We give a general analysis of a class of pairs of positive self-adjoint operators A and B for which A + XB has a limit (in strong resolvent sense) as h-10 which is an operator A, # A! Recently, Klauder [4] has discussed the following example: Let A be the operator-(d2/A2) + x2 on L2(R, dx) and let B = 1 x 1-s. The eigenvectors and eigenvalues of A are, of course, well known to be the Hermite functions, H,(x), n = 0, l,... and E, = 2n + 1. Klauder then considers the eigenvectors of A + XB (A> 0) by manipulations with the ordinary differential equation (we consider the domain questions, which Klauder ignores, below). He finds that the eigenvalues E,(X) and eigenvectors &(A) do not converge to 8, and H, but rather AO) + (en 4 Ho+, J%(X)-+ gn+1 I n = 0, 2,..., We wish to discuss in detail the general phenomena which Klauder has uncovered. We freely use the techniques of quadratic forms and strong resolvent convergence; see e.g. [3], [5]. Once one decides to analyze Klauder’s phenomenon in the language of quadratic forms, the phenomenon is quite easy to understand and control. In fact, the theory is implicit in Kato’s book [3, VIII.31.

economics, rationality Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status quo alternative-that is, doing noth-ing or maintaining one’s current or previous decision. A series of decision-making experiments shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo. Data on the selections of health plans and retirement programs by faculty members reveal that the status quo bias is substantial in important real decisions. Economics, psychology, and decision theory provide possible explanations for this bias. Ap-plications are discussed ranging from marketing techniques, to industrial organization, to the advance of science. “To do nothing is within the power of all men.”

Abstract not found

This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect the incentive to settle and with the proper disagreement jfoint chosen. The results provide a guide for the application of the Nash bar-gaining solution in economic modelling. 1.

Trust is a judgement of unquestionable utility — as humans we use it every day of our lives. However, trust has suffered from an imperfect understanding, a plethora of definitions, and informal use in the literature and in everyday life. It is common to say “I trust you, ” but what does that mean? This thesis provides a clarification of trust. We present a formalism for trust which provides us with a tool for precise discussion. The formalism is implementable: it can be embedded in an artificial agent, enabling the agent to make trust-based decisions. Its applicability in the domain of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) is raised. The thesis presents a testbed populated by simple trusting agents which substantiates the utility of the formalism. The formalism provides a step in the direction of a proper understanding and definition of human trust. A contribution of the thesis is its detailed exploration of the possibilities of future work in the area. Summary 1. Overview This thesis presents an overview of trust as a social phenomenon and discusses it formally. It argues that trust is: • A means for understanding and adapting to the complexity of the environment. • A means of providing added robustness to independent agents. • A useful judgement in the light of experience of the behaviour of others. • Applicable to inanimate others. The thesis argues these points from the point of view of artificial agents. Trust in an artificial agent is a means of providing an additional tool for the consideration of other agents and the environment in which it exists. Moreover, a formalisation of trust enables the embedding of the concept into an artificial agent. This has been done, and is documented in the thesis. 2. Exposition There are places in the thesis where it is necessary to give a broad outline before going deeper. In consequence it may seem that the subject is not receiving a thorough treatment, or that too much is being discussed at one time! (This is particularly apparent in the first and second chapters.) To present a thorough understanding of trust, we have proceeded breadth first in the introductory chapters. Chapter 3 expands, depth first, presenting critical views of established researchers.

Abstract not found

This paper is an exploratory and tentative study of the specific differentia of medical care as the object of normativeconomics. It is contended here, on the basis of comparison of obvious characteristics of the medical-care industry with the norms of welfare economics,

We review studies conducted by ourselves and coauthors that document a "self-serving " bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations. We discuss experimental evidence showing that (a) the bias causes impasse; (b) it is possible to reduce impasses by debiasing bargainers; and (c) the bias results from selective evaluation of information. We also review results from a field study of negotiations between teachers ' unions and school boards in Pennsylvania that both documents the fairness bias in a naturalistic setting and demonstrates its impact on strikes. A major unsolved riddle facing the social sciences is the cause of impasse in negotiations. The consequences of impasse are evident in the amount of private and public resources spent on civil litigation, the costs of labor unrest, the psychic and pecuniary wounds of domestic strife, and in clashes between religious, ethnic and regional groups. Impasses in these settings are not only pernicious, but somewhat paradoxical since negotiations typically unfold over long periods of time, offering ample opportunities for interaction between the parties. Economists, and more specifically, game theorists, typically attribute delays in settlement to incomplete information. Bargainers possess private information about factors such as their alternatives to negotiated agreements and costs to delay, causing the bargainers to be mutually uncertain about the other side's reservation value. Uncertainty produces impasse because bargainers use costly delays to signal to

Abstract not found

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at