relation between the syntactic position of the argument and semantic interpretation; the existence of verbs of variable behavior with respect to argument projection; the obligatoriness of internal arguments of telic verbs; and typology of the resultative constructions. This thesis further develops an Optimality-Theoretic approach to case, which assumes that distribution of cases is governed by the violable principles that require verbal heads to check their nominal features. This approach, combined with the analysis of argument structure assumed