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93
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
 In Proc. STOC
, 2009
"... We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme – i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result – that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitra ..."
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Cited by 324 (15 self)
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We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme – i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result – that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable. Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable. Latticebased cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1. Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a publickey ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits. Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable – i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypter to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypter, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypter in a serveraided cryptosystem.
Improved proxy reencryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
 IN NDSS
, 2005
"... In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss proposed an application called atomic proxy reencryption, in which a semitrusted proxy converts a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. We predict that fast and secure reencryption will become increasingly popu ..."
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Cited by 112 (16 self)
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In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss proposed an application called atomic proxy reencryption, in which a semitrusted proxy converts a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. We predict that fast and secure reencryption will become increasingly popular as a method for managing encrypted file systems. Although efficiently computable, the widespread adoption of BBS reencryption has been hindered by considerable security risks. Following recent work of Ivan and Dodis, we present new reencryption schemes that realize a stronger notion of security and we demonstrate the usefulness of proxy reencryption as a method of adding access control to the SFS readonly file system. Performance measurements of our experimental file system demonstrate that proxy reencryption can work effectively in practice.
Transitive Signature Schemes
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF RSA 2002, VOLUME 2271 OF LNCS
, 2002
"... We consider the problem of finding publickey digital signature schemes with a transitiveclosure property for signing the vertices and edges of a (directed or undirected) finite graph. More precisely, we want the property that if Alice has signed edge (u, v) and she has also signed the edge (v, ..."
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Cited by 53 (7 self)
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We consider the problem of finding publickey digital signature schemes with a transitiveclosure property for signing the vertices and edges of a (directed or undirected) finite graph. More precisely, we want the property that if Alice has signed edge (u, v) and she has also signed the edge (v, w) then Bob (or anyone) can derive from those two signatures Alice's signature on the edge (u, w). We present an efficient solution for undirected graphs, and leave the case for directed graphs as an open problem.
Identitybased proxy reencryption
 In ACNS ’07
, 2007
"... In a proxy reencryption scheme a semitrusted proxy converts a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. A number of solutions have been proposed in the publickey setting. In this paper, we address the problem of IdentityBased proxy reencryption, whe ..."
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Cited by 33 (0 self)
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In a proxy reencryption scheme a semitrusted proxy converts a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. A number of solutions have been proposed in the publickey setting. In this paper, we address the problem of IdentityBased proxy reencryption, where ciphertexts are transformed from one identity to another. Our schemes are compatible with current IBE deployments and do not require any extra work from the IBE trustedparty key generator. In addition, they are noninteractive and one of them permits multiple reencryptions. Their security is based on a standard assumption (DBDH) in the random oracle model.
ChosenCiphertext Secure Proxy ReEncryption
 In Proc. of ACMCCS’007
, 2007
"... In a proxy reencryption (PRE) scheme, a proxy is given special information that allows it to translate a ciphertext under one key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different key. The proxy cannot, however, learn anything about the messages encrypted under either key. PRE schemes have ma ..."
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Cited by 32 (1 self)
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In a proxy reencryption (PRE) scheme, a proxy is given special information that allows it to translate a ciphertext under one key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different key. The proxy cannot, however, learn anything about the messages encrypted under either key. PRE schemes have many practical applications, including distributed storage, email, and DRM. Previously proposed reencryption schemes achieved only semantic security; in contrast, applications often require security against chosen ciphertext attacks. We propose a definition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks for PRE schemes, and present a scheme that satisfies the definition. Our construction is efficient and based only on the Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellman assumption in the standard model. We also formally capture CCA security for PRE schemes via both a gamebased definition and simulationbased definitions that guarantee universally composable security. We note that, simultaneously with our work, Green and Ateniese proposed a CCAsecure PRE, discussed herein. 1
On quorum controlled asymmetric proxy reencryption
 Public Key Cryptography, Second International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography, volume 1560 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 1999
"... ..."
