Australian Realist analytic philosophy is full of claims about truthmakers and truthmaking. In this paper, I seek to show that a number of intuitions about truthmaking are jointly inconsistent, and that some common attempts at resolving the inconsistency are unsatisfying. Finally, I propose an account of truthmaking which resolves the tensions as best as possible. This account has great affinities with both relevant entailment and situation semantics. This note can be seen as an apologetic for relevant entailment for those who are familiar with truthmaking, or as an introduction to truthmaking for those familiar with logic. Either way, it is an attempt to apply modern logical methods and insights to a philosophical problem.

this paper is concerned. That is the question, what makes disjunctions true? 3. The threat of triviality Postulate 2.1 (TF) shows that truthmaking distributes over conjunction: Theorem 3.1 THE CONJUNCTION THESIS (CT) For all s, p and q, s + p&q iff s + p and s + q. See Mulligan et al. (1984, p. 316); Restall (1996, p. 333, 338)

I have tried to apprehend the Pythagorean power by which number holds sway above the flux. Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, vol. 1, Prologue. The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their dispensability cannot be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of mathematical objects which are genuinely platonic. Therefore, indispensability, whether true or false, does not support platonism. Mathematical platonists claim that at least some of the objects

This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics. I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are related to David Lewis ’ work on modality, especially on counterfactuals. The first is the way Hamilton-Jacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of possible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to be explored by philosophers. The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches ’ variational principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that any actual truth, in particular an actual law, is made true by actual facts. Though this threat can be avoided, at least for simple mechanical systems, it repays scrutiny; not least because it leads to some open questions. 1