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84
Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks
 IEEE Transactions on Communication
, 2000
"... A major challenge in operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With increasing demand for wireless data servic ..."
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Cited by 201 (6 self)
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A major challenge in operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With increasing demand for wireless data services, it is necessary to establish power control algorithms for information sources other than voice. We present a power control solution for wireless data in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework. In this context, the quality of service (QoS) a wireless terminal receives is referred to as the utility and distributed power control is a noncooperative power control game where users maximize their utility. The outcome of the game results in a Nash equilibrium that is ine#cient. We introduce pricing of transmit powers in order to obtain Pareto improvement of the noncooperative power control game, i.e. to obtain improvements in user utilities relative to the case with no pricing. Specifically, we consider a pricing function that is a linear function of the transmit power. The simplicity of the pricing function allows a distributed implementation where the price can be broadcast by the base station to all the terminals. We see that pricing is especially helpful in a heavily loaded system.
Stability of Multipacket Slotted Aloha with Selfish Users and Perfect Information
, 2003
"... Aloha is perhaps the simplest and moststudied medium access control protocol in existence. Only in the recent past, however, have researchers begun to study the performance of Aloha in the presence of selfish users. In this paper, we present a gametheoretic model of multipacket slotted Aloha with ..."
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Cited by 71 (4 self)
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Aloha is perhaps the simplest and moststudied medium access control protocol in existence. Only in the recent past, however, have researchers begun to study the performance of Aloha in the presence of selfish users. In this paper, we present a gametheoretic model of multipacket slotted Aloha with perfect information. We show that this model must have an equilibrium and we characterize this equilibrium. Using the tools of stochastic processes, we then establish the equilibrium stability region for some wellknown channel models.
2000): ”A bargaining model of Collective Choice
 American Political Science Review
"... We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equil ..."
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Cited by 44 (3 self)
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We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters, and core equivalence One of the central findings in the spatial model of social choice is that in two or more dimensions the majority rule core, consisting of those alternatives unbeaten in pairwise majority comparisons, is empty for “most ” profiles of individual preferences. 1 This result extends beyond majority rule to include
Quantum Strategies
, 1999
"... We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). While not every twoperson zerosum finite game has an equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always ..."
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Cited by 39 (1 self)
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We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). While not every twoperson zerosum finite game has an equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always an equilibrium at which each player follows a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy deviating from the equilibrium strategy cannot increase a player's expected payoff. We show by example, however, that a player who implements a quantum strategy can increase his expected payoff, and explain the relation to efficient quantum algorithms. 1998 Physics and Astronomy Classification Scheme: 03.67.a, 03.67.Lx, 02.50.Le. American Mathematical Society Subject Classification: 81P15, 90D05. Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C72. Key Words: quantum computation; game theory. Quantum strategies David A. Meyer Attention to the physical representation of information underlies the recent t...
Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games
 IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special issue on Game Theory for Signal Processing
, 2009
"... Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where intelligent entities (e.g., terminals) interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance to be able to predict and even ensure s ..."
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Cited by 29 (18 self)
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Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where intelligent entities (e.g., terminals) interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance to be able to predict and even ensure such states at which the network will effectively operate. In this article, we provide nonexhaustive methodologies for characterizing equilibria in wireless games in terms of existence, uniqueness, selection and efficiency.
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
, 2000
"... This paper examines competition in the standard onedimensional Downsian model of twocandidate elections, but where one candidate #A# enjoys an advantage over the other candidate #D#. Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to ..."
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Cited by 24 (1 self)
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This paper examines competition in the standard onedimensional Downsian model of twocandidate elections, but where one candidate #A# enjoys an advantage over the other candidate #D#. Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some #xed distance #. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about # and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies. JEL classi#cation numbers: ...
A New Framework For Power Control In Wireless Data Networks: Games, Utility, And Pricing
, 1999
"... We develop a new framework for distributed power control for wireless data based on the economic principles of utility and pricing. Utility is defined as the measure of satisfaction that a user derives from accessing the wireless data network. Properties of utility functions are introduced and a spe ..."
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Cited by 22 (1 self)
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We develop a new framework for distributed power control for wireless data based on the economic principles of utility and pricing. Utility is defined as the measure of satisfaction that a user derives from accessing the wireless data network. Properties of utility functions are introduced and a specific function, based on throughput per terminal battery lifetime including forward error control, is presented and shown to conform to those properties. Users enter into a noncooperative game to maximize their individual utilities by adjusting their transmitter powers. A unique Nash equilibrium for the above game is shown to exist but is not Pareto efficient. A pricing function is then introduced which leads to Pareto improvements for the noncooperative game.
A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: NonSteady States
, 2001
"... We analyze a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and e±ciency never ob ..."
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Cited by 22 (3 self)
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We analyze a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and e±ciency never obtain in equilibrium, even as discounting is removed. This holds whether the asymmetry is twosided or onesided. In some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded. This contrasts with the earlier literature, which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period.
A Bargaining Model for Legislative PolicyMaking
, 2003
"... We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be “bad,” and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. Th ..."
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Cited by 20 (4 self)
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We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be “bad,” and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors: risk aversion of the legislators, the dimensionality of the policy space, the voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse, if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example, then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. This “core selection” result yields a gametheoretic foundation for the wellknown median voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the status quo is close to the core, then equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads to policy moderation).
Power Control in TwoTier Femtocell Networks
, 2008
"... Two tier cellular networks, comprising of a central macrocell underlaid with short range femtocell hotspots offer an economical way to improve cellular capacity. With shared spectrum and lack of coordination between tiers, crosstier interference limits overall capacity. To quantify nearfar effects ..."
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Cited by 14 (2 self)
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Two tier cellular networks, comprising of a central macrocell underlaid with short range femtocell hotspots offer an economical way to improve cellular capacity. With shared spectrum and lack of coordination between tiers, crosstier interference limits overall capacity. To quantify nearfar effects with universal frequency reuse, this paper derives a fundamental relation providing the largest feasible macrocell SignaltoInterferencePlusNoise Ratio (SINR), given any set of feasible femtocell SINRs. A distributed utilitybased SINR adaptation at femtocells is proposed in order to alleviate crosstier interference at the macrocell from overlaid femtocell infrastructure. The FoschiniMiljanic (FM) algorithm is a special case of the adaptation. Each femtocell maximizes its individual utility consisting of a SINR based reward less an incurred cost (interference to the macrocell). Numerical results show greater than 30 % improvement in mean femtocell SINRs relative to FM. In the event that crosstier interference prevents a macrouser from obtaining its SINR target, an algorithm is proposed that adaptively curtails transmission powers of the strongest femtocell interferers. The algorithm ensures that a macrouser achieves its SINR target even with 100 femtocells/cellsite, and requires a worst case SINR reduction of only 16 % at femtocells. These results motivate design of power control schemes requiring minimal network overhead in twotier networks with shared spectrum.