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Gametheoretic security for bit commitment
 In 8th International Workshop on Security (IWSEC 2013
, 2013
"... Abstract. Higo, Tanaka, Yamada, and Yasunaga (ACISP 2012) studied oblivious transfer (OT) from a gametheoretic viewpoint in the malicious model. Their work can be considered as an extension of the study on twoparty computation in the failstop model by Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay (EUROCRYPT 2011). ..."
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Abstract. Higo, Tanaka, Yamada, and Yasunaga (ACISP 2012) studied oblivious transfer (OT) from a gametheoretic viewpoint in the malicious model. Their work can be considered as an extension of the study on twoparty computation in the failstop model by Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay (EUROCRYPT 2011). This paper focuses on bit commitment, and continues to study it from a perspective of game theory. In a similar manner to the work on OT, we consider bit commitment in the malicious model. In order to naturally capture the security properties of bit commitment, we characterize them with a single game where both parties are rational. In particular, we define a security notion from a game theoretic viewpoint, and prove the equivalence between it and the standard security notion.
Distributed Computing Building Blocks for Rational Agents
"... Following [4] we extend and generalize the gametheoretic model of distributed computing, identifying different utility functions that encompass different potential preferences of players in a distributed system. A good distributed algorithm in the gametheoretic context is one that prohibits the ag ..."
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Following [4] we extend and generalize the gametheoretic model of distributed computing, identifying different utility functions that encompass different potential preferences of players in a distributed system. A good distributed algorithm in the gametheoretic context is one that prohibits the agents (processors with interests) from deviating from the protocol; any deviation would result in the agent losing, i.e., reducing its utility at the end of the algorithm. We distinguish between different utility functions in the context of distributed algorithms, e.g., utilities based on communication preference, solution preference, and output preference. Given these preferences we construct two basic building blocks for game theoretic distributed algorithms, a wakeup building block resilient to any preference and in particular to the communication preference (to which previous wakeup solutions were not resilient), and a knowledge sharing building block that is resilient to any and in particular to solution and output preferences. Using the building blocks we present several new algorithms for consensus, and renaming as well as a modular presentation of the leader election algorithm of [4].