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Interactive proofs and the hardness of approximating cliques
 JOURNAL OF THE ACM
, 1996
"... The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, a connection is shown between approximating the size of the largest clique in a graph and multiprover interactive proofs. Second, an efficient multiprover interactive proof for NP languages is constructed, where the verifier uses very few random b ..."
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Cited by 183 (13 self)
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The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, a connection is shown between approximating the size of the largest clique in a graph and multiprover interactive proofs. Second, an efficient multiprover interactive proof for NP languages is constructed, where the verifier uses very few random bits and communication bits. Last, the connection between cliques and efficient multiprover interactive proofs, is shown to yield hardness results on the complexity of approximating the size of the largest clique in a graph. Of independent interest is our proof of correctness for the multilinearity test of functions.
Hiding information and signatures in trapdoor knapsacks
 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY
, 1978
"... The knapsack problem is aa Npcomplete combinatorial problem that is strongly believed to be computationally difficult to solve in general. Specific instances of this problem tbat appear very difficult to solve unless one pawses “trapdoor information” used in the design of the problem are demonstra ..."
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Cited by 180 (2 self)
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The knapsack problem is aa Npcomplete combinatorial problem that is strongly believed to be computationally difficult to solve in general. Specific instances of this problem tbat appear very difficult to solve unless one pawses “trapdoor information” used in the design of the problem are demonstrated. Because only the designer can easily solve problems, others can send bim ioformation hidden in the solution to the problems without fear that au eavesdropper will be able to extract the information. This approach differs from usual cryptograpkic systems in that a secret key is not needed. Conversely, only the designer can generate signature8 for messages, but anyone can easily check their authenticity.
The Hardness of Approximate Optima in Lattices, Codes, and Systems of Linear Equations
, 1993
"... We prove the following about the Nearest Lattice Vector Problem (in any `p norm), the Nearest Codeword Problem for binary codes, the problem of learning a halfspace in the presence of errors, and some other problems. 1. Approximating the optimum within any constant factor is NPhard. 2. If for some ..."
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Cited by 176 (8 self)
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We prove the following about the Nearest Lattice Vector Problem (in any `p norm), the Nearest Codeword Problem for binary codes, the problem of learning a halfspace in the presence of errors, and some other problems. 1. Approximating the optimum within any constant factor is NPhard. 2. If for some ffl ? 0 there exists a polynomialtime algorithm that approximates the optimum within a factor of 2 log 0:5\Gammaffl n , then every NP language can be decided in quasipolynomial deterministic time, i.e., NP ` DTIME(n poly(log n) ). Moreover, we show that result 2 also holds for the Shortest Lattice Vector Problem in the `1 norm. Also, for some of these problems we can prove the same result as above, but for a larger factor such as 2 log 1\Gammaffl n or n ffl . Improving the factor 2 log 0:5\Gammaffl n to p dimension for either of the lattice problems would imply the hardness of the Shortest Vector Problem in `2 norm; an old open problem. Our proofs use reductions from fewpr...
Edmonds polytopes and a hierarchy of combinatorial problems
, 2006
"... Let S be a set of linear inequalities that determine a bounded polyhedron P. The closure of S is the smallest set of inequalities that contains S and is closed under two operations: (i) taking linear combinations of inequalities, (ii) replacing an inequality Σaj xj ≤ a0, where a1,a2,...,an are integ ..."
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Cited by 171 (0 self)
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Let S be a set of linear inequalities that determine a bounded polyhedron P. The closure of S is the smallest set of inequalities that contains S and is closed under two operations: (i) taking linear combinations of inequalities, (ii) replacing an inequality Σaj xj ≤ a0, where a1,a2,...,an are integers, by the inequality Σaj xj ≤ a with a ≥[a0]. Obviously, if integers x1,x2,...,xn satisfy all the inequalities in S, then they satisfy also all inequalities in the closure of S. Conversely, let Σcj xj ≤ c0 hold for all choices of integers x1,x2,...,xn, that satisfy all the inequalities in S. Then we prove that Σcj xj ≤ c0 belongs to the closure of S. To each integer linear programming problem, we assign a nonnegative integer, called its rank. (The rank is the minimum number of iterations of the operation (ii) that are required in order to eliminate the integrality constraint.) We prove that there is no upper bound on the rank of problems arising from the search for largest independent sets in graphs.
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
 JOURNAL OF THE ACM
, 2007
"... In multiagent settings where the agents have di®erent preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protoco ..."
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Cited by 163 (18 self)
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In multiagent settings where the agents have di®erent preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protocols where determining a bene¯cial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. Such hardness results lose relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential only in the number of candidates (and only slightly so) might be available. We give such an algorithm for an individual agent to manipulate the Single Transferable Vote (STV) protocol, which has been shown hard to manipulate in the above sense. This motivates the core of this paper, which derives hardness results for realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant (but the number of voters can be large). The main manipulation question we study is that of coalitional manipulation by weighted voters. (We show that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.) We study both constructive manipulation (making a given candidate win) and de
Metascheduling for continuous media
 ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
, 1993
"... Nextgeneration distributed systems will support corLtLzLzLous medLa (digztal audio and video) in the same framework as other data. Many applications that use continuous media need guaranteed endtoend performance (bounds on throughput and delay). To reliably support these requirements, system com ..."
