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The empirical case for two systems of reasoning
, 1996
"... Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations ref ..."
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Cited by 631 (4 self)
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Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is “rule based” because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve complementary functions and can simultaneously generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rulebased system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and its characterization.
Statistical Foundations for Default Reasoning
, 1993
"... We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible worlds. We interpret default rules as extreme statistical statements, thus obtaining a knowledge base KB comprised of statistical and firstorder statements. We then assign equal probability to all w ..."
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Cited by 48 (8 self)
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We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible worlds. We interpret default rules as extreme statistical statements, thus obtaining a knowledge base KB comprised of statistical and firstorder statements. We then assign equal probability to all worlds consistent with KB in order to assign a degree of belief to a statement '. The degree of belief can be used to decide whether to defeasibly conclude '. Various natural patterns of reasoning, such as a preference for more specific defaults, indifference to irrelevant information, and the ability to combine independent pieces of evidence, turn out to follow naturally from this technique. Furthermore, our approach is not restricted to default reasoning; it supports a spectrum of reasoning, from quantitative to qualitative. It is also related to other systems for default reasoning. In particular, we show that the work of [ Goldszmidt et al., 1990 ] , which applies maximum entropy ideas t...
On Subjective MeasuresofInterestingness in Knowledge Discovery
"... One of the central problems in the eld of knowledge discovery is the development of good measures of interestingness of discovered patterns. Such measures of interestingness are divided into objective measures { those that depend only on the structure of a pattern and the underlying data used in the ..."
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One of the central problems in the eld of knowledge discovery is the development of good measures of interestingness of discovered patterns. Such measures of interestingness are divided into objective measures { those that depend only on the structure of a pattern and the underlying data used in the discovery process, and the subjective measures { those that also depend on the class of users who examine the pattern. The purpose of this paper is to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive study of subjective measures of interestingness. In the paper, we classify these measures into actionable and unexpected, and examine the relationship between them. The unexpected measure of interestingness is de ned in terms of the belief system that the user has. Interestingness of a pattern is expressed in terms of how it a ects the belief system. 1