We develop a rigorous semantics for Power and ARM multiprocessor programs, including their relaxed memory model and the behaviour of reasonable fragments of their instruction sets. The semantics is mechanised in the HOL proof assistant. This should provide a good basis for informal reasoning and formal verification of low-level code for these weakly consistent architectures, and, together with our x86 semantics, for the design and compilation of high-level concurrent languages.

A verifying compiler is one that emits both object code and a proof of correspondence between object and source code. 1 We report the use of ACL2 in building a verifying compiler for µCryptol, a stream-based language for encryption algorithm specification that targets Rockwell Collins’ AAMP7 microprocessor (and is designed to compile efficiently to hardware, too). This paper reports on our success in verifying the “core ” transformations of the compiler – those transformations over the sub-language of µCryptol that begin after “higher-order ” aspects of the language are compiled away, and finish just before hardware or software specific transformations are exercised. The core transformations are responsible for aggressive optimizations. We have written an ACL2 macro that automatically generates both the correspondence theorems and their proofs. The compiler also supplies measure functions that ACL2 uses to automatically prove termination of µCryptol programs, including programs with mutually-recursive cliques of streams. Our verifying compiler has proved the correctness of its core transformations for multiple algorithms, including TEA, RC6, and AES. Finally, we describe an ACL2 book of primitive operations for the general specification and verification of encryption algorithms. Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification—correctness proofs, formal methods, reliability; D.3.4 ∗ The ACL2 books associated with this paper can be retrieved at

Abstract. This paper presents a new HOL4 formalization of the current ARM instruction set architecture, ARMv7. This is a modern RISC architecture with many advanced features. The formalization is detailed and extensive. Considerable tool support has been developed, with the goal of making the model accessible and easy to work with. The model and supporting tools are publicly available – we wish to encourage others to make use of this resource. This paper explains our monadic specification approach and gives some details of the endeavours that have been made to ensure that the sizeable model is valid and trustworthy. A novel and efficient testing approach has been developed, based on automated forward proof and communication with ARM development boards. 1

Abstract. This paper presents a compiler which produces machine code from functions defined in the logic of a theorem prover, and at the same time proves that the generated code executes the source functions. Unlike previously published work on proof-producing compilation from a theorem prover, our compiler provides broad support for user-defined extensions, targets multiple carefully modelled commercial machine languages, and does not require termination proofs for input functions. As a case study, the compiler is used to construct verified interpreters for a small LISP-like language. The compiler has been implemented in the HOL4 theorem prover. 1

Abstract. This paper shows how a machine-code Hoare logic is used to lift reasoning from the tedious operational model of a machine language to a manageable level of abstraction without making simplifying assumptions. A Hoare logic is placed on top of a high-fidelity model of the ARM instruction set. We show how the generality of ARM instructions is captured by specifications in the logic and how the logic can be used to prove loops and procedures that traverse pointer-based data structures. The presented work has been mechanised in the HOL4 theorem prover and is currently being used to verify ARM machine code implementations of arithmetic and cryptographic operations. 1

This paper addresses the problem of creating abstract transfer functions supporting dataflow analyses. Writing these functions by hand is problematic: transfer functions are difficult to understand, difficult to make precise, and difficult to debug. Bugs in transfer functions are particularly serious since they defeat the soundness of any program analysis running on top of them. Furthermore, implementing transfer functions by hand is wasteful because the resulting code is often difficult to reuse in new analyzers and to analyze new languages. We have developed algorithms and tools for deriving domains. The interval domain is standard; in the bitwise domain, values are vectors of three-valued bits. For both domains, important challenges are to derive transfer functions that are sound in the presence of integer overflow, and to derive precise transfer functions for operations whose semantics are a mismatch for the domain (i.e., bit-vector operations in the interval domain and arithmetic operations in the bitwise domain). We can derive transfer functions, and execute them, in time linear in the bitwidth of the operands. These functions are maximally precise in most cases. Our generated transfer functions are parameterized by a bitwidth and are independent of the language being analyzed, and also of the language in which the analyzer is written. Currently, we generate interval and bitwise transfer functions in C and OCaml for analyzing C source code, ARM object code, and AVR object code. We evaluate our derived functions by using them in an interprocedural dataflow analyzer.

Abstract. This paper presents a separation-logic framework for reasoning about low-level C code in the presence of virtual memory. We describe our abstract, generic Isabelle/HOL framework for reasoning about virtual memory in separation logic, and we instantiate this framework to a precise, formal model of ARMv6 page tables. The logic supports the usual separation logic rules, including the frame rule, and extends separation logic with additional basic predicates for mapping virtual to physical addresses. We build on earlier work to parse potentially type-unsafe, system-level C code directly into Isabelle/HOL and further instantiate the separation logic framework to C. 1

Abstract. This paper reports on a case study, which we believe is the first to produce a formally verified end-to-end implementation of a functional programming language running on commercial processors. Interpreters for the core of McCarthy’s LISP 1.5 were implemented in ARM, x86 and PowerPC machine code, and proved to correctly parse, evaluate and print LISP s-expressions. The proof of evaluation required working on top of verified implementations of memory allocation and garbage collection. All proofs are mechanised in the HOL4 theorem prover. 1

Abstract. We analyze three proof strategies commonly used in deductive verification of deterministic sequential programs formalized with operational semantics. The strategies are: (i) stepwise invariants, (ii) clock functions, and (iii) inductive assertions. We show how to formalize the strategies in the logic of the ACL2 theorem prover. Based on our formalization, we prove that each strategy is both sound and complete. The completeness result implies that given any proof of correctness of a sequential program one can derive a proof in each of the above strategies. The soundness and completeness theorems have been mechanically checked with ACL2.

We have designed and implemented ARMor, a system that uses software fault isolation (SFI) to sandbox application code running on small embedded processors. Sandboxing can be used to protect components such as the RTOS and critical control loops from other, less-trusted components. ARMorguaranteesmemory safety andcontrol flow integrity; it worksbyrewritingabinaryto putacheckin frontof every potentially dangerous operation. We formally and automatically verify that an ARMored application respects the SFI safety properties using the HOL theorem prover. Thus, AR-Mor provides strong isolation guarantees and has an exceptionally small trusted computing base—there is no trusted compiler, binary rewriter, verifier, or operating system.