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Hierarchies Of Generalized Kolmogorov Complexities And Nonenumerable Universal Measures Computable In The Limit
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 2000
"... The traditional theory of Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability focuses on monotone Turing machines with oneway writeonly output tape. This naturally leads to the universal enumerable SolomonoLevin measure. Here we introduce more general, nonenumerable but cumulatively enumerable m ..."
Abstract

Cited by 40 (21 self)
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The traditional theory of Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability focuses on monotone Turing machines with oneway writeonly output tape. This naturally leads to the universal enumerable SolomonoLevin measure. Here we introduce more general, nonenumerable but cumulatively enumerable measures (CEMs) derived from Turing machines with lexicographically nondecreasing output and random input, and even more general approximable measures and distributions computable in the limit. We obtain a natural hierarchy of generalizations of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity, suggesting that the "true" information content of some (possibly in nite) bitstring x is the size of the shortest nonhalting program that converges to x and nothing but x on a Turing machine that can edit its previous outputs. Among other things we show that there are objects computable in the limit yet more random than Chaitin's "number of wisdom" Omega, that any approximable measure of x is small for any x lacking a short description, that there is no universal approximable distribution, that there is a universal CEM, and that any nonenumerable CEM of x is small for any x lacking a short enumerating program. We briey mention consequences for universes sampled from such priors.
Algorithmic Theories Of Everything
, 2000
"... The probability distribution P from which the history of our universe is sampled represents a theory of everything or TOE. We assume P is formally describable. Since most (uncountably many) distributions are not, this imposes a strong inductive bias. We show that P(x) is small for any universe x lac ..."
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Cited by 32 (15 self)
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The probability distribution P from which the history of our universe is sampled represents a theory of everything or TOE. We assume P is formally describable. Since most (uncountably many) distributions are not, this imposes a strong inductive bias. We show that P(x) is small for any universe x lacking a short description, and study the spectrum of TOEs spanned by two Ps, one reflecting the most compact constructive descriptions, the other the fastest way of computing everything. The former derives from generalizations of traditional computability, Solomonoff’s algorithmic probability, Kolmogorov complexity, and objects more random than Chaitin’s Omega, the latter from Levin’s universal search and a natural resourceoriented postulate: the cumulative prior probability of all x incomputable within time t by this optimal algorithm should be 1/t. Between both Ps we find a universal cumulatively enumerable measure that dominates traditional enumerable measures; any such CEM must assign low probability to any universe lacking a short enumerating program. We derive Pspecific consequences for evolving observers, inductive reasoning, quantum physics, philosophy, and the expected duration of our universe.