One way to ensure correctness of the inference performed by computer theorem provers is to force all proofs to be done step by step in a simple, more or less traditional, deductive system. Using techniques pioneered in Edinburgh LCF, this can be made palatable. However, some believe such an approach will never be efficient enough for large, complex proofs. One alternative, commonly called reflection, is to analyze proofs using a second layer of logic, a metalogic, and so justify abbreviating or simplifying proofs, making the kinds of shortcuts humans often do or appealing to specialized decision algorithms. In this paper we contrast the fully-expansive LCF approach with the use of reflection. We put forward arguments to suggest that the inadequacy of the LCF approach has not been adequately demonstrated, and neither has the practical utility of reflection (notwithstanding its undoubted intellectual interest). The LCF system with which we are most concerned is the HOL proof ...

The HOL Light theorem prover can be difficult to get started with. While the manual is fairly detailed and comprehensive, the large amount of background information that has to be absorbed before the user can do anything interesting is intimidating. Here we give an alternative ‘quick start ’ guide, aimed at teaching basic use of the system quickly by means of a graded set of examples. Some readers may find it easier to absorb; those who do not are referred after all to the standard manual. “Shouldn’t we read the instructions?”

The HOL Light theorem prover can be difficult to get started with. While the manual is fairly detailed and comprehensive, the large amount of background information that has to be absorbed before the user can do anything interesting is intimidating. Here we give an alternative ‘quick start ’ guide, aimed at teaching basic use of the system quickly by means of a graded set of examples. Some readers may find it easier to absorb; those who do not are referred after all to the standard manual. “Shouldn’t we read the instructions?”

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ABSTRACT: Formal semantics and pragmatics as they have developed since the late 1960’s have been shaped by fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration among linguists, philosophers, and logicians, among others, and in turn have had noticeable effects on developments in syntax, philosophy of language, computational linguistics, and cognitive science. In this paper I describe the environment in which formal semantics was born and took root, highlighting the differences in ways of thinking about natural language semantics in linguistics and in philosophy and logic. With Montague as a central but not solo player in the story, I reflect on crucial developments in the 1960’s and 70’s in linguistics and philosophy, and the growth of formal semantics and formal pragmatics from there. I discuss innovations, key players, and leading ideas that shaped the development of formal semantics and its relation to syntax, to pragmatics, and to the philosophy of language in its early years, and some central aspects of its early impact on those fields. 1.