The Nature-Nurture controversy has been with us since it was first outlined by Plato and Aristotle. Nobody likes it anymore. All reasonable scholars today agree that genes and environment interact to determine complex cognitive outcomes. So why does the controversy persist? First, it persists because it has practical implications that cannot be postponed (i.e., what can we do to avoid bad outcomes and insure better ones?), a state of emergency that sometimes tempts scholars to stake out claims they cannot defend. Second, the controversy persists because we lack a precise, testable theory of the process by which genes and environment interact. In the absence of a better theory, innateness is often confused with (1) domain specificity (Outcome X is so peculiar that it must be innate), (2) species specificity (we are the only species who do X, so X must lie in the human genome), (3) localization (Outcome X is mediated by a particular part of the brain, so X must be innate), and (4) learnability (we cannot figure out how X could be learned, so X must be innate). We believe that an explicit and plausible theory of interaction is now around the corner, and that many of the classic maneuvers to defend or attack innateness will soon disappear. In the interim, some serious errors can be avoided if we keep these confounded issues apart. That is the major goal of this paper, i.e., not to attack innateness but to clarify what

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The author reviews reemerging coconstructive conceptions of development and recent empirical findings of developmental plasticity at different levels spanning several fields of developmental and life sciences. A cross-level dynamic biocultural coconstructive framework is endorsed to understand cognitive and behavioral development across the life span. This framework integrates main conceptions of earlier views into a unifying frame, viewing the dynamics of life span development as occurring simultaneously within different time scales (i.e., moment-to-moment microgenesis, life span ontogeny, and human phylogeny) and encompassing multiple levels (i.e., neurobiological, cognitive, behavioral, and sociocultural). Viewed through this metatheoretical framework, new insights of potential interfaces for reciprocal cultural and experiential influences to be integrated with behavioral genetics and cognitive neuroscience research can be more easily prescribed. Metaphorically speaking, two related pendulums, one swinging back and forth from nature to nurture and the other from brain to mind, have been running the clocks of developmental and cognitive inquiries for centuries. Instead of polarizing toward either end, this review of recent advances in life and developmental sciences

The Nature-Nurture controversy has been with us since it was first outlined by Plato and Aristotle. Nobody likes it anymore. All reasonable scholars today agree that genes and environment interact to determine complex cognitive outcomes. So why does the controversy persist? First, it persists because it has practical implications that cannot be postponed (i.e., what can we do to avoid bad outcomes and insure better ones?), a state of emergency that sometimes tempts scholars to stake out claims they cannot defend. Second, the controversy persists because we lack a precise, testable theory of the process by which genes and environment interact. In the absence of a better theory, innateness is often confused with (1) domain specificity (Outcome X is so peculiar that it must be

Abstract not found

Description Translate neurodevelopmental event timing across species. Predict unknown event timings and investigate phylogenetic proximity by hierarchical clustering of the known and predicted event timings.

The human brain has often been viewed as outstanding among mammalian brains: the most cognitively able, the largest-than-expected from body size, endowed with an overdeveloped cerebral cortex that represents over 80 % of brain mass, and purportedly containing 100 billion neurons and 10 × more glial cells. Such uniqueness was seemingly necessary to justify the superior cognitive abilities of humans over larger-brained mammals such as elephants and whales. However, our recent studies using a novel method to determine the cellular composition of the brain of humans and other primates as well as of rodents and insectivores show that, since different cellular scaling rules apply to the brains within these orders, brain size can no longer be considered a proxy for the number of neurons in the brain. These studies also showed that the human brain is not exceptional in its cellular composition, as it was found to contain as many neuronal and non-neuronal cells as would be expected of a primate brain of its size. Additionally, the so-called overdeveloped human cerebral cortex holds only 19 % of all brain neurons, a fraction that is similar to that found in other mammals. In what regards absolute numbers of neurons, however, the human brain does have two advantages compared to other mammalian brains: compared to rodents, and probably to whales and elephants as well, it is built according

Abstract: Philosophy of psychology takes various forms. Some philosophers of psychology use psychological findings and theories to develop new answers to traditional philosophical issues. A smaller number of philosophers of psychology take their cue from the philosophy of science. They describe and evaluate the discovery heuristics, theories, and explanatory practices endorsed by psychologists. Finally, much philosophy of psychology can be characterized as psychological theorizing. Just like psychologists, philosophers propose empirical theories of specific aspects of our mind, trying to explain relevant psychological phenomena. Focusing mostly on this aspect of the philosophy of psychology, I will consider philosophers ’ contribution to the theoretical development of psychology in four areas: cognitive architecture and modularity (§2); situated, embodied and extended cognition (§3); concepts (§4), and mindreading (§6). 1 Before doing this, however, I will discuss philosophers’ and psychologists ’ views and arguments about the distinctive character of psychology—its mentalistic nature (§1).

Model of the early development of thalamo-cortical connections and area patterning via signaling molecules

Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Facial motor nucleus volume coevolves with both social group size and primary visual cortex volume in catarrhine primates as part of a specialized neuroethological system for communication using facial expressions. Here, we examine whether facial nucleus volume also coevolves with functionally unrelated brainstem motor nuclei (trigeminal motor and hypoglossal) due to developmental constraints. Using phylogenetically informed multiple regression analyses of previously published brain component data, we demonstrate that facial nucleus volume is not correlated with the volume of other motor nuclei after controlling for medulla volume. Our results show that brainstem motor nuclei can evolve independently of other developmentally linked structures in association with specific behavioral ecological conditions. This finding provides additional support for the mosaic view of brain evolution. 1.