This paper aims at assisting empirical researchers benefit from recent advances in causal inference. The paper stresses the paradigmatic shifts that must be undertaken in moving from traditional statistical analysis to causal analysis of multivariate data. Special emphasis is placed on the assumptions that underly all causal inferences, the languages used in formulating those assumptions, and the conditional nature of causal claims inferred from nonexperimental studies. These emphases are illustrated through a brief survey of recent results, including the control of confounding, the assessment of causal effects, the interpretation of counterfactuals, and a symbiosis between counterfactual and graphical methods of analysis.

Bayesian networks are normally given one of two types of foundations: they are either treated purely formally as an abstract way of representing probability functions, or they are interpreted, with some causal interpretation given to the graph in a network and some standard interpretation of probability given to the probabilities specified in the network. In this chapter I argue that current foundations are problematic, and put forward new foundations which involve aspects of both the interpreted and the formal approaches. One standard approach is to interpret a Bayesian network objectively: the graph in a Bayesian network represents causality in the world and the specified probabilities are objective, empirical probabilities. Such an interpretation founders when the Bayesian network independence assumption (often called the causal Markov condition) fails to hold. In §2 I catalogue the occasions when the independence assumption fails, and show that such failures are pervasive. Next, in §3, I show that even where the independence assumption does hold objectively, an agent’s causal knowledge is unlikely to satisfy the assumption with respect to her subjective probabilities, and that slight differences between an agent’s subjective Bayesian network and an objective Bayesian network can lead to large differences between probability distributions determined by these networks. To overcome these difficulties I put forward logical Bayesian foundations in §5. I show that if the graph and probability specification in a Bayesian network are thought of as an agent’s background knowledge, then the agent is most rational if she adopts the probability distribution determined by the

According to common judicial standard, judgment in favor of plaintiff should be made if and only if it is "more probable than not" that the defendant's action was the cause for the plaintiff's damage (or death). This paper provides formal semantics, based on structural models of counterfactuals, for the probability that event x was a necessary or sufficient cause (or both) of another event y. The paper then explicates conditions under which the probability of necessary (or sufficient) causation can be learned from statistical data, and shows how data from both experimental and nonexperimental studies can be combined to yield information that neither study alone can provide. Finally,weshow that necessity and sufficiency are two independent aspects of causation, and that both should be invoked in the construction of causal explanations for specific scenarios.

developed a theory of statistical causal inference. In his presentation at the Notre Dame

This paper provides a conceptual introduction to causal inference, aimed to assist health services researchers benefit from recent advances in this area. The paper stresses the paradigmatic shifts that must be undertaken in moving from traditional statistical analysis to causal analysis of multivariate data. Special emphasis is placed on the assumptions that underlie all causal inferences, the languages used in formulating those assumptions, and the conditional nature of causal claims inferred from nonexperimental studies. These emphases are illustrated through a brief survey of recent results, including the control of confounding, corrections for noncompliance, and a symbiosis between counterfactual and graphical methods of analysis.

This report is based on lecture notes written for CS 262C, Spring 1998, and is organized as follows. Following a review of the SL framework (Section 2) Section 3 provides a comparison to other approaches to causation and suggests an explanation of why the notion of actual cause has encountered difficulties in those approaches. Section 3 defines "actual cause" and illustrates, through examples, how the "probability that event X = x actually caused event

Directed acyclic graph (DAG) models are popular tools for describing causal relationships and for guiding attempts to learn them from data. In particular, they appear to supply a means of extracting causal conclusions from probabilistic conditional independence properties inferred from purely observational data. I take a critical look at this enterprise, and suggest that it is in need of more, and more explicit, methodological and philosophical justification than it typically receives. In particular, I argue for the value of a clean separation between formal causal language and intuitive causal assumptions.

This paper unifies three complementary approaches to defining, identifying, and estimating causal effects: the classical structural equations approach of the Cowles Commision; the treatment effects framework of Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); and the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) approach of Pearl. The settable system framework nests these prior approaches, while affording significant improvements to each. For example, the settable system approach permits identification of causal effects without requiring exogenous instruments; instead, a weaker conditional exogeneity condition suffices. It removes the stable unit treatment value assumption of the treatment effect approach and provides significant insight into the selection of covariates. It generalizes the DAG ap-proach by accommodating mutual causality and attributes. We provide a variety of results ensuring structural identification of general covariate-conditioned average causal effects, laying the founda-tion for parametric and nonparametric estimation of effects of interest and new tests for structural identification.

Abstract not found

This paper unifies three complementary approaches to defining, identifying, and estimating causal effects: the classical structural equations approach of the Cowles Commision; the treatment effects framework of Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); and the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) approach of Pearl. The settable system framework nests these prior approaches, while affording significant improvements to each. For example, the settable system approach permits identification and estimation of causal effects without requiring exogenous instruments, generalizing the classical structural equations approach; it relaxes the stable unit treatment value assumption of the treatment effect approach and provides significant insight into the selection of covariates; and it accommodates mutual causality, generalizing the DAG approach. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for identification of covariate-conditioned average causal effects, parametric and nonparametric estimation results, and new tests for unconfoundedness.