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A Logic of Argumentation for Reasoning under Uncertainty.
 Computational Intelligence
, 1995
"... We present the syntax and proof theory of a logic of argumentation, LA. We also outline the development of a category theoretic semantics for LA. LA is the core of a proof theoretic model for reasoning under uncertainty. In this logic, propositions are labelled with a representation of the arguments ..."
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Cited by 145 (8 self)
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We present the syntax and proof theory of a logic of argumentation, LA. We also outline the development of a category theoretic semantics for LA. LA is the core of a proof theoretic model for reasoning under uncertainty. In this logic, propositions are labelled with a representation of the arguments which support their validity. Arguments may then be aggregated to collect more information about the potential validity of the propositions of interest. We make the notion of aggregation primitive to the logic, and then define strength mappings from sets of arguments to one of a number of possible dictionaries. This provides a uniform framework which incorporates a number of numerical and symbolic techniques for assigning subjective confidences to propositions on the basis of their supporting arguments. These aggregation techniques are also described, with examples. Key words: Uncertain reasoning, epistemic probability, argumentation, nonclassical logics, nonmonotonic reasoning 1. Introd...
The Theory of LEGO  A Proof Checker for the Extended Calculus of Constructions
, 1994
"... LEGO is a computer program for interactive typechecking in the Extended Calculus of Constructions and two of its subsystems. LEGO also supports the extension of these three systems with inductive types. These type systems can be viewed as logics, and as meta languages for expressing logics, and LEGO ..."
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Cited by 73 (10 self)
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LEGO is a computer program for interactive typechecking in the Extended Calculus of Constructions and two of its subsystems. LEGO also supports the extension of these three systems with inductive types. These type systems can be viewed as logics, and as meta languages for expressing logics, and LEGO is intended to be used for interactively constructing proofs in mathematical theories presented in these logics. I have developed LEGO over six years, starting from an implementation of the Calculus of Constructions by G erard Huet. LEGO has been used for problems at the limits of our abilities to do formal mathematics. In this thesis I explain some aspects of the metatheory of LEGO's type systems leading to a machinechecked proof that typechecking is decidable for all three type theories supported by LEGO, and to a verified algorithm for deciding their typing judgements, assuming only that they are normalizing. In order to do this, the theory of Pure Type Systems (PTS) is extended and f...
A Nonstandard Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1990
"... We introduce a new approach to dealing with the wellknown logical omniscience problem in epistemic logic. Instead of taking possible worlds where each world is a model of classical propositional logic, we take possible worlds which are models of a nonstandard propositional logic we call NPL, which ..."
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Cited by 53 (4 self)
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We introduce a new approach to dealing with the wellknown logical omniscience problem in epistemic logic. Instead of taking possible worlds where each world is a model of classical propositional logic, we take possible worlds which are models of a nonstandard propositional logic we call NPL, which is somewhat related to relevance logic. This approach gives new insights into the logic of implicit and explicit'belief considered by Levesque and Lakemeyer. In particular, we show that in a precise sense agents in the structures considered by Levesque and Lakemeyer are perfect reasoners in NPL. 1
Predicative Recursion and Computational Complexity
, 1992
"... The purpose of this thesis is to give a "foundational" characterization of some common complexity classes. Such a characterization is distinguished by the fact that no explicit resource bounds are used. For example, we characterize the polynomial time computable functions without making an ..."
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Cited by 45 (3 self)
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The purpose of this thesis is to give a "foundational" characterization of some common complexity classes. Such a characterization is distinguished by the fact that no explicit resource bounds are used. For example, we characterize the polynomial time computable functions without making any direct reference to polynomials, time, or even computation. Complexity classes characterized in this way include polynomial time, the functional polytime hierarchy, the logspace decidable problems, and NC. After developing these "resource free" definitions, we apply them to redeveloping the feasible logical system of Cook and Urquhart, and show how this firstorder system relates to the secondorder system of Leivant. The connection is an interesting one since the systems were defined independently and have what appear to be very different rules for the principle of induction. Furthermore it is interesting to see, albeit in a very specific context, how to retract a second order statement, ("inducti...
Reasoning About Knowledge: A Survey
 Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming
, 1995
"... : In this survey, I attempt to identify and describe some of the common threads that tie together work in reasoning about knowledge in such diverse fields as philosophy, economics, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and theoretical computer science, with particular emphasis on work of the past fi ..."
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Cited by 28 (2 self)
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: In this survey, I attempt to identify and describe some of the common threads that tie together work in reasoning about knowledge in such diverse fields as philosophy, economics, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and theoretical computer science, with particular emphasis on work of the past five years, particularly in computer science. This articule is essentially the same as one that appears in Handbook of of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 4, D. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, and J. A. Robinson, eds., Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 134. It is a revised and updated version of a paper entitled "Reasoning about knowledge: a survey circa 1991", which appears in the Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology, Vol. 27, Supplement 12 (ed. A. Kent and J. G. Williams), Marcel Dekker, 1993, pp. 275296. That article, in turn is a revision of an article entitled "Reasoning About Knowledge: An Overview" that appears in Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning Abou...
Multiple conclusions
 In 12th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
, 2005
"... Abstract: I argue for the following four theses. (1) Denial is not to be analysed as the assertion of a negation. (2) Given the concepts of assertion and denial, we have the resources to analyse logical consequence as relating arguments with multiple premises and multiple conclusions. Gentzen’s mult ..."
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Abstract: I argue for the following four theses. (1) Denial is not to be analysed as the assertion of a negation. (2) Given the concepts of assertion and denial, we have the resources to analyse logical consequence as relating arguments with multiple premises and multiple conclusions. Gentzen’s multiple conclusion calculus can be understood in a straightforward, motivated, nonquestionbegging way. (3) If a broadly antirealist or inferentialist justification of a logical system works, it works just as well for classical logic as it does for intuitionistic logic. The special case for an antirealist justification of intuitionistic logic over and above a justification of classical logic relies on an unjustified assumption about the shape of proofs. Finally, (4) this picture of logical consequence provides a relatively neutral shared vocabulary which can help us understand and adjudicate debates between proponents of classical and nonclassical logics. Our topic is the notion of logical consequence: the link between premises and conclusions, the glue that holds together deductively valid argument. How can we understand this relation between premises and conclusions? It seems that any account begs questions. Painting with very broad brushtrokes, we can sketch the landscape