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Axioms of Causal Relevance
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1996
"... This paper develops axioms and formal semantics for statements of the form "X is causally irrelevant to Y in context Z," which we interpret to mean "Changing X will not affect Y if we hold Z constant." The axiomization of causal irrelevance is contrasted with the axiomization of informational irr ..."
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Cited by 54 (15 self)
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This paper develops axioms and formal semantics for statements of the form "X is causally irrelevant to Y in context Z," which we interpret to mean "Changing X will not affect Y if we hold Z constant." The axiomization of causal irrelevance is contrasted with the axiomization of informational irrelevance, as in "Learning X will not alter our belief in Y , once we know Z." Two versions of causal irrelevance are analyzed, probabilistic and deterministic. We show that, unless stability is assumed, the probabilistic definition yields a very loose structure, that is governed by just two trivial axioms. Under the stability assumption, probabilistic causal irrelevance is isomorphic to path interception in cyclic graphs. Under the deterministic definition, causal irrelevance complies with all of the axioms of path interception in cyclic graphs, with the exception of transitivity. We compare our formalism to that of [Lewis, 1973], and offer a graphical method of proving theorems abou...
An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals
, 1998
"... This paper studies the causal interpretation of counterfactual sentences using a modifiable structural equation model. It is shown that two properties of counterfactuals, namely, composition and effectiveness, are sound and complete relative to this interpretation, when recursive (i.e., feedback ..."
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Cited by 47 (19 self)
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This paper studies the causal interpretation of counterfactual sentences using a modifiable structural equation model. It is shown that two properties of counterfactuals, namely, composition and effectiveness, are sound and complete relative to this interpretation, when recursive (i.e., feedbackless) models are considered. Composition and effectiveness also hold in Lewis's closestworld semantics, which implies that for recursive models the causal interpretation imposes no restrictions beyond those embodied in Lewis's framework. A third property, called reversibility, holds in nonrecursive causal models but not in Lewis's closestworld semantics, which implies that Lewis's axioms do not capture some properties of systems with feedback. Causal inferences based on counterfactual analysis are exemplified and compared to those based on graphical models.
Reasoning With Cause And Effect
, 1999
"... This paper summarizes basic concepts and principles that I have found to be useful in dealing with causal reasoning. The paper is written as a companion to a lecture under the same title, to be presented at IJCAI99, and is intended to supplement the lecture with technical details and pointers to mo ..."
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Cited by 36 (0 self)
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This paper summarizes basic concepts and principles that I have found to be useful in dealing with causal reasoning. The paper is written as a companion to a lecture under the same title, to be presented at IJCAI99, and is intended to supplement the lecture with technical details and pointers to more elaborate discussions in the literature. The ruling conception will be to treat causation as a computational schema devised to identify the invariant relationships in the environment, so as to facilitate reliable prediction of the effect of actions. This conception, as well as several of its satellite principles and tools, has been guiding paradigm for several research communities in AI, most notably those connected with causal discovery, troubleshooting, planning under uncertainty and modeling the behavior of physical systems. My hopes are to encourage a broader and more effective usage of causal modeling by explicating these common principles in simple and familiar mathematical form. Af...
Nondeterministic Action and Dominance: Foundations for Planning and Qualitative Decision
 In Proceedings of the TARK'96
, 1996
"... ..."
A Calculus of Pragmatic Obligation
, 1993
"... We present a qualitative, decisiontheoretic account for statements of the form: "You ought to do A, if C". We show that adding a qualitative causal theory (in the form of a graph) as part of an epistemic state is sufficient to facilitate the analysis of action sequences, their consequences, their ..."
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Cited by 10 (1 self)
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We present a qualitative, decisiontheoretic account for statements of the form: "You ought to do A, if C". We show that adding a qualitative causal theory (in the form of a graph) as part of an epistemic state is sufficient to facilitate the analysis of action sequences, their consequences, their interaction with observations, their expected utilities and, hence, the assertability of conditional "ought" statements. 1 Introduction Obligation statements, also called deontic statements, come in two varieties: obligations to act in accordance with peers' expectations or commitments to oneself, and obligations to act in the interest of one's survival, namely, to avoid danger and pursue safety. This paper develops a decision theoretic account of obligation statements of the second variety, using qualitative abstractions of probabilities and utilities. The idea is simple. A conditional obligation sentence of the form "You ought to do A if C" is interpreted as shorthand for a more elaborat...
Minimal belief change, paretooptimality and logical consequence
 ECONOMIC THEORY
, 2002
"... A rational agent changes her beliefs in response to new information; a widely held idea is that such belief changes should be minimal. This paper is an overview of the theory of minimal belief revision. I employ a decisiontheoretic framework to compare various principles for minimal belief revisi ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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A rational agent changes her beliefs in response to new information; a widely held idea is that such belief changes should be minimal. This paper is an overview of the theory of minimal belief revision. I employ a decisiontheoretic framework to compare various principles for minimal belief revision. The main topics covered include the AGM postulates for belief revision, belief contraction, Grove’s representation theorem, axioms for conditionals, and the connections between minimal belief change and questions in formal logic. I characterize under what conditions belief revision functions are consistent with the Levi Identity, and under what conditions belief contraction functions are consistent with the Harper Identity.
Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence,” Philosophy of Science 68 (3) Supplement
 Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers, S313–S324
, 2001
"... In “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, ” David Lewis defends an analysis of counterfactuals intended to yield the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence: that later affairs depend counterfactually on earlier ones, and not the other way around. I argue that careful attention to the dynamical ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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In “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, ” David Lewis defends an analysis of counterfactuals intended to yield the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence: that later affairs depend counterfactually on earlier ones, and not the other way around. I argue that careful attention to the dynamical properties of thermodynamically irreversible processes shows that in many ordinary cases, Lewis’s analysis fails to yield this asymmetry. Furthermore, the analysis fails in an instructive way: one that teaches us something about the connection between the asymmetry of overdetermination and the asymmetry of entropy. 1
Believing Change and Changing Belief
 IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Special Issue on HigherOrder Uncertainty
, 1996
"... We present a firstorder logic of time, chance, and probability that is capable of expressing the four types of higherorder probability sentences relating subjective probability and objective chance at different times. We define a causal notion of objective chance and show how it can be used in con ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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We present a firstorder logic of time, chance, and probability that is capable of expressing the four types of higherorder probability sentences relating subjective probability and objective chance at different times. We define a causal notion of objective chance and show how it can be used in conjunction with subjective probability to distinguish between causal and evidential correlation by distinguishing between conditions, events, and actions that 1) influence the agent's belief in chance and 2) the agent believes to influence chance. Furthermore, the semantics of the logic captures some commonsense inferences concerning objective chance and causality. We show that an agent's subjective probability is the expected value of its beliefs concerning objective chance. We also prove that an agent using this representation believes with certainty that the past cannot be causally influenced. To appear in IEEE SMC special issue on HigherOrder Probability. 1 Introduction Temporal probab...