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Methods for Task Allocation Via Agent Coalition Formation
, 1998
"... Task execution in multiagent environments may require cooperation among agents. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents that will perform the task. Task allocation to groups of agents is nece ..."
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Cited by 271 (21 self)
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Task execution in multiagent environments may require cooperation among agents. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents that will perform the task. Task allocation to groups of agents is necessary when tasks cannot be performed by a single agent. However it may also be beneficial when groups perform more efficiently with respect to the single agents' performance. In this paper we present several solutions to the problem of task allocation among autonomous agents, and suggest that the agents form coalitions in order to perform tasks or improve the efficiency of their performance. We present efficient distributed algorithms with low ratio bounds and with low computational complexities. These properties are proven theoretically and supported by simulations and an implementation in an agent system. Our methods are based on both the algorithmic aspects of combinatorics and approximat...
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
, 1983
"... this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is one of ..."
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Cited by 80 (6 self)
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this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is one of the primitive features of our analysis. A companion article no. ET962236 00220531#97 #25.00 Copyright # 1997 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
Coalition formation among autonomous agents: Strategies and complexity
, 1993
"... . Autonomous agents are designed to reach goals that were predefined by their operators. An important way to execute tasks and to maximize payoff is to share resources and to cooperate on task execution by creating coalitions of agents. Such coalitions will take place if, and only if, each member o ..."
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Cited by 44 (10 self)
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. Autonomous agents are designed to reach goals that were predefined by their operators. An important way to execute tasks and to maximize payoff is to share resources and to cooperate on task execution by creating coalitions of agents. Such coalitions will take place if, and only if, each member of a coalition gains more if he joins the coalition than he could gain before. There are several ways to create such coalitions and to divide the joint payoff among the members. Variance in these methods is due to different environments, different settings in a specific environment, and different approaches to a specific environment with specific settings. In this paper we focus on the cooperative (superadditive) environment, and suggest two different algorithms for coalition formation and payoff distribution in this environment. We also deal with the complexity of both computation and communication of each algorithm, and we try to give designers some basic tools for developing agents for th...
Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among BoundedRational SelfInterested Agents
 Journal of Logic and Computation
, 1999
"... This paper studies coalition formation among selfinterested agents that cannot make sidepayments. We show that alphacore stability reduces to analyzing whether some utility profile is maximal for all agents. We also show that strategy profiles that lead to the alphacore are a subset of Strong Nas ..."
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Cited by 31 (5 self)
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This paper studies coalition formation among selfinterested agents that cannot make sidepayments. We show that alphacore stability reduces to analyzing whether some utility profile is maximal for all agents. We also show that strategy profiles that lead to the alphacore are a subset of Strong Nash equilibria. This fact carries our alphacorebased stability results directly over to two other strategic solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and CoalitionProof Nash equilibrium.
Corestable bidding rings
, 2009
"... We propose a semicooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, which are achieved at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (coo ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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We propose a semicooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, which are achieved at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is corestable if the core of a specific characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders’ final utility possibly depends on the winner’s identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels’ structures (not) observed in practice.
Coral Games and the Core of Cores
, 2007
"... Casual observation reveals that groups of people interact on many levels simultaneously. Examples include political party formation and interaction; the interaction of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds in the Government of Iraq; and labor union and confederation formation. In this paper, a model of hierarchic ..."
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Casual observation reveals that groups of people interact on many levels simultaneously. Examples include political party formation and interaction; the interaction of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds in the Government of Iraq; and labor union and confederation formation. In this paper, a model of hierarchical group structures is developed. The model generalizes the existing coalitional theory in several ways and reveals a new connection between characteristic and partition function theories; that they are both valuable components of an overall theory. The stability concept that emerges is called the core of cores. Several results are presented, including necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the core of cores and a theorem that demonstrates the relationship between the cores of each level of the organizational structure and the core of cores. The results establish that stability can arise from any combination of stable and unstable components, and suggest a rethinking of existing coalitional models, taking into account the effect of “nearby” games. The framework developed here has immediate applications to various topics in political economy and industrial organization, such as representative voting and corporate mergers.