Results 1  10
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20
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
, 2002
"... When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCGlike payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We dev ..."
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Cited by 94 (3 self)
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When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCGlike payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where each bidder desires a specific known subset of items and only the valuation is unknown by the mechanism (the single parameter case). For this case we extend the work of Lehmann O’Callaghan, and Shoham, who presented greedy heuristics. We show how to use IFTHENELSE constructs, perform a partial search, and use the LP relaxation. We apply these techniques for several canonical types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable approximation ratios. 1
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
 IN STOC
, 2006
"... We design two computationallyefficient incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentivecompatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion o ..."
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Cited by 82 (15 self)
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We design two computationallyefficient incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentivecompatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O(pm)approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations  this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log2 m) approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentivecompatible mechanism for this class which only provides an O(pm)approximation.
Algorithms for selfish agents: Mechanism design for distributed computation
 In Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
, 1999
"... Abstract This paper considers algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own selfinterest. Such scenarios arise, in particular, when computers or users aim to cooperate or trade over the Internet. As such participa ..."
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Cited by 35 (1 self)
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Abstract This paper considers algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own selfinterest. Such scenarios arise, in particular, when computers or users aim to cooperate or trade over the Internet. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents ' interests are best served by behaving correctly. This exposition presents a model to formally study such algorithms. This model, based on the field of mechanism design, is taken from the author's joint work with Amir Ronen, and is similar to approaches taken in the distributed AI community in recent years. Using this model, we demonstrate how some of the techniques of mechanism design can be applied towards distributed computation problems. We then exhibit some issues that arise in distributed computation which require going beyond the existing theory of mechanism design. 1 Introduction A large part of research in computer science is concerned with protocols and algorithms for interconnected collections of computers. The designer of such an algorithm or protocol always makes an implicit assumption that the participating computers will act as instructed except, perhaps, for the faulty or malicious ones.
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
 In PODC
, 2004
"... We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two distinguished nodes in G. Given a distribution on the edge cos ..."
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Cited by 18 (1 self)
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We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two distinguished nodes in G. Given a distribution on the edge costs, the goal is to design a mechanism (protocol) which acquires a cheap st path. We first prove that the class of generalized VCG mechanisms has certain monotonicity properties. We exploit this observation to obtain, under an independence assumption, expected payments which are significantly better than the worst case bounds of [4, 7]. We then investigate whether these payments can be improved when there is a competition among paths. Surprisingly, we give evidence to the fact that typically such competition hardly helps incentive compatible mechanisms. In particular, we show this for the celebrated VCG mechanism. We then construct a novel general protocol combining the advantages of incentive compatible and nonincentive compatible mechanisms. Under reasonable assumptions on the agents we show that the overpayment of our mechanism is very small. Finally, we demonstrate that many task allocation problems can be reduced to shortest paths. 1
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
 In EC ’08
"... ..."
An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
"... We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to minimize the makespan on m unrelated machines. In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] showed a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m, thus leaving a large gap. They conjectured that their upper bound is tight, but were unable to p ..."
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Cited by 14 (2 self)
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We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to minimize the makespan on m unrelated machines. In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] showed a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m, thus leaving a large gap. They conjectured that their upper bound is tight, but were unable to prove it. Despite many attempts that yield positive results for several special cases, the conjecture is far from being solved: the lower bound was only recently slightly increased to 2.61 [5, 10], while the best upper bound remained unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. This is the first concrete evidence to the correctness of the NisanRonen conjecture, especially given that the classic scheduling algorithms are anonymous, and all stateoftheart mechanisms for special cases of the problem are anonymous as well.
Marriage, honesty, and stability
 In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA
, 2005
"... Many centralized twosided markets form a matching between participants by running a stable marriage algorithm. It is a wellknown fact that no matching mechanism based on a stable marriage algorithm can guarantee truthfulness as a dominant strategy for participants. However, as we will show in this ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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Many centralized twosided markets form a matching between participants by running a stable marriage algorithm. It is a wellknown fact that no matching mechanism based on a stable marriage algorithm can guarantee truthfulness as a dominant strategy for participants. However, as we will show in this paper, in a probabilistic setting where the preference lists of one side of the market are composed of only a constant (independent of the the size of the market) number of entries, each drawn from an arbitrary distribution, the number of participants that have more than one stable partner is vanishingly small. This proves (and generalizes) a conjecture of Roth and Peranson [23]. As a corollary Ó of this result, we show that, with high probability, the truthful strategy is the best response for a given player when the other players are truthful. We also analyze equilibria of the deferred acceptance stable marriage game. We show that the game with complete information has an equilibrium in which a fraction of the strategies are truthful in expectation. In the more realistic setting of a game of incomplete information, we will show that the set of truthful strategies form a Ó
On the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design
"... In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multiunit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomialtime truthful deterministic m ..."
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Cited by 11 (7 self)
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In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multiunit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomialtime truthful deterministic mechanism provides an approximation ratio better than 2. We also show for the first time that truthful in expectation polynomialtime mechanisms are provably stronger than polynomialtime universally truthful mechanisms. Specifically, we show that there is a setting in which: (1) there is a nonpolynomial time truthful mechanism that always outputs the optimal solution, and that (2) no universally truthful randomized mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2 in polynomial time, but (3) an FPTAS that is truthful in expectation exists.
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: An impossibility result
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (ACMEC
, 2004
"... In many settings, agents participating in mechanisms do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information processing or information gathering). Agents are faced not only with the problem of deciding how to reveal their preferences ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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In many settings, agents participating in mechanisms do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information processing or information gathering). Agents are faced not only with the problem of deciding how to reveal their preferences to the mechanism but also how to deliberate in order to determine their preferences. For such settings, we have introduced the deliberation equilibrium as the gametheoretic solution concept where the agents ’ deliberation actions are modeled as part of their strategies. In this paper, we lay out mechanism design principles for such deliberative agents. We also derive the first impossibility results for such settings specifically for privatevalue auctions where the agents ’ utility functions are quasilinear, but the agents can only determine their valuations through deliberation. We propose a set of intuitive properties which are desirable in mechanisms used among deliberative agents. First, mechanisms should be nondeliberative: the mechanism should not be solving the deliberation problems for the agents. Secondly, mechanisms should be deliberationproof: agents should not deliberate on others’ valuations in equilibrium. Third, the mechanism should be nondeceiving: agents do not strategically misrepresent. Finally, the mechanism should be sensitive: the agents’ actions should affect the outcome. We show that no directrevelation mechanism satisfies these four properties. Moving beyond directrevelation mechanisms, we show that no valuebased mechanism (that is, mechanism where the agents are only asked to report valuations either partially or fully determined ones) satisfies these four properties.