Results 1 
3 of
3
Explicit Provability And Constructive Semantics
 Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
, 2001
"... In 1933 G odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G odel's provability calculus is nothing b ..."
Abstract

Cited by 114 (22 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In 1933 G odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G odel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves G odel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a BrouwerHeytingKolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and #calculus.
Intuitionistic Necessity Revisited
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE LOGIC AT WORK CONFERENCE
, 1996
"... In this paper we consider an intuitionistic modal logic, which we call IS42 . Our approach is different to others in that we favour the natural deduction and sequent calculus proof systems rather than the axiomatic, or Hilbertstyle, system. Our natural deduction formulation is simpler than other pr ..."
Abstract

Cited by 23 (7 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper we consider an intuitionistic modal logic, which we call IS42 . Our approach is different to others in that we favour the natural deduction and sequent calculus proof systems rather than the axiomatic, or Hilbertstyle, system. Our natural deduction formulation is simpler than other proposals. The traditional means of devising a modal logic is with reference to a model, and almost always, in terms of a Kripke model. Again our approach is different in that we favour categorical models. This facilitates not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability.
On an Intuitionistic Modal Logic
 Studia Logica
, 2001
"... . In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models ..."
Abstract

Cited by 19 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
. In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4, not in the framework of Kripke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability. 1. Introduction Modal logics are traditionally extensions of classical logic with new operators, or modalities, whose operation is intensional. Modal logics are most commonly justified by the provision of an intuitive semantics based upon `possible worlds', an idea originally due to Kripke. Kripke also provided a possible worlds semantics for intuitionistic logic, and so it is natural to consider intuitionistic logic extended with intensional modalities...