Results 1 
6 of
6
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi to Singleagent Reduction
, 1203
"... We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multidimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good (furthermore, it allows an agent’s budget and risk preference t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multidimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good (furthermore, it allows an agent’s budget and risk preference to be known only privately to the agent). These are the main challenge areas for auction theory. A singleagent problem is to optimize a given objective subject to a constraint on the maximum probability with which each type is allocated, a.k.a., an allocation rule. Our approach is a reduction from multiagent mechanism design problem to collection of singleagent problems. We focus on maximizing revenue, but our results can be applied to other objectives (e.g., welfare). An optimal multiagent mechanism can be computed by a linear/convex program on interim allocation rules by simultaneously optimizing several singleagent mechanisms subject to joint feasibility of the allocation rules. For singleunit auctions, Border (1991) showed that the space of all jointly feasible interim allocation rules for n agents is a Ddimensional convex polytope which can be specified by 2D linear constraints, where D is the total number of all agents’
Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Pricing: Optional Calling Plans and Tapered Tariffs
 JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS
, 1992
"... We study optimal nonuniform pricing in a setting where a customer's demand at the start of a billing period contains a random variable whose realization becomes known by the end of the billing period. In this context, an optional calling plan is a tariff which the consumer must select based on his/h ..."
Abstract

Cited by 8 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study optimal nonuniform pricing in a setting where a customer's demand at the start of a billing period contains a random variable whose realization becomes known by the end of the billing period. In this context, an optional calling plan is a tariff which the consumer must select based on his/her expectations about the random variable, whereas, under a tapered tariff, the consumer's choice of usage charge is made after he/she knows the realization of the random variable. We show that for low to moderate levels of uncertainty about the random variable entering the demand function, the optional calling plan approach to nonuniform pricing yields higher expected profit than does the tapered tariff approach, given riskneutral consumers. We illustrate this finding with a case study and argue that it is consistent with the historical evolution of tariffs in the interexchange telecommunications market.
Adjustment of an Affine Contract with FixedPoint Iteration
 Manuscript. URL: http://www.sal.hut.fi/Publications/pdffiles/mkit07.pdf
, 2003
"... We study a principalagent game where the principal commits to an a#ne contract. We suppose that the principal has incomplete information but he can adjust the contract according to the myopically behaving agent's reactions when the game is played repeatedly. The adjustment process can be consid ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study a principalagent game where the principal commits to an a#ne contract. We suppose that the principal has incomplete information but he can adjust the contract according to the myopically behaving agent's reactions when the game is played repeatedly. The adjustment process can be considered as a learning model. We derive convergence conditions for fixedpoint iteration as an adjustment scheme and study a related continuous time process. The analysis is based on parameterizing the problem such that we obtain a degree zero homogeneous system of equations, where the nonlinear mapping satisfies Walras' law.
Positive And Negative Externality Effects On Product Pricing And Capacity Planning
, 1996
"... Physically constrained subscriptionbased telephone network services can experience opposing market forces which affect new product adoption. In such networks, a positive externality due to increases in subscribership encourages more consumers to sign up. As a result, the addition of users to the sy ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Physically constrained subscriptionbased telephone network services can experience opposing market forces which affect new product adoption. In such networks, a positive externality due to increases in subscribership encourages more consumers to sign up. As a result, the addition of users to the system then leads to an increase in network load (measured in call minutes for the entire system). At some point, call demand exceeds network capacity and subscribers are forced to wait for call completion. This translates to a negative externality in the form of congestion and not only reduces the consumption by current customers but also discourages subscriber set expansion. These concurrent positive and negative externalities ultimately determine demand dynamics, given subscriber attitudes and pricing changes. A typical example of these subscriptionbased services can be found in the mobile communications industry. In the past few years, metropolitan cellular telephone has been plagued by m...
J Optim Theory Appl (2008) 137: 641–673 DOI 10.1007/s1095700793391 Monotone Comparative Statics: Geometric Approach
, 2007
"... Abstract We consider the comparative statics of solutions to parameterized optimization problems. A geometric method is developed for finding a vector field that, at each point in the parameter space, indicates a direction in which monotone comparative statics obtains. Given such a vector field, we ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract We consider the comparative statics of solutions to parameterized optimization problems. A geometric method is developed for finding a vector field that, at each point in the parameter space, indicates a direction in which monotone comparative statics obtains. Given such a vector field, we provide sufficient conditions under which the problem can be reparameterized on the parameter space (or a subset thereof) in a way that guarantees monotone comparative statics. A key feature of our method is that it does not require the feasible set to be a lattice and works in the absence of the standard quasisupermodularity and singlecrossing assumptions on the objective function. We illustrate our approach with a variety of applications.