We propose a fully functional identity-based encryption scheme (IBE). The scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model assuming an elliptic curve variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Our system is based on bilinear maps between groups. The Weil pairing on elliptic curves is an example of such a map. We give precise definitions for secure identity based encryption schemes and give several applications for such systems.

A group signature scheme allows a group member to sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group. However, in the case of a dispute, the identity of a signature’s originator can be revealed (only) by a designated entity. The interactive counterparts of group signatures are identity escrow schemes or group identification scheme with revocable anonymity. This work introduces a new provably secure group signature and a companion identity escrow scheme that are significantly more efficient than the state of the art. In its interactive, identity escrow form, our scheme is proven secure and coalition-resistant under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions. The security of the noninteractive variant, i.e., the group signature scheme, relies additionally on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (also known as the random oracle model).

A new public key encryption scheme, along with several variants, is proposed and analyzed. The scheme and its variants are quite practical, and are proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. These appear to be the first public-key encryption schemes in the literature that are simultaneously practical and provably secure.

Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.

Pseudonym systems allow users to interact with multiple organizations anonymously, using pseudonyms. The pseudonyms cannot be linked, but are formed in such a way that a user can prove to one organization a statement about his relationship with another. Such statement is called a credential. Previous work in this area did not protect the system against dishonest users who collectively use their pseudonyms and credentials, i.e. share an identity. Previous practical schemes also relied very heavily on the involvement of a trusted center. In the present paper we give a formal definition of pseudonym systems where users are motivated not to share their identity, and in which the trusted center's involvement is minimal. We give theoretical constructions for such systems based on any one-way function. We also suggest an efficient and easy to implement practical scheme. This is joint work with Ronald L. Rivest and Amit Sahai.

This document should be viewed less as a first draft of a standard for public-key encryption, and more as a proposal for what such a draft standard should contain. It is hoped that this proposal will serve as a basis for discussion, from which a consensus for a standard may be formed.

Abstract. We propose a way to establish peer-to-peer authenticated communications over an insecure channel by using an extra channel which can authenticate very short strings, e.g. 15 bits. We call this SAS-based authentication as for authentication based on Short Authenticated Strings. The extra channel uses a weak notion of authentication in which strings cannot be forged nor modi£ed, but whose delivery can be maliciously stalled, canceled, or replayed. Our protocol is optimal and relies on an extractable or equivocable commitment scheme. This approach offers an alternative (or complement) to public-key infrastructures, since we no longer need any central authority, and to password-based authenticated key exchange, since we no longer need to establish a con£dential password. It can be used to establish secure associations in ad-hoc networks. Applications could be the authentication of a public key (e.g. for SSH or PGP) by users over the telephone, the user-aided pairing of wireless (e.g. Bluetooth) devices, or the restore of secure associations in a disaster case, namely when one remote peer had his long-term keys corrupted.

We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be coercion resistant if it is impossible for the adversary to determine whether a coerced voter complies with the demands. Furthermore, we relax the requirements made in some previous proposals from an untappable channel to only requiring the existence of an anonymous channel.

We introduce a new cryptographic technique that we call universal re-encryption. A conventional cryptosystem that permits reencryption, such as ElGamal, does so only for a player with knowledge of the public key corresponding to a given ciphertext. In contrast, universal re-encryption can be done without knowledge of public keys. We propose an asymmetric cryptosystem with universal re-encryption that is half as efficient as standard ElGamal in terms of computation and storage. While

We propose a new general primitive called lossy trapdoor functions (lossy TDFs), and realize it under a variety of different number theoretic assumptions, including hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem and the worst-case hardness of standard lattice problems. Using lossy TDFs, we develop a new approach for constructing many important cryptographic primitives, including standard trapdoor functions, CCA-secure cryptosystems, collisionresistant hash functions, and more. All of our constructions are simple, efficient, and black-box. Taken all together, these results resolve some long-standing open problems in cryptography. They give the first known (injective) trapdoor functions based on problems not directly related to integer factorization, and provide the first known CCA-secure cryptosystem based solely on worst-case lattice assumptions.