This essay attempts to develop a psychologically informed semantics of perception reports, whose predictions match with the linguistic data. As suggested by the quotation from Miller and Johnson-Laird, we take a hallmark of perception to be its fallible nature; the resulting semantics thus necessarily differs from situation semantics. On the psychological side, our main inspiration is Marr's (1982) theory of vision, which can easily accomodate fallible perception. In Marr's theory, vision is a multi-layered process. The different layers have filters of different gradation, wkich makes vision at each of them approximate. On the logical side, our task is therefore twofold to fomalise the layers and the ways in which they may refine each other, and to develop logical means to let description vary with such degrees of refinement.

Psychological and social systems provide us with a natural domain for the study of anticipations because these systems are based on and operate in terms of intentionality. Psychological systems can be expected to contain a model of themselves and their environments; social systems can be strongly anticipatory and therefore co-construct their environments, for example, in techno-economic (co-)evolutions. Using Dubois’s hyper-incursive and incursive formulations of the logistic equation, these two types of systems and their couplings can be simulated. In addition to their structural coupling, psychological and social systems are also coupled by providing meaning reflexively to each other’s meaning-processing. Luhmann’s distinctions among (1) interactions between intentions at the micro-level, (2) organization at the meso-level, and (3) self-organization of the fluxes of meaningful communication at the global level can be modeled and simulated using three hyper-incursive equations. The global level of self-organizing interactions among fluxes of communication is retained at the meso-level of organization. In a knowledge-based economy, these two levels of anticipatory structuration can be expected to propel each other at the supra-individual level.

Abstract The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative variation as applied to the specific regional ontology of biology. Thus, at a time when the clarification of the essence of our biological embodiment is of growing interest for phenomenology, we suggest that artificial life should be seen as a method of externalizing some of the insurmountable complexity of imaginatively varying the phenomenon of life. 1

Instead of speaking of conscious experience as arising in a brain, we prefer to speak of a brain as arising in conscious experience. From an epistemological standpoint, starting from direct experiences strikes us as more justified. As a first option, we reconsider the `hard problem' of the relation between conscious experience and the physical world by thus turning that problem upside down. We also consider a second option: turning the hard problem sideways. Rather than starting with the third-person approach used in physics, or the first-person approach of starting with individual conscious experience, we consider starting from an I-and-you basis, centered around the secondperson. Finally, we present a candidate for what could be considered to underlie conscious experience: `sense'. We consider this to be a shot in the dark, but at least a shot in the right direction: somewhere between upside down and sideways. Our notion of sense can be seen as an alternative to panpsychism. To giv...

Contents 1 The continuity principle 1 2 A phenomenological consideration 8 2.1 An argument for G(raph)WC-N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2 Two arguments against WC-N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 Other arguments for continuity 15 3.1 Undecidability of equality of choice sequences . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2 Kripke's Schema and full PEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.3 The KLST theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4 Conclusion 19 1 The continuity principle There are two principles that lend Brouwer's mathematics the extra power beyond arithmetic. Both are presented in Brouwer's writings with little or no argument. One, the principle of bar induction, will not concern us here. The other, the continuity principle for numbers, occurs for the rst time in print in [Brouwer 1918]. It is formulated and immediately applied to show that the set of numerical choice sequences is not enumerable. In fa

theory of communication and miscommunication Luigi ANOLLI Abstract: Traditional psychology considers communication in terms of semantic and intentional transparency. This idea should be overcome, since the borderline between what is communicated and what is miscommunicated cannot be split up and partitioned in two separate and discrete domains. The starting point of this chapter is based on the assumption that a viable theory of communication has also to explain miscommunication in its different forms. In this perspective, communication sets up a unique and global category, including miscommunication phenomena, coming to the eventuality of not communicating. In particular, our aim is to outline some general principles that might connect communication and miscommunication processes to each other in a global, parsimonious and coherent theoretical perspective. This chapter intends to sketch out a miscommunication as a chance theory

The paper deals with the development of the informational since the IFIP '71 Congress in Ljubljana when the new consciousness evolved to the necessity of nowadays informational society. A new methodological and technological challenge enters into the view of the future information systems, their design and implementation. The challenge is called informational consciousness- the human and the artificial one. Thirty years ago, at the IFIP '71 Congress in Ljubljana, nobody could foresee the advances in development in the field of the informational, that is, of computational, communicational, methodological, technological, scientific, theoretical, applicative, organizational, and managerial. Thirty years in the informational development is an exceptionally long period of surprise, experience, change, and the evolution of consciousness, although thirty years is only a good half of the average professional working life. No a participant of the the IFIP '71 Congress in Ljubljana could predict the technological and methodological progress happened in the field of computer science, artificial intelligence, and information systems in the last thirty years. Much more surprising than the advance of the theoretical and applied computer science was the revolution in the design and manufacturing of computer technology-hardware and software- setting new standards in application possibilities, operation speed, large memory arrays, net accessibility and net communication. Thus, information processing system and communication

told the following anecdote about a meeting with the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler: Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. ‘Because of my thousandfold experience, ’ he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: ‘And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one fold.’ Although Luhmann formulated with modesty and precaution, for example in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990a, at pp. 412f.), that his theory claims to be a universal one because it is self-referential, the “operational closure ” that follows from this assumption easily generates a

Abstract: A number of conceptions of the continuum are examined from the perspective of conceptual structuralism, a view of the nature of mathematics according to which mathematics emerges from humanly constructed, intersubjectively established, basic structural conceptions. This puts into question the idea from current set theory that the continuum is somehow a uniquely determined concept. Key words: the continuum, structuralism, conceptual structuralism, basic structural conceptions, Euclidean geometry, Hilbertian geometry, the real number system, settheoretical conceptions, phenomenological conceptions, foundational conceptions, physical conceptions. 1. What is the continuum? On the face of it, there are several distinct forms of the continuum as a mathematical concept: in geometry, as a straight line, in analysis as the real number system (characterized in one of several ways), and in set theory as the power set of the natural numbers and, alternatively, as the set of all infinite sequences of zeros and ones. Since it is common to refer to the continuum, in what sense are these all instances of the same concept? When one speaks of the continuum in current settheoretical

Abstract. The paper deals with the development of the informational since the IFIP 1971 Congress in Ljubljana when the new consciousness evolved to the necessity of nowadays informational society. A new methodological and technological challenge enters into the view of the future information systems, their design and implementation. The challenge is called informational consciousness the human and the arti cial one. Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning! Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me to speak to the International Conference concerning the Field of Information Systems in Europe, and particularly in the Middle Europe and Eastern Europe, and worldwide. The