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Discrete Logarithms in Finite Fields and Their Cryptographic Significance
, 1984
"... Given a primitive element g of a finite field GF(q), the discrete logarithm of a nonzero element u GF(q) is that integer k, 1 k q  1, for which u = g k . The wellknown problem of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields has acquired additional importance in recent years due to its appl ..."
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Given a primitive element g of a finite field GF(q), the discrete logarithm of a nonzero element u GF(q) is that integer k, 1 k q  1, for which u = g k . The wellknown problem of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields has acquired additional importance in recent years due to its applicability in cryptography. Several cryptographic systems would become insecure if an efficient discrete logarithm algorithm were discovered. This paper surveys and analyzes known algorithms in this area, with special attention devoted to algorithms for the fields GF(2 n ). It appears that in order to be safe from attacks using these algorithms, the value of n for which GF(2 n ) is used in a cryptosystem has to be very large and carefully chosen. Due in large part to recent discoveries, discrete logarithms in fields GF(2 n ) are much easier to compute than in fields GF(p) with p prime. Hence the fields GF(2 n ) ought to be avoided in all cryptographic applications. On the other hand, ...
Elliptic Curves and their use in Cryptography
 DIMACS Workshop on Unusual Applications of Number Theory
, 1997
"... The security of many cryptographic protocols depends on the difficulty of solving the socalled "discrete logarithm" problem, in the multiplicative group of a finite field. Although, in the general case, there are no polynomial time algorithms for this problem, constant improvements are being ma ..."
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The security of many cryptographic protocols depends on the difficulty of solving the socalled "discrete logarithm" problem, in the multiplicative group of a finite field. Although, in the general case, there are no polynomial time algorithms for this problem, constant improvements are being made  with the result that the use of these protocols require much larger key sizes, for a given level of security, than may be convenient. An abstraction of these protocols shows that they have analogues in any group. The challenge presents itself: find some other groups for which there are no good attacks on the discrete logarithm, and for which the group operations are sufficiently economical. In 1985, the author suggested that the groups arising from a particular mathematical object known as an "elliptic curve" might fill the bill. In this paper I review the general cryptographic protocols which are involved, briefly describe elliptic curves and review the possible attacks again...
A Cryptosystem Based on the Symmetric Group Sn
"... This paper proposes a public key cryptosystem based on the symmetric group Sn, and validates its theoretical foundation. The proposed system benefits from the algebraic properties of Sn such as non commutative, high computational speed and high flexibility in selecting keys which make the Discrete L ..."
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This paper proposes a public key cryptosystem based on the symmetric group Sn, and validates its theoretical foundation. The proposed system benefits from the algebraic properties of Sn such as non commutative, high computational speed and high flexibility in selecting keys which make the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) resistant to attacks by algorithms such as PohligHellman. Against these properties, the only disadvantage of the scheme is its relative large memory and bandwidth requirements. Due to the similarities in the algebraic structures, many other cryptosystems can be translated to their symmetric group analogs, and the proposed cryptosystem is in fact the Generalized ElGamal cryptosystem which is based on Sn instead of GF(p). Key words: