This paper reports on the development and formal certification (proof of semantic preservation) of a compiler from Cminor (a C-like imperative language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a certified compiler is useful in the context of formal methods applied to the certification of critical software: the certification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well.

We present the first verification of full functional correctness for a range of linked data structure implementations, including mutable lists, trees, graphs, and hash tables. Specifically, we present the use of the Jahob verification system to verify formal specifications, written in classical higher-order logic, that completely capture the desired behavior of the Java data structure implementations (with the exception of properties involving execution time and/or memory consumption). Given that the desired correctness properties include intractable constructs such as quantifiers, transitive closure, and lambda abstraction, it is a challenge to successfully prove the generated verification conditions. Our Jahob verification system uses integrated reasoning to split each verification condition into a conjunction of simpler subformulas, then apply a diverse collection of specialized decision procedures,

This paper presents FABLE, a core formalism for a programming language in which programmers may specify security policies and reason that these policies are properly enforced. In FABLE, security policies can be expressed by associating security labels with the data or actions they protect. Programmers define the semantics of labels in a separate part of the program called the enforcement policy. FABLE prevents a policy from being circumvented by allowing labeled terms to be manipulated only within the enforcement policy; application code must treat labeled values abstractly. Together, these features facilitate straightforward proofs that programs implementing a particular policy achieve their high-level security goals. FABLE is flexible enough to implement a wide variety of security policies, including access control, information flow, provenance, and security automata. We have implemented FABLE as part of the LINKS web programming language; we call the resulting language SELINKS. We report on our experience using SELINKS to build two substantial applications, a wiki and an on-line store, equipped with a combination of access control and provenance policies. To our knowledge, no existing framework enables the enforcement of such a wide variety of security policies with an equally high level of assurance. 1

Hoare Type Theory (HTT) combines a dependently typed, higher-order language with monadicallyencapsulated, stateful computations. The type system incorporates pre- and post-conditions, in a fashion similar to Hoare and Separation Logic, so that programmers can modularly specify the requirements and effects of computations within types. This paper extends HTT with quantification over abstract predicates (i.e., higher-order logic), thus embedding into HTT the Extended Calculus of Constructions. When combined with the Hoare-like specifications, abstract predicates provide a powerful way to define and encapsulate the invariants of private state; that is, state which may be shared by several functions, but is not accessible to their clients. We demonstrate this power by sketching a number of abstract data types and functions that demand ownership of mutable memory, including an idealized custom memory manager. 1

This dissertation describes an approach for automatically verifying data structures, focusing on techniques for automatically proving formulas that arise in such verification. I have implemented this approach with my colleagues in a verification system called Jahob. Jahob verifies properties of Java programs with dynamically allocated data structures. Developers write Jahob specifications in classical higher-order logic (HOL); Jahob reduces the verification problem to deciding the validity of HOL formulas. I present a new method for proving HOL formulas by combining automated reasoning techniques. My method consists of 1) splitting formulas into individual HOL conjuncts, 2) soundly approximating each HOL conjunct with a formula in a more tractable fragment and 3) proving the resulting approximation using a decision procedure or a theorem prover. I present three concrete logics; for each logic I show how to use it to approximate HOL formulas, and how to decide the validity of formulas in this logic. First, I present an approximation of HOL based on a translation to first-order logic, which enables the use of existing resolution-based theorem provers. Second, I present an approximation of HOL based on field constraint analysis, a new technique that enables

Abstract. We propose a new language for writing programs with dependent types which can be elaborated into partial Coq terms. This language permits to establish a phase distinction between writing and proving algorithms in the Coq environment. Concretely, this means allowing to write algorithms as easily as in a practical functional programming language whilst giving them as rich a specification as desired and proving that the code meets the specification using the whole Coq proof apparatus. This is achieved by extending conversion to an equivalence which relates types and subsets based on them, a technique originating from the “Predicate subtyping ” feature of PVS and following mathematical convention. The typing judgements can be translated to the Calculus of (Co-)Inductive Constructions (Cic) by means of an interpretation which inserts coercions at the appropriate places. These coercions can contain existential variables representing the propositional parts of the final term, corresponding to proof obligations (or PVS type-checking conditions). A prototype implementation of this process is integrated with the Coq environment. 1

Abstract. This paper illustrates the use of coinductive definitions and proofs in big-step operational semantics, enabling the latter to describe diverging evaluations in addition to terminating evaluations. We show applications to proofs of type soundness and to proofs of semantic preservation for compilers. 1

This article describes the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of a compiler back-end from Cminor (a simple imperative intermediate language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a verified compiler is useful in the context of formal methods applied to the certification of critical software: the verification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.3.1 [Logics and meanings of programs]: Specifying and verifying and reasoning about programs—Mechanical verification; D.2.4 [Software engineering]: Software/program verification—Correctness proofs, formal methods, reliability; D.3.4 [Programming languages]: Processors—Compilers, optimization

We propose an aspect-oriented programming (AOP) language called Aspectual Caml based on a strongly-typed functional language Objective Caml. Aspectual Caml o#ers two AOP mechanisms, namely the pointcut and advice mechanism and the type extension mechanism, which gives similar functionality to the inter-type declarations in AspectJ. Those mechanisms are not simple adaptation of the similar mechanisms in existing AOP languages, but re-designed for common programming styles in functional languages such as type inference, polymorphic types, and curried functions. We implemented a prototype compiler of the language and used the language for separating crosscutting concerns in application programs, including a type system separated from a compiler of a simple language.

This paper reports on the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of CompCert, a compiler from Clight (a large subset of the C programming language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for programming the compiler and for proving its correctness. Such a verified compiler is useful in the context of critical software and its formal verification: the verification of the compiler guarantees that the safety properties proved on the source code hold for the executable compiled code as well. 1.