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Testing Game Theory
, 2004
"... Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very definition of ..."
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Cited by 996 (15 self)
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Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very definition of a game and of players ’ preferences, in particular with respect to potential context dependence, interpersonal preference dependence, backward induction and incomplete information.
Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games
"... In singleperson decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function (or NMUF) that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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In singleperson decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function (or NMUF) that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the
Belief Revision and Rationalizability
 Proceedings TARK 1998, 201
, 1998
"... The Bayesian approach to noncooperative game theory, pioneered by Bernheim [6] and Pearce [15], views games as Bayesian decision problems in the sense of Savage, where the uncertainty faced by the players is the strategy choices of their opponents. Accordingly it is assumed that each player has a p ..."
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The Bayesian approach to noncooperative game theory, pioneered by Bernheim [6] and Pearce [15], views games as Bayesian decision problems in the sense of Savage, where the uncertainty faced by the players is the strategy choices of their opponents. Accordingly it is assumed that each player has a prior over the strategy sets of the other players.
Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory
, 2000
"... This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers ..."
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This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers
CLOSING ECONOMIC MODELS BY INFORMATION
"... In this paper it is shown how interactive social systems, like microeconomic models and noncooperative games, can be closed by assumptions on the participants ’ information concerning the structure of the social system, the beliefs of other agents, and the information structure itself. A coherent f ..."
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In this paper it is shown how interactive social systems, like microeconomic models and noncooperative games, can be closed by assumptions on the participants ’ information concerning the structure of the social system, the beliefs of other agents, and the information structure itself. A coherent framework for analyzing information assumptions in games as well as in economies that cannot be written in strategic form is developed. A variety of information assumptions is analyzed, and it is demonstrated that these assumptions are equivalent to certain solution concepts. Results are applied to a two–period exchange economy. A sufficient condition is derived for which the Walrasian equilibria of this economy describe the event that households are completely informed about the economy and about the beliefs of the other households.
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE
"... The revelation principle is reconsidered in the light of recent work questioning its general applicability, as well as other work on the Bayesian foundations of game theory. Implementation in rationalizable strategies is considered. A generalized version of the revelation principle is proposed reco ..."
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The revelation principle is reconsidered in the light of recent work questioning its general applicability, as well as other work on the Bayesian foundations of game theory. Implementation in rationalizable strategies is considered. A generalized version of the revelation principle is proposed recognizing that, unless agents all have dominant strategies, the outcome of any allocation mechanism depends not only upon agents ’ “intrinsic ” types, but also upon their beliefs about other agents and their strategic behaviour. This generalization applies even if agents are “boundedly rational ” in the sense of being Bayesian rational only with respect to bounded models of the game form. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My special thanks to Fernando Salas, one of whose comments on a preliminary version of Hammond (1990) largely prompted this work.Earlier versions formed the basis of presentations to the conferences on “Rational Behaviour in Games ” at the Centre International de Rencontres Mathématiques,
Robust Implementation in Weakly Rationalizable Strategies
, 2013
"... Weakly rationalizable implementation represents a generalization of robust implementation to dynamic mechanisms. It is so conservative that virtual implementation in weakly rationalizable strategies is characterized by the same conditions as robust virtual implementation by static mechanisms. We sho ..."
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Weakly rationalizable implementation represents a generalization of robust implementation to dynamic mechanisms. It is so conservative that virtual implementation in weakly rationalizable strategies is characterized by the same conditions as robust virtual implementation by static mechanisms. We show that despite that, (exact) weakly rationalizable implementation is more permissive than (exact) robust implementation in general static mechanisms. We introduce a dynamic robust monotonicity condition that is weaker than Bergemann and Morris ’ (2011) robust monotonicity condition and prove that it is necessary, and together with weak extra assumptions sufficient for weakly rationalizable implementation in general dynamic mechanisms. We demonstrate that sometimes even weakly rationalizable implementation in finite dynamic mechanisms is more permissive than robust implementation in general static mechanisms.