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Truthmakers, entailment and necessity
 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
, 1996
"... Australian Realists are fond of talking about truthmakers. Here are three examples from the recent literature •.. suppose a is F... What is needed is something in the world which ensures that a is F, some truthmaker or ontological ground for a's being F. What can this be except the state of affairs ..."
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Cited by 23 (7 self)
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Australian Realists are fond of talking about truthmakers. Here are three examples from the recent literature •.. suppose a is F... What is needed is something in the world which ensures that a is F, some truthmaker or ontological ground for a's being F. What can this be except the state of affairs of a's being F? [3, p. 190] If • entails lI, what makes ~ true also makes II true (at least when • and I] are contingent). [8, p. 32] The hallowed path from language to universals has been by way of the correspondence theory of truth: the doctrine that whenever something is true, there must be something in the world which makes it true. I will call this the Truthmaker axiom. The desire to find an adequate truthmaker for every truth has been one of the sustaining forces behind traditional theories of universals... Correspondence theories of truth breed legions of recalcitrant philosophical problems • For this reason I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet, I have never really succeeded. Without some such axiom, I find I have no adequate anchor to hold me
The Relation Between General and Particular: Entailment vs. Supervenience
 Studies in Metaphysics
, 2006
"... I say (with many others): the world is a thing, the biggest thing, the mereological sum (or aggregate) of all things. Truth is determined by the distribution of fundamental, or perfectly natural, properties and relations over the parts of this biggest thing. For want of a better name, call this the ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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I say (with many others): the world is a thing, the biggest thing, the mereological sum (or aggregate) of all things. Truth is determined by the distribution of fundamental, or perfectly natural, properties and relations over the parts of this biggest thing. For want of a better name, call this the thing theory. 1 Some say instead: the world is a fact, the most inclusive fact, the conjunction (also mereological sum) of all the
Truthmakers and the Disjunction Thesis
"... this paper is concerned. That is the question, what makes disjunctions true? 3. The threat of triviality Postulate 2.1 (TF) shows that truthmaking distributes over conjunction: Theorem 3.1 THE CONJUNCTION THESIS (CT) For all s, p and q, s + p&q iff s + p and s + q. See Mulligan et al. (1984, p. 3 ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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this paper is concerned. That is the question, what makes disjunctions true? 3. The threat of triviality Postulate 2.1 (TF) shows that truthmaking distributes over conjunction: Theorem 3.1 THE CONJUNCTION THESIS (CT) For all s, p and q, s + p&q iff s + p and s + q. See Mulligan et al. (1984, p. 316); Restall (1996, p. 333, 338)
Everettian Quantum Mechanics Without Branching Time
"... In this paper I assess the prospects for combining contemporary Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) with branchingtime semantics in the tradition of Kripke, Prior, Thomason and Belnap. I begin by outlining the salient features of ‘decoherencebased ’ EQM, and of the ’consistent histories ’ formalism ..."
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In this paper I assess the prospects for combining contemporary Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) with branchingtime semantics in the tradition of Kripke, Prior, Thomason and Belnap. I begin by outlining the salient features of ‘decoherencebased ’ EQM, and of the ’consistent histories ’ formalism that is particularly apt for conceptual discussions in EQM. This formalism permits of both ‘branching worlds’ and ‘parallel worlds ’ interpretations; the metaphysics of EQM is in this sense underdetermined by the physics. A prominent argument due to David Lewis [1986] supports the nonbranching interpretation. Belnap et al. [2001] refer to Lewis ’ argument as the ’Assertion problem’, and propose a pragmatic response to it. I argue that their response is unattractively ad hoc and complex, and that it prevents an Everettian who adopts branchingtime semantics from making clear sense of objective probability. The upshot is that Everettians are better off without branchingtime semantics. I conclude by discussing and rejecting
1 PYTHAGOREAN POWERS or A CHALLENGE TO PLATONISM
"... I have tried to apprehend the Pythagorean power by which number holds sway above the flux. Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, vol. 1, Prologue. The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot ..."
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I have tried to apprehend the Pythagorean power by which number holds sway above the flux. Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, vol. 1, Prologue. The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their dispensability cannot be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of mathematical objects which are genuinely platonic. Therefore, indispensability, whether true or false, does not support platonism. Mathematical platonists claim that at least some of the objects
Dedicated to the memory of David Lewis For the book, Formal Teleology and Causality, ed. M. Stöltzner, P. Weingartner,
, 2003
"... This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics. I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and HamiltonJacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are related to David Lewis ’ work on modality, especially on counterfactuals. ..."
