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Inductive influence
 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
"... Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief 1 to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have 2 been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bay ..."
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Cited by 9 (7 self)
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Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief 1 to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have 2 been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence on the next observation. I show how this approach can be used to capture the JohnsonCarnap continuum of inductive methods, as well as the NixParis continuum, and show how inductive influence can
Philosophies of probability: objective Bayesianism and its challenges
 Handbook of the philosophy of mathematics. Elsevier, Amsterdam. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science
, 2004
"... This chapter presents an overview of the major interpretations of probability followed by an outline of the objective Bayesian interpretation and a discussion of the key challenges it faces. ..."
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Cited by 8 (5 self)
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This chapter presents an overview of the major interpretations of probability followed by an outline of the objective Bayesian interpretation and a discussion of the key challenges it faces.
Objective bayesian probabilistic logic
 Journal of Algorithms
"... This paper develops connections between objective Bayesian epistemology—which holds that the strengths of an agent’s beliefs should be representable by probabilities, should be calibrated with evidence of empirical probability, and should otherwise be equivocal—and probabilistic logic. After introdu ..."
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Cited by 6 (4 self)
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This paper develops connections between objective Bayesian epistemology—which holds that the strengths of an agent’s beliefs should be representable by probabilities, should be calibrated with evidence of empirical probability, and should otherwise be equivocal—and probabilistic logic. After introducing objective Bayesian epistemology over propositional languages, the formalism is extended to handle predicate languages. A rather general probabilistic logic is formulated and then given a natural semantics in terms of objective Bayesian epistemology. The machinery of objective Bayesian nets and objective credal nets is introduced and this machinery is applied to provide a calculus for probabilistic logic that meshes with the objective Bayesian semantics.
Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages. Synthese
, 2008
"... Objective Bayesian probability is often defined over rather simple domains, e.g., finite event spaces or propositional languages. This paper investigates the extension of objective Bayesianism to firstorder logical languages. It is argued that the objective Bayesian should choose a probability func ..."
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Cited by 5 (5 self)
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Objective Bayesian probability is often defined over rather simple domains, e.g., finite event spaces or propositional languages. This paper investigates the extension of objective Bayesianism to firstorder logical languages. It is argued that the objective Bayesian should choose a probability function, from all those that satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, that is closest to a particular frequencyinduced probability function which generalises the λ = 0 function of Carnap’s continuum of inductive methods.
Philosophies of probability
 Handbook of the Philosophy of Mathematics, Volume 4 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science
"... This chapter presents an overview of the major interpretations of probability followed by an outline of the objective Bayesian interpretation and a discussion of the key challenges it faces. I discuss the ramifications of interpretations of probability and objective Bayesianism for the philosophy of ..."
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Cited by 3 (2 self)
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This chapter presents an overview of the major interpretations of probability followed by an outline of the objective Bayesian interpretation and a discussion of the key challenges it faces. I discuss the ramifications of interpretations of probability and objective Bayesianism for the philosophy of mathematics in general.
A proof of the base cases of the Emergence of Reason's Conjecture for CM
, 2003
"... In this paper we extend the support for a general `Emergence of Reasons' principle in predicate uncertain reasoning by proving the base case of the `Emergence of Reasons Conjecture', for all s, in the case of the inference process CM . ..."
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In this paper we extend the support for a general `Emergence of Reasons' principle in predicate uncertain reasoning by proving the base case of the `Emergence of Reasons Conjecture', for all s, in the case of the inference process CM .
DOI 10.1007/s112290079298y Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages
"... Abstract Objective Bayesian probability is often defined over rather simple domains, e.g., finite event spaces or propositional languages. This paper investigates the extension of objective Bayesianism to firstorder logical languages. It is argued that the objective Bayesian should choose a probabi ..."
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Abstract Objective Bayesian probability is often defined over rather simple domains, e.g., finite event spaces or propositional languages. This paper investigates the extension of objective Bayesianism to firstorder logical languages. It is argued that the objective Bayesian should choose a probability function, from all those that satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, that is closest to a particular frequencyinduced probability function which generalises the λ = 0 function of Carnap’s continuum of inductive methods.