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114
Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations
, 2004
"... We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are ..."
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Cited by 87 (12 self)
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We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.
Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
 Review of Economic Studies
, 2002
"... We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantitysetting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) following the exemplary firm, and (3) belief learning. Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Courn ..."
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Cited by 69 (5 self)
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We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantitysetting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) following the exemplary firm, and (3) belief learning. Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the CournotNash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments. Each of these treatments is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, dynamic rules, and outcomes.
Learning in Cournot Oligopoly  An Experiment
, 1997
"... This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behavior i ..."
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Cited by 49 (13 self)
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This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behavior, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behavior.
Does information about competitors’ actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?
, 1998
"... ..."
Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning
, 1999
"... This paper presents a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of higher payoffs, subject to random error. This process produces a probability distribution of players' decisions whose evolution over time is determined by the FokkerPlanck equation. The dynamic proce ..."
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Cited by 27 (13 self)
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This paper presents a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of higher payoffs, subject to random error. This process produces a probability distribution of players' decisions whose evolution over time is determined by the FokkerPlanck equation. The dynamic process is stable for all potential games, a class of payoff structures that includes several widely studied games. In equilibrium, the distributions that determine expected payoffs correspond to the distributions that arise from the logit function applied to those expected payoffs. This "logit equilibrium" forms a stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium and provides a possible explanation of anomalous laboratory data.
Imitation  Theory and experimental evidence
, 2004
"... We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is ..."
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Cited by 22 (6 self)
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We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Aggregate Comparative Statics
 CEPR DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 7254
, 2011
"... In aggregative games, each player’s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics ca ..."
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Cited by 14 (5 self)
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In aggregative games, each player’s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. In most of these situations, the behavior of the aggregate is of interest both directly and also indirectly because the comparative statics of the actions of each player can be obtained as a function of the aggregate. In this paper, we provide a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of aggregative games: (1) aggregative of games with strategic substitutes and (2) “nice ” aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which “positive shocks ” to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. We show how this framework can be applied to a variety of examples and how this enables more general and stronger comparative static results than typically obtained in the literature.
Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
, 2002
"... VegaRedondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasisubmodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, CommonPool Resource games, RentSeeking games ..."
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Cited by 13 (3 self)
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VegaRedondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasisubmodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, CommonPool Resource games, RentSeeking games and generalized NashDemand games.