Solomonoff's optimal but noncomputable method for inductive inference assumes that observation sequences x are drawn from an recursive prior distribution p(x). Instead of using the unknown p() he predicts using the celebrated universal enumerable prior M() which for all exceeds any recursive p(), save for a constant factor independent of x. The simplicity measure M() naturally implements "Occam's razor " and is closely related to the Kolmogorov complexity of . However, M assigns high probability to certain data that are extremely hard to compute. This does not match our intuitive notion of simplicity. Here we suggest a more plausible measure derived from the fastest way of computing data. In absence of contrarian evidence, we assume that the physical world is generated by a computational process, and that any possibly infinite sequence of observations is therefore computable in the limit (this assumption is more radical and stronger than Solomonoff's).

The traditional theory of Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability focuses on monotone Turing machines with one-way write-only output tape. This naturally leads to the universal enumerable Solomono-Levin measure. Here we introduce more general, nonenumerable but cumulatively enumerable measures (CEMs) derived from Turing machines with lexicographically nondecreasing output and random input, and even more general approximable measures and distributions computable in the limit. We obtain a natural hierarchy of generalizations of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity, suggesting that the "true" information content of some (possibly in nite) bitstring x is the size of the shortest nonhalting program that converges to x and nothing but x on a Turing machine that can edit its previous outputs. Among other things we show that there are objects computable in the limit yet more random than Chaitin's "number of wisdom" Omega, that any approximable measure of x is small for any x lacking a short description, that there is no universal approximable distribution, that there is a universal CEM, and that any nonenumerable CEM of x is small for any x lacking a short enumerating program. We briey mention consequences for universes sampled from such priors.

An old dream of computer scientists is to build an optimally ecient universal problem solver. We show how to solve arbitrary computational problems in an optimal fashion inspired by Kurt Godel's celebrated self-referential formulas (1931). Our Godel machine's initial software includes an axiomatic description of: the Godel machine's hardware, the problem-speci c utility function (such as the expected future reward of a robot), known aspects of the environment, costs of actions and computations, and the initial software itself (this is possible without introducing circularity). It also includes a typically sub-optimal initial problem-solving policy and an asymptotically optimal proof searcher searching the space of computable proof techniques|that is, programs whose outputs are proofs. Unlike previous approaches, the self-referential Godel machine will rewrite any part of its software, including axioms and proof searcher, as soon as it has found a proof that this will improve its future performance, given its typically limited computational resources. We show that self-rewrites are globally optimal|no local minima!|since provably none of all the alternative rewrites and proofs (those that could be found by continuing the proof search) are worth waiting for.