Psychologists and neuroscientists have had a long-standing interest in the P3, a prominent component of the event-related brain potential. This review aims to integrate knowledge regarding the neural basis of the P3 and to elucidate its functional role in information processing. The authors review evidence suggesting that the P3 reflects phasic activity of the neuromodulatory locus coeruleus–norepinephrine (LC-NE) system. They discuss the P3 literature in the light of empirical findings and a recent theory regarding the information-processing function of the LC-NE phasic response. The theoretical framework emerging from this research synthesis suggests that the P3 reflects the response of the LC-NE system to the outcome of internal decision-making processes and the consequent effects of noradrenergic potentiation of information processing.

There has been a conceptual revolution in the biological sciences over the past several decades. Evidence from genetics, embryology, and developmental biology has converged to offer a more epigenetic, contingent, and dynamic view of how organisms develop. Despite these advances, arguments for the heuristic value of a gene-centered, predeterministic approach to the study of human behavior and development have become increasingly evident in the psychological sciences during this time. In this article, the authors review recent advances in genetics, embryology, and developmental biology that have transformed contemporary developmental and evolutionary theory and explore how these advances challenge gene-centered explanations of human behavior that ignore the complex, highly coordinated system of regulatory dynamics involved in development and evolution. The prestige of success enjoyed by the gene theory might become a hindrance to the understanding of development by directing our attention solely to the genome....Already we have theories that refer the processes of development to genic action and regard the whole performance as no more than the realization of the potencies of the genes. Such theories are altogether too one-sided. (Harrison, 1937, p. 370) There is growing consensus in popular culture that by understanding genes and the mutual interactions of the proteins derived from them it is possible to understand all of life, including human nature. Psychology is no stranger to this perspective. As most psychologists are aware, a blend of ethology and sociobiology known as evolutionary psychology has gained increasing attention and recognition over the past several decades. Arguments for the heuristic value of a gene-centered, evolutionary approach to the study of human behavior have become increasingly evident in mainstream psychology journals (i.e., Buss, 1995; Buss & Schmitt,

Two-component theories of intellectual development over the life span postulate that fluid abilities develop earlier during child development and decline earlier during aging than crystallized abilities do, and that fluid abilities support or constrain the acquisition and expression of crystallized abilities. Thus, maturation and senescence compress the structure of intelligence by imposing age-specific constraints upon its constituent processes. Hence, the couplings among different intellectual abilities and cognitive processes are expected to be strong in childhood and old age. Findings from a populationbased study of 291 individuals aged 6 to 89 years support these predictions. Furthermore, processing robustness, a frequently overlooked aspect of processing, predicted fluid intelligence beyond processing speed in old age but not in childhood, suggesting that the causes of more compressed functional organization of intelligence differ between maturation and senescence. Research on developmental changes in functional brain circuitry may profit from explicitly recognizing transformations in the organization of intellectual abilities and their underlying cognitive processes across the life span.

The nature and scope of cultural diversity in human behavior is breathtakingly unparalleled throughout the animal kingdom. With the exception of a few primitive cultural traits shared with nonhuman primate societies (Tomasello et al., 2005; Whiten et al., 2007), humans demonstrate a rare level of cultural competence, which has