Results 1 -
2 of
2
Artificial Intelligence, Logic And Formalizing Common Sense
- Philosophical Logic and Artificial Intelligence
, 1990
"... This article discusses the problems and difficulties, the results so far, and some improvements in logic and logical languages that may be required to formalize common sense. Fundamental conceptual advances are almost certainly required. The object of the paper is to get more help for AI from philos ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 19 (3 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This article discusses the problems and difficulties, the results so far, and some improvements in logic and logical languages that may be required to formalize common sense. Fundamental conceptual advances are almost certainly required. The object of the paper is to get more help for AI from philosophical logicians. Some of the requested help will be mostly philosophical and some will be logical. Likewise the concrete AI approach may fertilize philosophical logic as physics has repeatedly fertilized mathematics.
Nonmonotonicity and the Scope of Reasoning: Preliminary Report
- In Proc. 8th Nat. Conf. on A.I
, 1990
"... Existing formalisms for default reasoning capture some aspects of the nonmonotonicity of human commonsense reasoning. However, Perlis has shown that one of these formalisms, circumscription, is subject to certain counterintuitive limitations. Kraus and Perlis suggested a partial solution, but signif ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 2 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Existing formalisms for default reasoning capture some aspects of the nonmonotonicity of human commonsense reasoning. However, Perlis has shown that one of these formalisms, circumscription, is subject to certain counterintuitive limitations. Kraus and Perlis suggested a partial solution, but significant problems remain. In this paper, we observe that the unfortunate limitations of circumscription are even broader than Perlis originally pointed out. Moreover, these problems are not confined to circumscription; they appear to be endemic in current nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms. We develop a much more general solution than that of Kraus and Perlis, involving restricting the scope of nonmonotonic reasoning, and show that it remedies these problems in a variety of formalisms. Introduction The search for theories of nonmonotonic reasoning--- theories of how to reach reasonable conclusions that are not strictly entailed by what is known, and hence are subject to retraction---has yielde...

