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Logical models of argument formalize commonsense reasoning while taking process and computation seriously. This survey discusses the main ideas which characterize different logical models of argument. It presents the formal features of a few main approaches to the modeling of argumentation. We trace the

The work reported here introduces Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP), a formalism that combines results of Logic Programming and Defeasible Argumentation. DeLP provides the possibility of representing information in the form of weak rules in a declarative manner, and a defeasible argumentation inference mechanism for warranting the entailed conclusions. In DeLP an argumentation formalism will be used for deciding between contradictory goals. Queries will be supported by arguments that could be defeated by other arguments. A query q will succeed when there is an argument A for q that is warranted, i. e. the argument A that supports q is found undefeated by a warrant procedure that implements a dialectical analysis. The defeasible argumentation basis of DeLP allows to build applications that deal with incomplete and contradictory information in dynamic domains. Thus, the resulting approach is suitable for representing agent’s knowledge and for providing an argumentation based reasoning mechanism to agents.

This paper relates the Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP ) framework and its semantics SEM DeLP to classical logic programming frameworks. In DeLP we distinguish between two different sorts of rules: strict and defeasible rules. Negative literals (A) in these rules are considered to represent classical negation. In contrast to this, in normal logic programming (NLP ), there is only one kind of rules, but the meaning of negative literals (notA) is different: they represent a kind of negation as failure, and thereby introduce defeasibility. Various semantics have been defined for NLP, notably the well-founded semantics WFS and the stable semantics Stable. In this paper we consider the transformation properties for NLP introduced by Brass and Dix and suitably adjusted for the DeLP framework. We show which transformation properties are satisfied, thereby identifying aspects in which NLP and DeLP differ. We contend that the transformation rules presented in this paper can he...

In this paper we give a short introduction to logic programming approach to knowledge representation and reasoning. The intention is to help the reader to develop a 'feel' for the field's history and some of its recent developments. The discussion is mainly limited to logic programs under the answer set semantics. For understanding of approaches to logic programming build on well-founded semantics, general theories of argumentation, abductive reasoning, etc., the reader is referred to other publications.

Abstract. In this paper we explore the thesis that the role of argumentation in practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular is to justify the use of defeasible rules to derive a conclusion in preference to the use of other defeasible rules to derive a conflicting conclusion. The defeasibility of rules is expressed by means of non-provability claims as additional conditions of the rules. We outline an abstract approach to defeasible reasoning and argumentation which includes many existing formalisms, including default logic, extended logic programming, non-monotonic modal logic and auto-epistemic logic, as special cases. We show, in particular, that the “admissibility ” semantics for all these formalisms has a natural argumentationtheoretic interpretation and proof procedure, which seem to correspond well with informal argumentation. In the admissibility semantics there is only one way for one argument to attack another, namely by undermining one of its non-provability claims. In this paper, we show how other kinds of attack between arguments, specifically how rebuttal and priority attacks, can be reduced to the undermining of non-provability claims. 1.

In many cases of disagreement, particularly in situations involving practical reasoning, it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that either party is wrong. The role of argument in such cases is to persuade rather than to prove, demonstrate or refute. Following Perelman, we argue that persuasion in such cases relies on a recognition that the strength of an argument depends on the social values that it advances, and that whether the attack of one argument on another succeeds depends on the comparative strength of the values advanced by the arguments concerned. To model this we extend the standard notion of Argumentation Frameworks (AFs) to Value-based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs). After defining VAFs we explore their properties, and show how they can provide a rational basis for the acceptance or rejection of arguments, even where this would appear to be a matter of choice in a standard AF. In particular we show that in a VAF certain arguments can be shown to be acceptable however the relative strengths of the values involved are assessed. This means that disputants can concur on the acceptance of arguments, even when they differ as to which values are more important, and hence that we can identify points for which persuasion should be possible. We illustrate the above using an example moral debate. We then show how factual considerations can be admitted to our framework and discuss the possibility of persuasion in the face of uncertainty and disagreement as to values.

In many cases of disagreement, particularly in situations involving practical reasoning, it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that either party is wrong. The role of argument in such cases is to persuade rather than to prove, demonstrate or refute. Following Perelman, we argue that persuasion in such cases relies on a recognition that the strength of an argument depends on the social values that it advances, and that whether the attack of one argument on another succeeds depends on the comparative strength of the values advanced by the arguments concerned.

. This article investigates to what extent protocols for dynamic disputes, i.e., disputes in which the information base can vary at dierent stages, can be justied in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. First a general framework is formulated for dialectical proof theories for such logics. Then this framework is adapted to serve as a framework for protocols for dynamic disputes, after which soundness and fairness properties are formulated for such protocols relative to dialectical proof theories. It then turns out that certain types of protocols that are perfectly ne with a static information base, are not sound or fair in a dynamic setting. Finally, a natural dynamic protocol is dened for which soundness and fairness can be established. 1. Introduction This paper studies the exchange of arguments and counterarguments in dynamic disputes, i.e., in disputes where the available information can change during the dispute. The research is motivated by two recent developments ...

We present a formal model of argumentation based on situation calculus which captures both the logical and the procedural aspects of argumentation processes. The logic is used to determine what is accepted by each agent participating in the discussion and by the group as a whole, on the basis of the speech acts performed during argumentation. Argumentation protocols, also called rules of order, describe declaratively which speech acts are legal in a particular state of the argumentation. We first discuss argumentation with fixed rules of order. Our model tolerates protocol violations but makes it possible to object to illegal actions. In realistic settings the rules of order themselves can at any time become the topic of the debate. We show how meta level argumentation of this kind can be modelled in what we call dynamic argument systems. To illustrate the notions introduced in the paper we present a reconstruction of Rescher's theory of formal disputation and a dynamic argument system with three levels which we use to discuss a murder case. 1