PrivacyEnhanced Searches Using Encrypted Bloom Filters
, 2004
"... It is often necessary for two or more or more parties that do not fully trust each other to selectively share data. We propose a search scheme based on Bloom filters and PohligHellman encryption. A semitrusted third party can transform one party's search queries to a form suitable for queryin ..."
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Cited by 29 (1 self)
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It is often necessary for two or more or more parties that do not fully trust each other to selectively share data. We propose a search scheme based on Bloom filters and PohligHellman encryption. A semitrusted third party can transform one party's search queries to a form suitable for querying the other party's database, in such a way that neither the third party nor the database owner can see the original query. Furthermore, the encryption keys used to construct the Bloom filters are not shared with this third party. Provision can be made for thirdparty "warrant servers", as well as "censorship sets" that limit the data to be shared.
Delegatable Pseudorandom Functions and Applications
"... We put forth the problem of delegating the evaluation of a pseudorandom function (PRF) to an untrusted proxy. A delegatable PRF, or DPRF for short, is a new primitive that enables a proxy to evaluate a PRF on a strict subset of its domain using a trapdoor derived from the DPRF secretkey. PRF delega ..."
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Cited by 21 (0 self)
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We put forth the problem of delegating the evaluation of a pseudorandom function (PRF) to an untrusted proxy. A delegatable PRF, or DPRF for short, is a new primitive that enables a proxy to evaluate a PRF on a strict subset of its domain using a trapdoor derived from the DPRF secretkey. PRF delegation is policybased: the trapdoor is constructed with respect to a certain policy that determines the subset of input values which the proxy is allowed to compute. Interesting DPRFs should achieve lowbandwidth delegation: Enabling the proxy to compute the PRF values that conform to the policy should be more efficient than simply providing the proxy with the sequence of all such values precomputed. The main challenge in constructing DPRFs is in maintaining the pseudorandomness of unknown values in the face of an attacker that adaptively controls proxy servers. A DPRF may be optionally equipped with an additional property we call policy privacy, where any two delegation predicates remain indistinguishable in the view of a DPRFquerying proxy: achieving this raises new design challenges as policy privacy and efficiency are seemingly conflicting goals. For the important class of policies described as (1dimensional) ranges, we devise two DPRF constructions and rigorously prove their security. Built upon the wellknown treebased GGM PRF family [15], our constructions are generic and feature only logarithmic delegation size in the number of values conforming to the policy predicate. At only a constantfactor efficiency reduction, we show that our second construction is also policy private. As we finally describe, their new security and efficiency properties render our delegated PRF schemes particularly useful in numerous security applications, including RFID, symmetric searchable encryption, and broadcast encryption. 1
Unidirectional ChosenCiphertext Secure Proxy ReEncryption
 In PKC’08, LNCS
"... Abstract. In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy reencryption (PRE) in which a proxy can transform – without seeing the plaintext – a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recentl ..."
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Cited by 19 (1 self)
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Abstract. In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced a cryptographic primitive called proxy reencryption (PRE) in which a proxy can transform – without seeing the plaintext – a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same plaintext under another key. The concept has recently drawn renewed interest. Notably, Canetti and Hohenberger showed how to properly define (and realize) chosenciphertext security for the primitive. Their system is bidirectional as the translation key allows converting ciphertexts in both directions. This paper presents the first unidirectional proxy reencryption schemes with chosenciphertext security in the standard model (i.e. without the random oracle idealization). The first system provably fits a unidirectional extension of the CanettiHohenberger security model. As a second contribution, the paper considers a more realistic adversarial model where attackers may choose dishonest users ’ keys on their own. It is shown how to modify the first scheme to achieve security in the latter scenario. At a moderate expense, the resulting system provides additional useful properties such as noninteractive temporary delegations. Both constructions are efficient and rely on mild complexity assumptions in bilinear groups. Like the CanettiHohenberger scheme, they meet a relaxed flavor of chosenciphertext security introduced by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen. 1