This is the manuscript that was published, with only minor copy-editing alterations, as: Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review. 108, 814-834 Copyright 2001, American Psychological Association To obtain a reprint of the final type-set article, please go through your library’s journal services, or contact the author directly Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. Four reasons are given for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as anthropology and primatology. Author notes

The 30th anniversary of The Journal of Portfolio Management is a milestone in the rich intellectual history of modern finance, firmly establishing the relevance of quantitative models and scientific inquiry in the practice of financial management. One of the most enduring ideas from this intellectual history is the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), a deceptively simple notion that has become a lightning rod for its disciples and the proponents of behavioral economics and finance. In its purest form, the EMH obviates active portfolio management, calling into question the very motivation for portfolio research. It is only fitting that we revisit this groundbreaking idea after three very successful decades of this Journal. In this article, I review the current state of the controversy surrounding the EMH and propose a new perspective that reconciles the two opposing schools of thought. The proposed reconciliation, which I call the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH), is based on an evolutionary approach to economic interactions, as well as some recent research in the cognitive neurosciences that has been transforming and revitalizing the intersection of psychology and economics. Although some of these ideas have not yet been fully articulated within a rigorous quantitative framework, long time students of the EMH and seasoned practitioners will no doubt recognize immediately the possibilities generated by this new perspective. Only time will tell whether its potential will be fulfilled. I begin with a brief review of the classic version of the EMH, and then summarize the most significant criticisms leveled against it by psychologists and behavioral economists. I argue that the sources of this controversy can

I use the example of the 2000 US Presidential election to show that political controversies with technical underpinnings are not resolved by technical means. Then, drawing from examples such as climate change, genetically modified foods, and nuclear waste disposal, I explore the idea that scientific inquiry is inherently and unavoidably subject to becoming politicized in environmental controversies. I discuss three reasons for this. First, science supplies contesting parties with their own bodies of relevant, legitimated facts about nature, chosen in part because they help make sense of, and are made sensible by, particular interests and normative frameworks. Second, competing disciplinary approaches to understanding the scientific bases of an environmental controversy may be causally tied to competing value-based political or ethical positions. The necessity of looking at nature through a variety of disciplinary lenses brings with it a variety of normative lenses, as well. Third, it follows from the foregoing that scientific uncertainty, which so often occupies a central place in environmental controversies, can be understood not as a lack of scientific understanding but as the lack of coherence among competing scientific understandings, amplified by the various political, cultural, and institutional contexts within which science is carried out. In light of these observations, I briefly explore the problem of why some types of political controversies become “scientized ” and others do not, and conclude that the value bases of disputes underlying environmental controversies must be fully articulated and adjudicated through political means before science can play an effective role in resolving environmental problems.

and Creative Modeling Modeling is not simply a process of response mimicry as commonly believed. Modeled judgments and actions may differ in specific content but embody the same rule. For example, a model may deal with moral dilemmas that differ widely in the nature of the activity but apply the same moral standard to them. Modeled activities thus convey rules for generative and innovative behavior. This higher level learning is achieved through abstract modeling. Once observers extract the rules underlying the modeled activities they can generate new behaviors that go beyond what they have seen or heard. Creativeness rarely springs entirely from individual inventiveness. A lot of modeling goes on in creativity. By refining preexisting innovations, synthesizing them into new ways and adding novel elements to them something new is created. When exposed to models of differing styles of thinking and behaving, observers vary in what they adopt from the different sources and thereby create ...

Abstract: In my book How the Mind Works, I defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally selected system of organs of computation. Jerry Fodor claims that ‘the mind doesn’t work that way ’ (in a book with that title) because (1) Turing Machines cannot duplicate humans ’ ability to perform abduction (inference to the best explanation); (2) though a massively modular system could succeed at abduction, such a system is implausible on other grounds; and (3) evolution adds nothing to our understanding of the mind. In this review I show that these arguments are flawed. First, my claim that the mind is a computational system is different from the claim Fodor attacks (that the mind has the architecture of a Turing Machine); therefore the practical limitations of Turing Machines are irrelevant. Second, Fodor identifies abduction with the cumulative accomplishments of the scientific community over millennia. This is very different from the accomplishments of human common sense, so the supposed gap between human cognition and computational models may be illusory. Third, my claim about biological specialization, as seen in organ systems, is distinct from Fodor’s own notion of encapsulated modules, so the limitations of the latter are

