We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN THE THEORY of the firm, raised by Coase ~1937! more than 60 years ago, is how decisions taken inside a hierarchy differ from those taken in the marketplace. Coase suggested that decisions within a hierarchy are determined by power considerations rather than relative prices. If this is indeed the case, why, and when, does the hierarchy dominate

We study shareholder returns for firms that acquired five or more public, private, and0or subsidiary targets within a short time period. Since the same bidder chooses different types of targets and methods of payment, any variation in returns must be due to the characteristics of the target and the bid. Results indicate bidder shareholders gain when buying a private firm or subsidiary but lose when purchasing a public firm. Further, the return is greater the larger the target and if the bidder offers stock. These results are consistent with a liquidity discount, and tax and control effects in this market. Takeovers are one of the most important events in corporate finance, both for a firm and the economy. Extensive research has shown that shareholders in target firms gain significantly and that wealth is created at the announcement of takeovers ~i.e., combined bidder and target returns are positive!. However, we know much less about the effects of takeovers on the shareholders of acquiring firms. Evidence suggests that these shareholders earn,

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The literature on conditional event-study methods criticizes standard event-study procedures as being misspecified if events are voluntary and investors are rational. We argue, however, that standard procedures (1) lead to statistically valid inferences, under conditions described in this article; and (2) are often a superior means of inference, even when event-study data are generated exactly as per a class of rational expectations specifications introduced by the conditional methods literature. Our results provide an equilibrium justification for traditional eventstudy methods, and we suggest how these simple procedures may be combined with conditional methods to improve statistical power in event studies. I am grateful to Stephen Brown, my dissertation chairman, for stimulating my interest in the topic, his guidance, and numerous valuable suggestions. Thanks are also due to Franklin Allen (the executive editor), Yakov Amihud,

: This study examines how interest rates and interest-rate exposures affect the level of acquisition activity, the identities of targets and acquirers, and the pricing of acquisitions in the banking industry. Using a sample of 477 large mergers from 1980 to 1994, we find that the level of acquisition activity is more negatively correlated with interest rates and more positively correlated with yield curve spreads for banks than for non-banks. Although we find that targets and acquirers have significantly different interest-rate exposures, we find little evidence that one group is consistently better or worse positioned, ex post, for various interest-rate environments. Finally, we find evidence that merger pricing is a function of the interest-rate environment, with acquirers paying higher prices and earning lower returns when rates are lower (and when more deals are announced.) I. Introduction Bank executives and industry analysts would readily agree that interest-rate expo...

This paper documents a dramatic difference in the abnormal announcement period returns of the first bidder to announce an acquisition attempt in a particular industry. Typical of the literature, the set of all bidders in our sample earn abnormal returns indistinguishable from zero. However, bidders announcing an acquisition after a ‘dormant period ’ of at least a year without such activity in their industry, earn significantly positive abnormal returns of 0.8%. This contrasts with the insignificantly negative returns earned by bidders with shorter industry dormant periods. We also document that the prices of subsequent bidders adjust proportionately to returns of the initial bidder at the time of that initial announcement. In addition, bidder abnormal returns are significantly positively related to the length of the dormant period. These results provide strong evidence in support of the anticipation hypothesis. Our results hold after controlling for variables typically associated with bidding firm returns. 2 Anticipation Acquisitions and the Bidder Return Puzzle

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Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s). Papers may only be downloaded for personal use only. The Diversification Discount Puzzle:

Fund managers are the primary investment decision-makers in the stock market, and corporate executives are their primary sources of information. Meetings between the two are therefore central to stock market investment decisions but are surprisingly under-researched. There is little in the academic literature concerning their aims, content and outcomes. We report findings from interview research conducted with chief financial officers (CFOs) and investor relations managers from FTSE 100 companies and with chief investment officers (CIOs) and fund managers (FMs) from large institutional investors. Of particular interest we note that FMs place great reliance on discounted cash flow valuation models (despite informational asymmetry in favour of CFOs). This leads the former to seek to control encounters with the latter and to place great store on the clarity and consistency of corporate messages, ultimately relying on them for purposes other than estimating fundamental value. We consider some of the consequences of this usage.

The wealth effects of labor representation on the board – evidence from German codetermination legislation *