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326
Distributed relay selection and power Control for multiuser cooperative communication networks using stackelberg game
 IEEE Trans. on Mobile Computing
, 2009
"... Abstract — The performances in cooperative communications depend on careful resource allocation such as relay selection and power control, but traditional centralized resource allocation needs considerable overhead and signaling to exchange the information for channel estimations. In this paper, we ..."
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Cited by 69 (11 self)
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Abstract — The performances in cooperative communications depend on careful resource allocation such as relay selection and power control, but traditional centralized resource allocation needs considerable overhead and signaling to exchange the information for channel estimations. In this paper, we propose a distributed buyer/seller game theoretic framework over multiuser cooperative communication networks to stimulate cooperation and improve the system performance. By employing a twolevel game to jointly consider the benefits of source nodes as buyers and relay nodes as sellers, the proposed approach not only helps the source smartly find the relays at relatively better locations and buy optimal amount of power from them, but also helps the competing relays maximize their own utilities by asking the reasonable prices. The game is proved to converge to a unique optimal equilibrium. From the simulation results, the relays in good locations can play more important roles in increasing source node’s utility, so the source would like to buy more power from these preferred relays. On the other hand, the relays have to set the proper prices to attract the source’s buying because of competition from other relays and selections from the source. Moreover, the distributed game resource allocation can achieve comparable performance compared with the centralized one. I.
A CrossLayer Optimization Framework for Multihop Multicast in Wireless Mesh Networks
 JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS (JSAC
, 2006
"... The optimal and distributed provisioning of high throughput in mesh networks is known as a fundamental but hard problem. The situation is exacerbated in a wireless setting due to the interference among local wireless transmissions. In this paper, we propose a crosslayer optimization framework for ..."
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Cited by 61 (6 self)
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The optimal and distributed provisioning of high throughput in mesh networks is known as a fundamental but hard problem. The situation is exacerbated in a wireless setting due to the interference among local wireless transmissions. In this paper, we propose a crosslayer optimization framework for throughput maximization in wireless mesh networks, in which the data routing problem and the wireless medium contention problem are jointly optimized for multihop multicast. We show that the throughput maximization problem can be decomposed into two subproblems: a data routing subproblem at the network layer, and a power control subproblem at the physical layer with a set of Lagrangian dual variables coordinating interlayer coupling. Various effective solutions are discussed for each subproblem. We emphasize the network coding technique for multicast routing and a game theoretic method for interference management, for which efficient and distributed solutions are derived and illustrated. Finally, we show that the proposed framework can be extended to take into account physicallayer wireless multicast in mesh networks.
On selfish behavior in CSMA/CA networks
 In Proc. of IEEE Infocom
, 2005
"... Abstract — CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment. Indeed, with the higher pro ..."
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Cited by 61 (8 self)
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Abstract — CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment. Indeed, with the higher programmability of the network adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or firmware is likely to grow; by doing so, a user could obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. We use a gametheoretic approach to investigate the problem of the selfish behavior of nodes in CSMA/CA networks, specifically geared towards the most widely accepted protocol in this class of protocols, IEEE 802.11. We characterize two families of Nash equilibria in a single stage game, one of which always results in a network collapse. We argue that this result provides an incentive for cheaters to cooperate with each other. Explicit cooperation among nodes is clearly impractical. By applying the model of dynamic games borrowed from game theory, we derive the conditions for the stable and optimal functioning of a population of cheaters. We use this insight to develop a simple, localized and distributed protocol that successfully guides multiple selfish nodes to a Paretooptimal Nash equilibrium. I.
Maximizing Capacity in Arbitrary Wireless Networks in the SINR Model: Complexity and Game Theory
"... Abstract—In this paper we consider the problem of maximizing the number of supported connections in arbitrary wireless networks where a transmission is supported if and only if the signaltointerferenceplusnoise ratio at the receiver is greater than some threshold. The aim is to choose transmissi ..."
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Cited by 54 (3 self)
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Abstract—In this paper we consider the problem of maximizing the number of supported connections in arbitrary wireless networks where a transmission is supported if and only if the signaltointerferenceplusnoise ratio at the receiver is greater than some threshold. The aim is to choose transmission powers for each connection so as to maximize the number of connections for which this threshold is met. We believe that analyzing this problem is important both in its own right and also because it arises as a subproblem in many other areas of wireless networking. We study both the complexity of the problem and also present some game theoretic results regarding capacity that is achieved by completely distributed algorithms. We also feel that this problem is intriguing since it involves both continuous aspects (i.e. choosing the transmission powers) as well as discrete aspects (i.e. which connections should be supported).
SModular Games and Power Control in Wireless Networks
 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
, 2003
"... This note shows how centralized or distributed power control algorithms in wireless communications can be viewed as Smodular games coupled policy sets (coupling is due to the fact that the set of powers of a mobile that satisfy the signaltointerference ratio constraints depends on powers used by ..."
