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Fast Hashing on the Pentium
- Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings Crypto'96, LNCS 1109
, 1996
"... With the advent of the Pentium processor parallelization finally became available to Intel based computer systems. One of the design principles of the MD4-family of hash functions (MD4, MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160) is to be fast on the 32-bit Intel processors. This paper shows that carefully coded im ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 35 (4 self)
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With the advent of the Pentium processor parallelization finally became available to Intel based computer systems. One of the design principles of the MD4-family of hash functions (MD4, MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160) is to be fast on the 32-bit Intel processors. This paper shows that carefully coded implementations of these hash functions are able to exploit the Pentium's superscalar architecture to its maximum e#ect: the performance with respect to execution on a non-parallel architecture increases by about 60%. This is an important result in view of the recent claims on the limited data bandwidth of these hash functions.
Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers and Quaternary Codes
- Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT
, 1996
"... . We consider constructions for cryptographic hash functions based on m-bit block ciphers. First we present a new attack on the LOKIDBH mode: the attack finds collisions in 2 3m=4 encryptions, which should be compared to 2 m encryptions for a brute force attack. This attack breaks the last remai ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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. We consider constructions for cryptographic hash functions based on m-bit block ciphers. First we present a new attack on the LOKIDBH mode: the attack finds collisions in 2 3m=4 encryptions, which should be compared to 2 m encryptions for a brute force attack. This attack breaks the last remaining subclass in a wide class of efficient hash functions which have been proposed in the literature. We then analyze hash functions based on a collision resistant compression function for which finding a collision requires at least 2 m encryptions, providing a lower bound of the complexity of collisions of the hash function. A new class of constructions is proposed, based on error correcting codes over GF(2 2 ) and a proof of security is given, which relates their security to that of single block hash functions. For example, a compression function is presented which requires about 4 encryptions to hash an m-bit block, and for which finding a collision requires at least 2 m encryptions...

