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Cryptographic Hash Functions: A Survey
, 1995
"... This paper gives a survey on cryptographic hash functions. It gives an overview of all types of hash functions and reviews design principals and possible methods of attacks. It also focuses on keyed hash functions and provides the applications, requirements, and constructions of keyed hash functions ..."
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Cited by 35 (7 self)
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This paper gives a survey on cryptographic hash functions. It gives an overview of all types of hash functions and reviews design principals and possible methods of attacks. It also focuses on keyed hash functions and provides the applications, requirements, and constructions of keyed hash functions.
SWIFFT: A Modest Proposal for FFT Hashing
"... We propose SWIFFT, a collection of compression functions that are highly parallelizable and admit very efficient implementations on modern microprocessors. The main technique underlying our functions is a novel use of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to achieve “diffusion, ” together with a linear ..."
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Cited by 28 (10 self)
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We propose SWIFFT, a collection of compression functions that are highly parallelizable and admit very efficient implementations on modern microprocessors. The main technique underlying our functions is a novel use of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to achieve “diffusion, ” together with a linear combination to achieve compression and “confusion. ” We provide a detailed security analysis of concrete instantiations, and give a highperformance software implementation that exploits the inherent parallelism of the FFT algorithm. The throughput of our implementation is competitive with that of SHA256, with additional parallelism yet to be exploited. Our functions are set apart from prior proposals (having comparable efficiency) by a supporting asymptotic security proof: it can be formally proved that finding a collision in a randomlychosen function from the family (with noticeable probability) is at least as hard as finding short vectors in cyclic/ideal lattices in the worst case.
Black Box Cryptanalysis of Hash Networks Based on Multipermutations
 EUROCRYPT'94, LNCS 950
, 1994
"... Black box cryptanalysis applies to hash algorithms consisting of many small boxes, connected by a known graph structure, so that the boxes can be evaluated forward and backwards by given oracles. We study attacks that work for any choice of the black boxes, i.e. we scrutinize the given graph struct ..."
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Cited by 27 (3 self)
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Black box cryptanalysis applies to hash algorithms consisting of many small boxes, connected by a known graph structure, so that the boxes can be evaluated forward and backwards by given oracles. We study attacks that work for any choice of the black boxes, i.e. we scrutinize the given graph structure. For example we analyze the graph of the fast Fourier transform (FFT). We present optimal black box inversions of FFTcompression functions and black box constructions of collisions. This determines the minimal depth of FFT compression networks for collisionresistant hashing. We propose the concept of multipermutation, which is a pair of orthogonal latin squares, as a new cryptographic primitive that generalizes the boxes of the FFT. Our examples of multipermutations are based on the operations circul
Provably secure FFT hashing
 2nd NIST Cryptographic Hash Function Workshop
, 2006
"... We propose a new family of collision resistant hash functions with the distinguishing feature of being provably secure. The main technique underlying our functions is a novel use of the Fast Fourier Transform to achieve ideal “diffusion ” properties, together with a random linear function to achieve ..."
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Cited by 3 (2 self)
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We propose a new family of collision resistant hash functions with the distinguishing feature of being provably secure. The main technique underlying our functions is a novel use of the Fast Fourier Transform to achieve ideal “diffusion ” properties, together with a random linear function to achieve compression and “confusion”. Our functions admit fast implementation both in hardware and software, but are set apart from previous proposals (based on similar building blocks) in the literature by a supporting security proof: it can be formally proven that (asymptotically) finding collisions to our functions (for keys chosen uniformly at random) with nonnegligible probability is at least as hard as solving certain lattice problems in the worst case. Our proposal and techniques are based on previous work by Micciancio (FOCS
Black Box Cryptanalysis of Cryptographic Primitives
, 1995
"... We analyse the security of a cryptographic primitive on the basis of the geometry of its computation graph. We assume the computation graph of the primitive to be given whereas the boxes sitting on the vertices of this graph are unknown and random, i.e. they are black boxes. We formalize and study a ..."
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We analyse the security of a cryptographic primitive on the basis of the geometry of its computation graph. We assume the computation graph of the primitive to be given whereas the boxes sitting on the vertices of this graph are unknown and random, i.e. they are black boxes. We formalize and study a family of attacks which generalize exhaustive search and the birthday paradox. We establish complexity lower bounds for this family and we apply it to compression functions based on the FFT network.
unknown title
"... The literature of cryptography has a curious history. Secrecy, of course, has always played a central role, but until the First World War, important developments appeared in print in a more or less timely fashion and the field moved forward in much the same way as other specialized disciplines. As l ..."
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The literature of cryptography has a curious history. Secrecy, of course, has always played a central role, but until the First World War, important developments appeared in print in a more or less timely fashion and the field moved forward in much the same way as other specialized disciplines. As late as 1918, one of the most influential cryptanalytic papers of the twentieth century, William F. Friedman’s monograph The Index of Coincidence and Its Applications in Cryptography, appeared as a research report of the private Riverbank Laboratories [577]. And this, despite the fact that the work had been done as part of the war effort. In the same year Edward H. Hebern of Oakland, California filed the first patent for a rotor machine [710], the device destined to be a mainstay of military cryptography for nearly 50 years. After the First World War, however, things began to change. U.S. Army and Navy organizations, working entirely in secret, began to make fundamental advances in cryptography. During the thirties and forties a few basic papers did appear in the open literature and several treatises on the subject were published, but the latter were farther and farther behind the state of the art. By the end of the war the transition was complete. With one notable exception, the public literature had died. That exception was Claude Shannon’s paper “The Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, ” which