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Cited by 53 (4 self)
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This note shows how centralized or distributed power control algorithms in wireless communications can be viewed as Smodular games coupled policy sets (coupling is due to the fact that the set of powers of a mobile that satisfy the signaltointerference ratio constraints depends on powers used by other mobiles). This sheds a new light on convergence properties of existing synchronous and asynchronous algorithms, and allows us to establish new convergence results of power control algorithms. Furthermore, known properties of power control algorithms allow us to extend the theory of Smodular games and obtain conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence of best response algorithms independently of the initial state.
Energyefficient resource allocation in wireless networks: An overview of gametheoretic approaches
 IEEE Signal Process. Magazine
, 2007
"... A gametheoretic model is proposed to study the crosslayer problem of joint power and rate control with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multipleaccess networks. In the proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power and rate in a distributed manner in order to maximize its own ..."
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Cited by 53 (8 self)
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A gametheoretic model is proposed to study the crosslayer problem of joint power and rate control with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multipleaccess networks. In the proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power and rate in a distributed manner in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its QoS requirements. The user’s QoS constraints are specified in terms of the average source rate and an upper bound on the average delay where the delay includes both transmission and queuing delays. The utility function considered here measures energy efficiency and is particularly suitable for wireless networks with energy constraints. The Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed noncooperative game is derived and a closedform expression for the utility achieved at equilibrium is obtained. It is shown that the QoS requirements of a user translate into a “size ” for the user which is an indication of the amount of network resources consumed by the user. Using this competitive multiuser framework, the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency are studied. In addition, analytical expressions are given for users ’ delay profiles and the delay performance of the users at Nash equilibrium is quantified.
The waterfilling game in fading multipleaccess channels
 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY
, 2008
"... A gametheoretic framework is developed to design and analyze the resource allocation algorithms in fading multipleaccess channels (MACs), where the users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. The maximum sumrate point on the boundary of the MAC capacity ..."
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Cited by 48 (0 self)
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A gametheoretic framework is developed to design and analyze the resource allocation algorithms in fading multipleaccess channels (MACs), where the users are assumed to be selfish, rational, and limited by average power constraints. The maximum sumrate point on the boundary of the MAC capacity region is shown to be the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding waterfilling game. This result sheds a new light on the opportunistic communication principle. The base station is then introduced as a player interested in maximizing a weighted sum of the individual rates. A Stackelberg formulation is proposed in which the base station is the designated game leader. In this setup, the base station announces first its strategy defined as the decoding order of the different users, in the successive cancellation receiver, as a function of the channel state. In the second stage, the users compete conditioned on this particular decoding strategy. This formulation is shown to be able to achieve all the corner points of the capacity region, in addition to the maximum sumrate point. On the negative side, it is shown that there does not exist a base station strategy in this formulation that achieves the rest of the boundary points. To overcome this limitation, a repeated game approach, which achieves the capacity region of the fading MAC, is presented. Finally, the study is extended to vector channels highlighting interesting differences between this scenario and the scalar channel case.
Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games
 IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special issue on Game Theory for Signal Processing
, 2009
"... Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where intelligent entities (e.g., terminals) interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance to be able to predict and even ensure s ..."
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Cited by 48 (25 self)
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Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where intelligent entities (e.g., terminals) interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance to be able to predict and even ensure such states at which the network will effectively operate. In this article, we provide nonexhaustive methodologies for characterizing equilibria in wireless games in terms of existence, uniqueness, selection and efficiency.
Distributed opportunistic scheduling for ad hoc communications with imperfect channel information,” Submitted to
 V. CONCLUSION In
"... Abstract — Distributed opportunistic scheduling is studied for wireless adhoc networks, where many links contend for one channel using random access. In such networks, distributed opportunistic scheduling (DOS) involves a process of joint channel probing and distributed scheduling. It has been show ..."
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Cited by 47 (9 self)
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Abstract — Distributed opportunistic scheduling is studied for wireless adhoc networks, where many links contend for one channel using random access. In such networks, distributed opportunistic scheduling (DOS) involves a process of joint channel probing and distributed scheduling. It has been shown that under perfect channel estimation, the optimal DOS for maximizing the network throughput is a pure threshold policy. In this paper, this formalism is generalized to explore DOS under noisy channel estimation, where the transmission rate needs to be backed off from the estimated rate to reduce the outage. It is shown that the optimal scheduling policy remains to be thresholdbased, and that the rate threshold turns out to be a function of the variance of the estimation error and be a functional of the backoff rate function. Since the optimal backoff rate is intractable, a suboptimal linear backoff scheme that backs off the estimated signaltonoise ratio (SNR) and hence the rate is proposed. The corresponding optimal backoff ratio and rate threshold can be obtained via an iterative algorithm. Finally, simulation results are provided to illustrate the tradeoff caused by increasing training time to improve channel estimation at the cost of probing efficiency. I.
Introducing Hierarchy in Energy Games
, 2009
"... In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energyefficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energyefficiency ..."
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Cited by 44 (29 self)
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In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energyefficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energyefficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming singleuser decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leader’s decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in noncooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of insuring the existence of a nonsaturated equilibrium and reaching a desired tradeoff between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the global performance of an energyefficient network is shown to be a critical issue.