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This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics. I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and HamiltonJacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are related to David Lewis ’ work on modality, especially on counterfactuals. The first is the way HamiltonJacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of possible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to be explored by philosophers. The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches ’ variational principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that any actual truth, in particular an actual law, is made true by actual facts. Though this threat can be avoided, at least for simple mechanical systems, it repays scrutiny; not least because it leads to some open questions. 1
© InternationalJournal.org Imaginary Numbers as Quantum Superposition States and Timelike Dimension
"... Abstract: The paper deals with the imaginary numbers from the perspective of mathematics, physics and philosophy. The core proposition is that the unitary imaginary number i is a double value number with the assigned not one but two different numbers at the same time, These numbers are proposed be: ..."
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Abstract: The paper deals with the imaginary numbers from the perspective of mathematics, physics and philosophy. The core proposition is that the unitary imaginary number i is a double value number with the assigned not one but two different numbers at the same time, These numbers are proposed be: and –, fact of which is written in the socalled iequation: i = [, –] or i = [–,]. Philosophical considerations aim at explanation or justification of such a paradoxical double value assignment, looking for a similar paradoxical at the same time appearances possibly taking place in philosophy and physics. The core of the philosophical analysis is an account of McTaggart’s proof of the unreality of time in which he claims that sequentially occurring events are not only sequential but they also appear at the same time. Then in physics – Special Theory of Relativity Theory (STR) – paradoxical at the same time appearances take place when in its inertial frame of reference the propagated the light ray is in countless number of places at the same time. Similarly in Quantum Mechanics (QM) when a superposition is present the spin of electron can be up and down at the same time as well. We try to make use of these paradoxical at the same time appearances to propose a new model of the timelike dimension of the spacetime, as well as to form a mathematical theory of the imaginary numbers based on an abstract superposition. However although paradoxical, at the same time appearances can in fact constitute a contradiction. But it is argued that introduction of time going backward can disarm this danger, as there is nothing contradictory in the concept of such a time. The paper also touches the history when mathematical inputs of Hamilton and Buée are reflected upon.
DOI 10.1007/s1109800508984
"... ABSTRACT. Nominalizations are expressions that are particularly challenging philosophically in that they help form singular terms that seem to refer to abstract or derived objects often considered controversial. The three standard views about the semantics of nominalizations are [1] that they map me ..."
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ABSTRACT. Nominalizations are expressions that are particularly challenging philosophically in that they help form singular terms that seem to refer to abstract or derived objects often considered controversial. The three standard views about the semantics of nominalizations are [1] that they map mere meanings onto objects, [2] that they refer to implicit arguments, and [3] that they introduce new objects, in virtue of their compositional semantics. In the second case, nominalizations do not add anything new but pick up objects that would be present anyway in the semantic structure of a corresponding sentence without a nominalization. In the first and third case, nominalizations in a sense ‘create ’ new objects’, enriching the ontology on the basis of the meaning of expressions. I will argue that there is a fourth kind of nominalization which requires a quite different treatment. These are nominalizations that introduce ‘new ’ objects, but only partially characterize them. Such nominalizations generally refer to events or tropes. I will explore an account according on which such nominalizations refer to
The Number of Planets, a NumberReferring Term?
"... The question whether numbers are objects is a central question in the philosophy of mathematics. Frege made use of a syntactic criterion for objethood: numbers are objects because there are singular terms that stand for them, and not just singular terms in some formal language, but in natural langua ..."
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The question whether numbers are objects is a central question in the philosophy of mathematics. Frege made use of a syntactic criterion for objethood: numbers are objects because there are singular terms that stand for them, and not just singular terms in some formal language, but in natural language in particular. More specifically, Frege (1884) thought that both noun phrases like the number of planets and simple numerals like eight as in (1) are singular terms referring to numbers as abstract objects: (1) The number of planets is eight. Frege took it to be obvious that (1) is an identity statement. In this paper I will argue that Frege’s view about reference to numbers in natural language is fundamentally mistaken. The number of planets, I would like to show, while it in general is a referential term, is not a term referring to a number (and in fact in the particular context of (1) it is not a referential term at all). In general the number of planets does not refer to an abstract object, but rather to what I will call a number trope, the concrete instantiation of a ‘number property ’ in a plurality, namely the instantiation of the property of being eight in the plurality of the planets. Moreover, I will argue that (1) is not an identity statement.