The question is not whether intelligent machines can have any emotions, but whether machines can be intelligent without any emotions. – Marvin Minsky, (Minsky, 1986) p. 163 In every art form it is the emotional content that makes the difference between mere technical skill and true art.

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The present paper takes the position that social action inherently involves meaning and, thus, cannot be adequately modeled without representing the interpretive process among agents. The development of interpretive models is challenging, however, and quickly raises issues of computational tractability. A strategy is developed based on three assumptions (agent focus, continuity reduction and orientation fields) and three mechanisms (prototype inference, orientation accounting, and situational definition). When the three mechanisms are incorporated into an action selection mechanism, they provide a model of the interpretive process of social interpretation with a higher level of verisimilitude than many other approaches.

allows modelling a great number of agent communication aspects while being computational. This paper describes our exploration in applying the cognitive coherence pragmatic theory for BDI agents communication. The presented practical fYamework rely on our dialogue games based agent communication language (DIAGAL) and our dialogue game simulator toolbox (DGS). It provides the necessary theoretical and practical elements for implementing the theory as a new layer over classical BDI agents. In doing so, it brought a general scheme for automatizing agents' communicational behavior. Finally, we give an example of the resulting system execution.

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Explanation of why things happen is one of humans ’ most important cognitive operations. In everyday life, people are continually generating explanations of why other people behave the way they do, why they get sick, why computers or cars are not working properly, and of many other puzzling occurrences. More systematically, scientists develop theories to provide general explanations of physical phenomena such as why objects fall to earth, chemical phenomena such as why elements combine, biological phenomena such as why species evolve, medical phenomena such as why organisms develop diseases, and psychological phenomena such as why people sometimes make mental errors. This chapter reviews computational models of the cognitive processes that underlie these kinds of explanations of why events happen. It is not concerned with another sense of explanation that just means clarification, as when someone explains the U. S. constitution. The focus will be on scientific explanations, but more mundane examples will occasionally be used, on the grounds that the cognitive processes for explaining why events happen are much the same in everyday life and in science, although scientific explanations tend tobe more systematic and rigorous than everyday ones. In addition to providing a concise review of previous computational models of explanation, this chapter describes a new neural network model that shows how explanations can be performed by multimodal distributed representations.

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In cognitive science, natural cognitive processes are generally conceptualized as computational processes: they serve to transform sensory and mental inputs into mental and action outputs. At the highest level of abstraction, computational models of cognitive processes aim at specifying the computational problem computed by the process under study. Because computational problems are realistic cognitive models only insofar as they can plausibly be computed by the human brain given its limited resources for computation, computational tractability provides a useful constraint on cognitive models. In this paper, we consider the particular benefits of the parameterized complexity framework for identifying sources of intractability in cognitive models. We review existing applications of the parameterized framework to this end in the domains of perception, action and higher cognition. We further identify important opportunities and challenges for future research. These include the development of new methods for complexity analyses specifically tailored to the reverse engineering perspective underlying cognitive science.

What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it is increasing its explanatory coherence in two key respects: broadening by explaining more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. I sketch an explanation of why deepening is a good epistemic strategy and discuss the prospect of deepening knowledge in the social sciences and everyday life. 1. Introduction. The