This article reviews theories of organizational communication with a special emphasis on theories that have been used to explain computer-mediated communication phenomena. Among the theories reviewed, two—social presence and media richness—are identified as problematic and as posing obstacles to future theoretical development. While shortcomings of these theories have been identified in the past, some of these theories ’ predictions have been supported by empirical evidence. It is argued that this theoretical dilemma can be resolved based upon principles derived from a modern version of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection and the application of those principles to the understanding of human evolution. A new theoretical model called the psychobiological model is developed, which predicts variations in cognitive effort in computer-mediated collaborative tasks. The model proposes that there is a negative causal link between the “naturalness ” of a computer-mediated communication medium, which is the similarity of the medium to the face-to-face medium, and the cognitive effort required from an individual using the medium for knowledge transfer. The model also states that this link is counterbalanced by what are referred to as “schema alignment ” and “cognitive adaptation. ” The schema alignment construct refers to the similarity between the mental schemas of an individual and those of other participant(s). The cognitive adaptation construct refers to an individual’s level of schema development associated with the use of a particular medium. Finally, the model states that the degree to which the medium supports an individual’s ability to convey and listen to speech is particularly significant in defining its naturalness, more so than the medium’s degree of

This article defines primary knowledge components for entities, actions, and processes. It also defines primary instructional strategy components. It proposes that a different combination of strategy and knowledge components is required for different kinds of instructional goals. It further proposes that if these fundamental strategy-knowledge component combinations are not present that there will be a decrement in the student's effective and efficient acquisition of the desired knowledge and skill. It further proposes that the underlying architecture of an instructional strategy is a combination of primary strategy components and primary knowledge components appropriate for, and consistent with, a given instructional goal. Instructional components are a theoretical tool. They are not a method or development procedure. These instructional strategy and knowledge components can be imbedded in a wide variety of different instructional architectures based on a variety of different philosophical orientations. It is hoped that one of the primary benefits of instructional components is to provide a common vocabulary that will enable designers, theorists, and instructional developers to more clearly describe their products and procedures.

This report summarizes ten levels of abstraction that together span the continuum from the most elementary to the most general levels when modeling biological systems. It is shown how the neocybernetic principles can be seen as the key to reaching a holistic view of complex processes in general. Preface Concrete examples help to understand complex systems. In this report, the key point is to illustrate the basic mechanisms and properties of neocybernetic system models. Good visualizations are certainly needed. It is biological systems, or living systems, that are perhaps the most characteristic examples of cybernetic systems. This intuition is extended here to natural systems in general — indeed, it is all other than man-made ones that seem to be cybernetic. The word “biological ” in the title should be interpreted as “bio-logical ” — referring to general studies of any living systems, independent of the phenosphere. Starting from the concrete examples, connections to more abstract systems are found, and the discussions become more and more all-embracing in this text. However, the neocybernetic model framework still makes it possible to conceptually master the complexity. There is more information about neocybernetics available in Internet — also this report is available there in electronic form:

This article reviews theoretical research on e-communication behavior, identifying two main types of theories – technological and social. This review provides the rationale for developing a new theory, based on Darwin’s theory of evolution, that is neither technological nor social. Three theoretical principles are developed from evolution theory: media naturalness, innate schema similarity, and learned schema variety. The article concludes by illustrating how the theoretical principles can be used as a basis for developing a simple predictive model in the context of an online broker.

Progress towards understanding human behavior has been hindered by discipline-bound theories, dividing our efforts. Fortunately, these separate endeavors are converging and can be effectively integrated. Focusing on the fundamental features of Picoeconomics, Expectancy, Cumulative Prospect Theory, and Need Theory, Temporal Motivational Theory (TMT) is constructed. TMT appears consistent with the major findings from many other investigations, including psychobiology. Potential applications of TMT are numerous, including: consumer behavior, aggression, stock market, and governmental behavior.