Abstract—We present a simple and fast method for conducting end to end voting and allowing public verification of correctness of the announced vote tallying results. In the present note voter privacy protection is achieved by use of a simple form of distributing the tallying of votes and creation of a verifiable proof of correctness amongst several servers, combined with random representations of integers as sums mod M of two values. At the end of vote tallying process, random permutations of the cast votes are publicly posted in the clear, without identification of voters or ballot ids. Thus vote counting and assurance of correct form of cast votes are directly available. Also, a proof of the claim that the revealed votes are a permutation of the concealed cast votes is publicly posted and verifiable by any interested party. We present two versions of the method, one assuring voter privacy and proof of correctness in the presence of information leaking

This study provides a proof-of-concept of a newly designed verifiable voting system. The implementation elicits details in the communication and synchronization among servers, unavailable in the original design paper [M. O. Rabin and R. L. Rivest, "Efficient End to End Verifiable Electronic Voting Employing Split Value Representations. " in Proc. EVOTE ’14, Bregenz, Austria.]. The implemented system was tested on networks of virtual machines in a cluster, and its performance was evaluated based on the computational time and amount of data transferred. The preliminary results simulates elections with up to ten thousand votes. The team will conduct further work to implement the handling of server failures and the secure channels among the servers. This study demonstrates the feasibility of running large elections with more transparent voting systems, by leveraging the split-value representation and simple cryptographic primitives.