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Cited by 162 (3 self)
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Nextgeneration distributed systems will support corLtLzLzLous medLa (digztal audio and video) in the same framework as other data. Many applications that use continuous media need guaranteed endtoend performance (bounds on throughput and delay). To reliably support these requirements, system components such as CPU schedulers, networks, and file systems must offer performance guarantees. A rnetasclzedtder coordinates these components, negotiating endtoend guarantees on behalf of clients. The CMresource model, described in this paper, provides a basis for such a metascheduler. It defines a workload parameterizatlon, an abstract interface to resources, and an algorithm for reserving multiple resources. The model uses an economic approach to dividing endtoend delay, and it allows system components to “work ahead,” improving the performance of nonrealtime workload.
Register Allocation via Graph Coloring
, 1992
"... Chaitin and his colleagues at IBM in Yorktown Heights built the first global register allocator based on graph coloring. This thesis describes a series of improvements and extensions to the Yorktown allocator. There are four primary results: Optimistic coloring Chaitin's coloring heuristic pes ..."
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Cited by 159 (4 self)
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Chaitin and his colleagues at IBM in Yorktown Heights built the first global register allocator based on graph coloring. This thesis describes a series of improvements and extensions to the Yorktown allocator. There are four primary results: Optimistic coloring Chaitin's coloring heuristic pessimistically assumes any node of high degree will not be colored and must therefore be spilled. By optimistically assuming that nodes of high degree will receive colors, I often achieve lower spill costs and faster code; my results are never worse. Coloring pairs The pessimism of Chaitin's coloring heuristic is emphasized when trying to color register pairs. My heuristic handles pairs as a natural consequence of its optimism. Rematerialization Chaitin et al. introduced the idea of rematerialization to avoid the expense of spilling and reloading certain simple values. By propagating rematerialization information around the SSA graph using a simple variation of Wegman and Zadeck's constant propag...
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (ACMEC
, 2006
"... In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realistic. In many settings, one player is able to commit to a strategy before the other player makes a decision. Such models a ..."
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Cited by 144 (22 self)
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In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realistic. In many settings, one player is able to commit to a strategy before the other player makes a decision. Such models are synonymously referred to as leadership, commitment, or Stackelberg models, and optimal play in such models is often significantly different from optimal play in the model where strategies are selected simultaneously. The recent surge in interest in computing gametheoretic solutions has so far ignored leadership models (with the exception of the interest in mechanism design, where the designer is implicitly in a leadership position). In this paper, we study how to compute optimal strategies to commit to under both commitment to pure strategies and commitment to mixed strategies, in both normalform and Bayesian games. We give both positive results (efficient algorithms) and negative results (NPhardness results).
Disjoint pattern database heuristics
 Artificial Intelligence
, 2002
"... We explore a method for computing admissible heuristic evaluation functions for search problems. It utilizes pattern databases (Culberson & Schaeffer, 1998), which are precomputed tables of the exact cost of solving various subproblems of an existing problem. Unlike standard pattern database heu ..."
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Cited by 141 (35 self)
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We explore a method for computing admissible heuristic evaluation functions for search problems. It utilizes pattern databases (Culberson & Schaeffer, 1998), which are precomputed tables of the exact cost of solving various subproblems of an existing problem. Unlike standard pattern database heuristics, however, we partition our problems into disjoint subproblems, so that the costs of solving the different subproblems can be added together without overestimating the cost of solving the original problem. Previously (Korf & Felner, 2002) we showed how to statically partition the slidingtile puzzles into disjoint groups of tiles to compute an admissible heuristic, using the same partition for each state and problem instance. Here we extend the method and show that it applies to other domains as well. We also present another method for additive heuristics which we call dynamically partitioned pattern databases. Here we partition the problem into disjoint subproblems for each state of the search dynamically. We discuss the pros and cons of each of these methods and apply both methods to three different problem domains: the slidingtile puzzles, the 4peg Towers of Hanoi problem, and finding an optimal vertex cover of a graph. We find that in some problem domains, static partitioning is most effective, while in others dynamic partitioning is a better choice. In each of these problem domains, either statically partitioned or dynamically partitioned pattern database heuristics are the best known heuristics for the problem.
ConstantTime Distributed Dominating Set Approximation
 In Proc. of the 22 nd ACM Symposium on the Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC
, 2003
"... Finding a small dominating set is one of the most fundamental problems of traditional graph theory. In this paper, we present a new fully distributed approximation algorithm based on LP relaxation techniques. For an arbitrary parameter k and maximum degree #, our algorithm computes a dominating set ..."
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Cited by 140 (25 self)
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Finding a small dominating set is one of the most fundamental problems of traditional graph theory. In this paper, we present a new fully distributed approximation algorithm based on LP relaxation techniques. For an arbitrary parameter k and maximum degree #, our algorithm computes a dominating set of expected size O k# log #DSOPT rounds where each node has to send O k messages of size O(log #). This is the first algorithm which achieves a nontrivial approximation ratio in a constant number of rounds.