Design experience and theoretical discussion suggest that a narrow design focus on one tool or medium as primary may clash with the way that everyday activity involves the interweaving and combination of many heterogeneous media. Interaction may become seamless and unproblematic, even if the differences, boundaries and `seams' in media are objectively perceivable. People accommodate and take advantage of seams and heterogeneity, in and through the process of interaction.

Cleeremans: The search for the computational correlates of consciousness

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Context shapes perception, thought, and action, but little is known about the neural mechanisms supporting these modulations. Here, we addressed the role of lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) in context updating and maintenance from an information-theoretic perspective. Ten patients with PFC lesions and 10 age-matched controls responded to bilaterally displayed visual targets intermixed with repetitive and novel distracters in 2 different task contexts. In a predictable context, targets were always preceded by a novel event, whereas this temporal contingency was removed in an unpredictable context condition. We applied information theory to the analysis and interpretation of behavioral and electrophysiological data. The results revealed deficits in both the selection and the suppression of familiar versus novel information mainly observed at the visual hemifield contralateral to PFC damage due to disrupted frontocortical and frontosubcortical connectivity. The findings support a deficit in the representation of the temporal contingency between contextually related novel and familiar stimulation subsequent to lateral PFC damage.

Abstract not found

Empirical arguments for materialism are highly circumstantial—based, as they are, upon inductions from our knowledge of the physical and upon the fact that mental phenomena have physical correlates, causes and effects. However, the qualitative characteristics of first-person conscious experience are empirically distinct from uncontroversially physical phenomena in being—at least on our present knowledge—thoroughly resistant to the kind of abstract, formal description to which the latter are always, to some degree, readily amenable. The prima facie inference that phenomenal qualities are, most probably, non-physical may be resisted either by denying their existence altogether or by proposing that they are properties of some peculiar sort of mysterious physical complexity, located, for example, within the functioning of the brain. It is argued here, however, that the first, eliminative hypothesis is empirically absurd—while the second is extravagant, vague, ad hoc and (for various additional reasons) profoundly implausible. Taken together, these considerations provide a compelling empirical case against materialism—yet its converse, mentalism, is usually regarded as subject to serious difficulties of its own. I conclude by suggesting empirical and theoretical desiderata, respectively, for the vindication of materialism and alternatively, for the development and defense of a potentially robust and viable mentalist theory of consciousness.