Abstract not found

A given Boolean function has its input distributed among many parties. The aim is to determine which parties to tMk to and what information to exchange with each of them in order to evaluate the function while minimizing the total communication. This paper shows that it is possible to obtain the Boolean answer deterministically with only a polynomial increase in communication with respect to the information lower bound given by the nondeterministic communication complexity of the function.

Publishing data about individuals without revealing sensitive information about them is an important problem. In recent years, a new definition of privacy called k-anonymity has gained popularity. In a k-anonymized dataset, each record is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records with respect to certain “identifying ” attributes. In this paper we show using two simple attacks that a k-anonymized dataset has some subtle, but severe privacy problems. First, an attacker can discover the values of sensitive attributes when there is little diversity in those sensitive attributes. This kind of attack is a known problem [60]. Second, attackers often have background knowledge, and we show that k-anonymity does not guarantee privacy against attackers using background knowledge. We give a detailed analysis of these two attacks and we propose a novel and powerful privacy criterion called ℓ-diversity that can defend against such attacks. In addition to building a formal foundation for ℓ-diversity, we show in an experimental evaluation that ℓ-diversity is practical and can be implemented efficiently.

In this paper we address the issue of privacy preserving data mining. Specifically, we consider a scenario in which two parties owning confidential databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases, without revealing any unnecessary information. Our work is motivated by the need to both protect privileged information and enable its use for research or other purposes. The

We present general definitions of security for multi-party cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation. The definitions follow the general paradigm of known definitions; yet some substantial modifications and simplifications are introduced. The composition operation is the natural `subroutine substitution' operation, formalized by Micali and Rogaway. We consider several standard settings for multi-party protocols, including the cases of eavesdropping, Byzantine, non-adaptive and adaptive adversaries, as well as the information-theoretic and the computational models. In particular, in the computational model we provide the first definition of security of protocols that is shown to be preserved under composition.

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) combines theoretical computer science’s traditional focus on computational tractability with its more recent interest in incentive compatibility and distributed computing. The Internet’s decentralized nature, in which distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, makes DAMD a very natural approach for many Internet problems. This paper first outlines the basics of DAMD and then reviews previous DAMD results on multicast cost sharing and interdomain routing. The remainder of the paper describes several promising research directions and poses some specific open problems.

We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some well-known key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being

Abstract not found

Reliable and atomic group multicast have been pro-posed as fundamental communication paradigms to sup-port secure distributed computing in systems in which processes may behave maliciously. These protocols en-able messages to be multicast to a group of processes, while ensuring that all honest group members deliver the same messages and, in the case of atomic multi-cast, deliver these messages in the same order. We present new reliable and atomic group multicast pro-tocols for asynchronous distributed systems. We also describe their implementation as part of Rampart, a toolkit for building high-integrily distributed services, i.e., services that remain correct and available despite the corruption of some component servers by an at-tacker. To our knowledge, Rampart is the first system to demonstrate reliable and atomic group multicast in asynchronous systems subject to process corruptions. 1

Abstract. We introduce a new approach to multiparty computation (MPC) basing it on homomorphic threshold crypto-systems. We show that given keys for any sufficiently efficient system of this type, general MPC protocols for n parties can be devised which are secure against an active adversary that corrupts any minority of the parties. The total number of bits broadcast is O(nk|C|), where k is the security parameter and |C | is the size of a (Boolean) circuit computing the function to be securely evaluated. An earlier proposal by Franklin and Haber with the same complexity was only secure for passive adversaries, while all earlier protocols with active security had complexity at least quadratic in n. We give two examples of threshold cryptosystems that can support our construction and lead to the claimed complexities. 1